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Preface
Let’s take a trip down memory lane, to a snowy morning in March 2013. I
had my application interview with Cedric De Jonghe and Dirk Van Hertem,
during which I was amazed by Electa’s track record, and the envisioned topic
for the open Ph.D. position. I would have the opportunity to work on electricity
storage, and do this in collaboration with major companies. As a master student
it is difficult to know whether a job opportunity is “the right one”, but now that
my journey here has come to an end, I can honestly say that the decision to
pursue a Ph.D. degree led to an amazing and intellectually enriching adventure.
I have always felt thankful to be given this opportunity, for which I would like
to thank my supervisor Ronnie Belmans. Ronnie, your ability to position my
research in the bigger picture of power systems definitely contributed to its
quality. Thank you for always being available to meet when I asked to discuss
both content-related and practical topics. While your many responsibilities may
sometimes have led to meetings that were short in duration, they were always
large in impact and a true source of inspiration.
I would also like to sincerely thank all members of the examination committee
for their support and insights. Prof. Wollants, thank you for chairing my
examination committee. Stef Proost, Chris De Groof, Dirk Van Hertem, Cedric
De Jonghe, and Sauleh Siddiqui, thank you for the opportunity to pick your
brains during our periodical meetings, and to steer me in the right direction.
Stef, thank you to challenge my research from an economics point of view, and
Chris, thank you for doing this from a finance and utility’s point of view. Dirk,
thank you for having me as part of your team at the HVDC colloquia and power
meetings, and as a lecturer at the FPS Economy, SMEs, Self-employed, and
Energy. Cedric, I owe you a special thank you. Your ability to find the fine line
between providing sufficient freedom and guidance, and your deep knowledge of
electricity markets, makes you the best possible mentor I could have wished
for. Over the years I have grown to see you as an older brother who I could
always turn to for advice. Sauleh, thank you for your enthusiasm, support,
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and collaboration during and after my research stays at The Johns Hopkins
University. You are an incredibly talented professor with the unique skill to
explain the most complex topics in an easy to understand way.
When talking about my time at The Johns Hopkins University, I also need to
thank Benjamin Hobbs and Daniel Huppmann. Ben, thank you to share your
world-renowned expertise. Our talks helped me in getting a better understanding
of my research. Daniel, just like Sauleh you have the unique skill to convey the
most complex messages in a crystal clear way. Thank you for introducing me to
the wonderful world of equilibrium modeling. I would also like to thank FWO
for providing me with a travel scholarship enabling these adventures.
Kristof De Vos and Frederik Geth deserve a big thank you as well. Kristof,
thank you for making it your life’s work to train the techno-economic researchers
at Electa, knowing that you were around gave me peace of mind in stressful
times. Frederik, you are an amazing researcher, I am grateful you were willing
to pass on your unparalleled knowledge on storage to give me a head start.
I would like to thank all colleagues for the nice atmosphere around the office,
but in particular Arne van Stiphout, Hanspeter Höschle, Glenn Plancke, Koen
Verpoorten, Philippe Van Dievel, Tom Van Acker, Hakan Ergun, Jef Beerten,
Niels Leemput, and Thomas Wijnhoven. A special thanks goes to Arne and
Hanspeter for our many collaborations and fun times on our way to becoming
Doctors, and to Tom and Glenn for their friendship on and off the job and our
talks on shared passions. In addition, I want to thank everyone from the Electa
and EnergyVille secretariat, especially Katleen, for always being there for us.
Finally, thank you Veronica for the skillful computer-related support.
This thesis was largely in cooperation with and funded by Engie, DEME, and
Ackermans & van Haaren. I would like to thank everyone who I interacted with,
but in particular Koen Janssen, Frank Verschraegen, Geert Magerman, Karel
Mendonck, and Wouter Vandekerkhove. Working with you on this challenging
topic was a unique experience, which made me realize that tackling complex
questions for major companies is what I love to do. As such, this collaboration
inspired and excited me to continue my career at The Boston Consulting Group.
Finally, there are some people that deserve to be acknowledged more than
anyone. Thank you to my family, in-laws, and friends, for the most welcome
relaxing moments that allowed me to recharge my batteries. Mama and papa, a
wholehearted thank you for always supporting me in chasing my dreams. Your
warmth and unconditional support enabled me to become the person that I am
today. Last but not least, I need to thank Linde more than words can say. For
taking on this challenge like it was your own, for your support in stressful times,
and for loving me unconditionally. I am truly blessed having you by my side.
Abstract
Electricity is a real-time product. Supply and demand, or generation and
consumption, have to match exactly at any instance to support the stable
operation of the power system. This results from the fact that electricity is
not economically storable on a large scale. While this is challenged by techno-
economic developments leading to increased and improved storage capacities,
storage levels remain well below that of other energy commodities. In addition,
in light of the growing importance of sustainability, there is an ongoing transition
towards variable renewable energy sources. Their limited controllability and
predictability result in an increasing need for flexibility, which is the ability to
provide power adjustments to compensate for temporary imbalances between
generation and consumption. At the same time, the flexibility offered by the
generation side is threatened by closure of conventional power plants that are
currently experiencing decreasing profitability. While flexibility can also be
provided by flexible supply, flexible demand, and the electric grid, electricity
storage is expected to play an important role to fill the flexibility gap.
This thesis studies the participation and modeling, and role and value, of
electricity storage in short-term electricity markets, including day-ahead and
intra-day energy markets, and real-time balancing markets. These markets are
important tools to deal with the variability in the system, in which the need for
flexibility is expressed and its provision is valorized. As such, they are becoming
increasingly important with the ongoing integration of variable renewables. The
geographical scope includes Belgium and the Central Western European region,
including the French, German, and Dutch market zones next to that of Belgium.
First, the concept of electricity storage is discussed, along with a quantitative
study on the role, value, and benefits of storage in the transition to, and operation
of, highly renewable power systems. The former includes a discussion on the
definition of electricity storage, applications for which storage systems can be
used, techno-economic parameters by which storage systems can be characterized,
and storage technologies that are often considered for grid integration. The
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latter includes the presentation of a system-wide generation expansion planning
model that decides on the cost-minimizing generation mix and scheduling to
meet the demand for energy and frequency control, subject to detailed operating
requirements and constraints. This model is applied to a test system to derive
system-independent and broadly-applicable insights on the role and value of
storage, and the interdependency of flexibility sources.
Second, since understanding short-term markets is essential for analyses
related to flexibility, their design rules are studied in detail along with the
implications for flexibility. This is done for the four market zones of the Central
Western European region, and provides insight in whether flexibility is treated
consistently and appropriately among the different markets, both in time and
in space. Where appropriate, desirable future market reforms are indicated.
Third, the storage participation, including its trading and operation, in short-
term markets is studied. In a first study, employing storage systems for a
single application is considered, namely day-ahead market arbitrage. A single-
player storage operator perspective is assumed, resulting in a price-based unit
commitment formulation. Detailed operating constraints are considered, and a
new methodology to study the price-effect of storage actions is introduced based
on so-called market resilience functions. This price-effect states that storage
generally reduces price spreads by increasing low prices and decreasing high
prices. In addition, a stepwise approximation to the piecewise linear market
resilience functions is proposed, offering the capability to reduce computation
time while providing accurate lower and upper bounds. The developed models
are applied to Belgian market data to quantify the arbitrage value and price-
effect. Since determining the true value of storage requires the aggregation of
applications, and the co-optimization of these applications to avoid conflicting
uses, in a second study the day-ahead market arbitrage models are extended
to allow for the aggregation of different arbitrage opportunities in the three
short-term markets. In addition, the price-effect is studied for the intra-day and
real-time markets as well. These models are used to analyze the opportunities for
storage in the three short-term markets and four market zones, while differences
in storage value are traced back to differences in market design.
Fourth, the aggregation of applications can also be achieved through the co-
operation and sharing of storage resources by different players. New markets, or
market products within existing markets, to enable such storage uses, and thus
the decoupling of ownership from operation, can be valuable levers to capture
the true value of storage. The concept of physical storage rights is introduced,
which can be auctioned to different players and entitle the holders to the right
to use storage resources. Based on a case study with Belgian data, the storage
value in a range of fixed a priori allocations is compared to that of allocations
resulting from the proposed auction-based mechanism to show its merits.
Beknopte samenvatting
Elektriciteit is een real-time product. Productie en verbruik moeten op elk
ogenblik in evenwicht zijn om de stabiele uitbating van het elektriciteitssyteem
te garanderen. Dit resulteert uit het feit dat elektriciteit niet eenvoudig
op grote schaal stockeerbaar is. Alhoewel dit gegeven wordt uitgedaagd
door techno-economische ontwikkelingen die resulteren in een verhoogde en
verbeterde opslagcapaciteit, blijft deze ver onder die van andere energiedragers.
Momenteel is er in het kader van duurzaamheid een transitie aan de gang naar
variabele hernieuwbare energiebronnen. Hun beperkte controlleerbaarheid en
voorspelbaarheid leidt tot een groeiende nood aan flexibiliteit, wat de vaardigheid
is om vermogensaanpassingen te doen om tijdelijke onbalansen tussen productie
en verbruik op te vangen. Tegelijkertijd is de flexibiliteit aangeboden door de
productiezijde bedreigd door de sluiting van conventionele centrales als gevolg
van hun dalende winstgevendheid. Alhoewel flexibiliteit ook kan worden voorzien
door flexibele productie en verbruikers, en het elektriciteitsnet, wordt verwacht
dat elektriciteitsopslag een grote rol zal spelen in de flexibiliteitsvoorziening.
Deze thesis bestudeert de deelname en modellering, en rol en waarde, van
opslag in korte-termijn elektriciteitsmarkten, zijnde day-ahead en intra-day
energiemarkten, en real-time balanceringsmarkten. Deze markten zijn belangrijk
om de variabiliteit in het systeem te beheren, waarin de nood aan flexibiliteit
zichtbaar wordt en het aanbod ervan gevaloriseerd. Als zodanig winnen deze
markten aan belang met het groeiende aandeel van hernieuwbare energie. De
geografische scope omvat België en de Centraal-West-Europese regio, bestaande
uit de Franse, Duitse, en Nederlandse marktzones bovenop de Belgische.
Eerst wordt het concept van elektriciteitsopslag toegelicht, waarna een studie
volgt rond de rol en waarde van opslag in de transitie naar, en uitbating
van, hernieuwbare elektriciteitssystemen. De eerste studie handelt rond
de definitie van elektriciteitsopslag, toepassingen waarvoor opslagsystemen
kunnen worden gebruikt, parameters waarmee ze kunnen worden beschreven,
en opslagtechnologiën die typisch voor netintegratie worden beschouwd. De
v
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tweede studie presenteert een planningsmodel dat op systeemniveau de
optimale productiemix en uitbating bepaalt om aan de vraag naar energie en
frequentieregeling te voldoen, gegeven gedetailleerde vereisten en beperkingen
rond uitbating. Het wordt toegepast om systeemonafhankelijke inzichten in de
rol en waarde van opslag, en interactie tussen flexibiliteitsbronnen, te verwerven.
Omdat een goede kennis van het marktkader van de korte-termijnmarkten
essentieel is voor flexibiliteitsanalyses, worden in tweede instantie de marktregels
in detail bestudeerd alsook de implicaties voor flexibiliteit. Dit wordt gedaan
voor de vier marktzones van de Centraal-West-Europese regio, en biedt inzicht
in hoe consistent en correct flexibiliteit behandeld wordt in de verschillende
markten. Waar opportuun worden interessante hervormingen geïdentificeerd.
Nadien wordt de deelname van opslag, zijnde de trading en uitbating, in korte-
termijnmarkten bestudeerd. In eerste instantie wordt een enkele toepassing
bekeken, namelijk day-ahead markt arbitrage. Het genomen perspectief is dat
van een enkele opslaguitbater, wat leidt tot een zogenaamde prijs-gebaseerde
unit commitment formulering. Gedetailleerde beperkingen rond de uitbating
worden beschouwd, alsook wordt er een nieuwe methodologie voorgesteld om het
prijseffect van opslag te bestuderen, gebaseerd op zogenaamde markt resilience
functies. Dit prijseffect houdt in dat opslag typisch prijsverschillen verkleint
door lage prijzen te verhogen en hoge prijzen te verlagen. Er wordt tevens een
trapsgewijze benadering voorgesteld voor de stuksgewijs lineaire markt resilience
functies. Deze benadering kan de rekentijd aanzienlijk verlagen en tegelijk
nauwkeurige boven- en ondergrenzen bekomen. De modellen worden toegepast
op Belgische data om de arbitrage waarde en het prijseffect te kwantificeren.
Aangezien het realiseren van de volledige waarde van opslag de aggregatie
van toepassingen vereist, en de co-optimalisatie van deze diensten omdat zij
conflicterend kunnen zijn, worden in tweede instantie de day-ahead markt
modellen uitgebreid om meerdere arbitrage opportuniteiten in de drie korte-
termijnmarkten te aggregeren. Het prijseffect wordt hier ook voor de intra-day
en real-time markt bekeken. Deze uitgebreide modellen worden gebruikt om de
opportuniteiten voor opslag in de drie korte-termijnmarkten en vier marktzones
te analyseren, en verschillen te linken aan verschillen in marktregels.
De aggregatie van toepassingen kan ook worden bereikt door de co-uitbating
en het delen van opslagmiddelen door verschillende spelers. Nieuwe markten,
of marktproducten, die zulk gebruik, en dus de ontkoppeling van eigendom en
uitbating, mogelijk maken, zijn waardevol om tot de volledige waarde van opslag
te komen. Het concept van fysieke opslagrechten wordt geïntroduceerd, welke
worden geveild aan verschillende spelers en het recht geven om opslagmiddelen
te gebruiken. Gebaseerd op een illustratieve case study wordt de waarde van
het voorgestelde veiling-gebaseerde mechanisme aangetoond door de bijhorende
waarde van opslag te vergelijken met die van een reeks van a priori allocaties.
List of abbreviations
Acronyms
AC Alternating current.
ACE Area control error.
aFRR Automatic frequency restoration reserve.
ATC Available transfer capacity.
BES Battery energy storage.
BRP Balance responsible party.
BSP Balance service provider.
CAES Compressed air energy storage.
CAISO California independent system operator.
CCGT Combined cycle gas turbine.
CO2 Carbon dioxide.
CWE Central Western European.
DA Day-ahead.
DC Direct current.
DSO Distribution system operator.
E2P Energy-to-power.
ENTSO-E European network of transmission system operators for electricity.
ERCOT Electric reliability council of Texas.
FBMC Flow-based market-coupling.
FCR Frequency containment reserve.
FRR Frequency restoration reserve.
FTR Financial transmission right.
GCC Grid control cooperation.
GEP Generation expansion planning.
GNEP Generalized Nash equilibrium problem.
ID Intra-day.
IGCC International grid control cooperation.
KKT Karush-Kuhn-Tucker.
vii
viii LIST OF ABBREVIATIONS
LDC Load duration curve.
MCP Mixed complementarity problem.
mFRR Manual frequency restoration reserve.
MIBEL Iberian electricity market.
MILP Mixed-integer linear program(ming).
MIQP Mixed-integer quadratic program(ming).
MRP Market reference point.
NEP Nash equilibrium problem.
NRV Net regulation volume.
NYISO New York independent system operator.
OCGT Open cycle gas turbine.
OLS Ordinary least squares.
OTC Over-the-counter.
O&M Operation and maintenance.
P2G Power-to-gas.
PBUC Price-based unit commitment.
PCR Price coupling of regions.
PDF Probability density function.
PHS Pumped-hydro storage.
PJM Pennsylvania - New Jersey - Maryland.
PTR Physical transmission right.
PV Photovoltaic.
RES Renewable energy sources.
RLDC Residual load duration curve.
RR Replacement reserve.
RT Real-time.
SI System imbalance.
SMES Superconducting magnetic energy storage.
SOS1 Special ordered set of type 1.
SOS2 Special ordered set of type 2.
s.t. Subject to.
TSO Transmission system operator.
UC Unit commitment.
UPS Uninterruptible power supply.
VOLL Value of lost load.
WACC Weighted average cost of capital.
Battery chemistries
Li-ion Lithium-ion.
NaS Sodium-sulfur.
Pb-acid Lead-acid.
LIST OF ABBREVIATIONS ix
Va-Va Vanadium-vanadium.
Zn-Br Zinc-bromine.
Country codes
BE Belgium.
DE Germany.
FR France.
NL The Netherlands.
UK United Kingdom.
US United States.
SI and base units
J Joule.
kg Kilogram.
l Liter.
s Second.
W Watt.
% Percentage.
e Currency of the eurozone.
Non-SI and non-base units
a Year.
boe Barrel of oil equivalent.
GW Gigawatt.
GWh Gigawatthour.
h Hour.
kW Kilowatt.
kWh Kilowatthour.
m3 Cubic meter.
min Minute.
MW Megawatt.
MWh Megawatthour.
MWq Megawatt quarter-hour.
rpm Revolutions per minute.

List of symbols
In the nomenclature below, the SI or base unit is indicated for the variables
and parameters. Formulas are provided assuming SI and base units as well.
In contrast, input data and results are provided in commonly used units in
power system engineering and power system economics, e.g., MWh instead of J.
Such conversion is performed without notice throughout this thesis. Finally, all
superscripts are descriptor indices, while all subscripts refer to valued indices.
Sets
h ∈ H Hourly time steps.
i ∈ I Injection technologies, I = ID ∪ II.
i ∈ ID Dispatchable injection technologies, ID ⊆ I.
i ∈ II Intermittent injection technologies, II ⊆ I.
k ∈ K Piecewise breakpoints.
k ∈ Kda Piecewise breakpoints for the DA market.
k ∈ Krt Piecewise breakpoints for the RT market.
l ∈ L Players.
o ∈ O Offtake technologies, O = S.
q ∈ Q Quarter-hourly time steps.
q ∈ Qfq First quarter-hours of each considered hour, Qfq ⊂ Q.
r ∈ R Operating reserve categories, R = RU ∪ RD.
r ∈ RD Downward FCR, aFRR, and mFRR, RD ⊂ R.
r ∈ RDA Downward FCR and aFRR, RDA ⊂ RD.
r ∈ RDF Downward FCR, RDF ⊂ RDA.
r ∈ RU Upward FCR, aFRR, and mFRR, RU ⊂ R.
r ∈ RUA Upward FCR and aFRR, RUA ⊂ RU.
r ∈ RUF Upward FCR, RUF ⊂ RUA.
s ∈ S Electricity storage technologies, S ⊆ ID, S = O.
t ∈ T Time stamps.
u ∈ Uh Stepwise steps.
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u ∈ Udaq Stepwise steps for the DA market.
u ∈ Urtq Stepwise steps for the RT market.
w ∈W Minimum up time set.
xl ∈ Xl Feasible strategies in an NEP.
xl ∈ Xl(x-l) Feasible strategies in a GNEP.
z ∈ Z Minimum down time set.
Variables
Binary variables
bh Charge/discharge state [-].
bdaq Charge/discharge state after the DA stage [-].
bidq Charge/discharge state after the ID stage [-].
brtq Charge/discharge state after the RT stage [-].
bbs,daq Buy/sell state in the DA market [-].
bbs,id,chq Buy/sell state in the hourly continuous ID market [-].
bbs,id,cqq Buy/sell state in the quarter-hourly continuous ID market [-].
bbs,id,aqq Buy/sell state in the auction-based ID market [-].
biq Positive/negative imbalance state [-].
bpwh,k Piecewise segment indicator [-].
bswh,u Stepwise step indicator [-].
bsw,daq,u Stepwise step indicator for the DA market [-].
bsw,rtq,u Stepwise step indicator for the RT market [-].
Dual variables
µcl,h Dual to the charge power constraint [e/(s·W)].
µch Price of charge power rights [e/(s·W)].
µct Price of charge power rights [e/(s·W)].
µc Price of charge power rights [e/(s·W)].
µdl,h Dual to the discharge power constraint [e/(s·W)].
µdh Price of discharge power rights [e/(s·W)].
µdt Price of discharge power rights [e/(s·W)].
µd Price of discharge power rights [e/(s·W)].
µel,h Dual to the storage capacity constraint [e/(s·J)].
µeh Price of storage capacity rights [e/(s·J)].
µet Price of storage capacity rights [e/(s·J)].
µe Price of storage capacity rights [e/(s·J)].
γel,h Dual to the intertemporal energy buffer constraint [e/(s·J)].
LIST OF SYMBOLS xiii
γgl,h Dual to the available renewable power constraint [e/(s·W)].
γll,h Dual to the imbalance position constraint [e/(s·W)].
τ cl,h Dual to the charge power rights constraint [e/(s·W)].
τdl,h Dual to the discharge power rights constraint [e/(s·W)].
τ el,h Dual to the storage capacity rights constraint [e/(s·J)].
Free variables
λdah DA price [e/J].
λdaq DA price [e/J].
pil Profit [e/s].
piop Operating profit [e/s].
piopl Operating profit [e/s].
piop,da Operating profit after the DA stage [e/s].
piop,id Operating profit after the ID stage [e/s].
piop,rt Operating profit after the RT stage [e/s].
Positive variables
ccyc Depreciation cost [e/s].
ccycs Depreciation cost [e/s].
ccyc,da Depreciation cost after the DA stage [e/s].
ccyc,id Depreciation cost after the ID stage [e/s].
ccyc,rt Depreciation cost after the RT stage [e/s].
dcl,t Price-quantity demand bid for charge power rights [e/(s·W)-W].
ddl,t Price-quantity demand bid for discharge power rights [e/(s·W)-W].
del,t Price-quantity demand bid for storage capacity rights [e/(s·J)-J].
eh Stored energy [J].
el,h Stored energy [J].
es,h Stored energy [J].
et Stored energy [J].
edaq Stored energy after the DA stage [J].
eidq Stored energy after the ID stage [J].
ertq Stored energy after the RT stage [J].
einsts Installed energy storage capacity [J].
emaxl Storage capacity right [J].
emaxl,h Storage capacity right [J].
emaxl,t Storage capacity right [J].
ncyc Cycling rate [s-1].
ncyc,da Cycling rate after the DA stage [s-1].
xiv LIST OF SYMBOLS
ncyc,id Cycling rate after the ID stage [s-1].
ncyc,rt Cycling rate after the RT stage [s-1].
ninji,h Number of online injection units [-].
noffo,h Number of online offtake units [-].
nsd,inji,h Number of online injection units shutting down [-].
nsd,offo,h Number of online offtake units shutting down [-].
nsdr,injr,i,h Number of online injection units committed to shut down to provide
reserve [-].
nsdr,offr,o,h Number of online offtake units committed to shut down to provide
reserve [-].
nsu,inji,h Number of oﬄine injection units starting up [-].
nsu,offo,h Number of oﬄine offtake units starting up [-].
nsur,injr,i,h Number of oﬄine injection units committed to start up to provide
reserve [-].
nsur,offr,o,h Number of oﬄine offtake units committed to start up to provide
reserve [-].
pb,daq Buy power in the DA market [W].
pb,daq,u Buy power in the DA market [W].
pb,id,chq Buy power in the hourly continuous ID market [W].
pb,id,cqq Buy power in the quarter-hourly continuous ID market [W].
pb,id,aqq Buy power in the auction-based ID market [W].
pch Charge power [W].
pch,u Charge power [W].
pcl,h Charge power [W].
pct Charge power [W].
pc,daq Charge power after the DA stage [W].
pc,idq Charge power after the ID stage [W].
pc,rtq Charge power after the RT stage [W].
pc,maxl Charge power right [W].
pc,maxl,h Charge power right [W].
pc,maxl,t Charge power right [W].
pdh Discharge power [W].
pdh,u Discharge power [W].
pdl,h Discharge power [W].
pdt Discharge power [W].
pd,daq Discharge power after the DA stage [W].
pd,idq Discharge power after the ID stage [W].
pd,rtq Discharge power after the RT stage [W].
pd,maxl Discharge power right [W].
LIST OF SYMBOLS xv
pd,maxl,h Discharge power right [W].
pd,maxl,t Discharge power right [W].
pgl,h Power generation [W].
pi,+q Positive imbalance power [W].
pi,+q,u Positive imbalance power [W].
pi,-q Negative imbalance power [W].
pi,-q,u Negative imbalance power [W].
pinji,h Power injection [W].
pinst,inji Installed injection power rating [W].
pinst,offo Installed offtake power rating [W].
pl,inji,h Power curtailment of injection units [W].
pll,h Power curtailment [W].
plsh Load shedding [W].
poffo,h Power offtake [W].
prd,inji,h Decrease in injection by ramping down injection units [W].
prd,offo,h Decrease in offtake by ramping down offtake units [W].
pru,inji,h Increase in injection by ramping up injection units [W].
pru,offo,h Increase in offtake by ramping up offtake units [W].
ps,daq Sell power in the DA market [W].
ps,daq,u Sell power in the DA market [W].
ps,id,chq Sell power in the hourly continuous ID market [W].
ps,id,cqq Sell power in the quarter-hourly continuous ID market [W].
ps,id,aqq Sell power in the auction-based ID market [W].
psd,inji,h Decrease in injection by shutting down injection units [W].
psd,offo,h Decrease in offtake by shutting down offtake units [W].
psu,inji,h Increase in injection by starting up injection units [W].
psu,offo,h Increase in offtake by starting up offtake units [W].
p+t Positive exogenous power flow [W].
p-t Negative exogenous power flow [W].
rinjr,i,h Reserve provision by injection units [W].
roffr,o,h Reserve provision by offtake units [W].
rs,injr,i,h Reserve provision by online injection units [W].
rs,offr,o,h Reserve provision by online offtake units [W].
rsd,injr,i,h Reserve provision by online injection units by shutting down [W].
rsd,offr,o,h Reserve provision by online offtake units by shutting down [W].
rsu,injr,i,h Reserve provision by oﬄine injection units by starting up [W].
rsu,offr,o,h Reserve provision by oﬄine offtake units by starting up [W].
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sct Quantity supply bid for charge power rights [W].
sdt Quantity supply bid for discharge power rights [W].
set Quantity supply bid for storage capacity rights [J].
βl Cost to obtain physical storage rights [e/s].
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Chapter 1
Introduction
Context, motivation, road towards this thesis, scope,
outline, and contributions
1.1 Context and motivation
Electricity differs fundamentally from other energy commodities (e.g., gas, oil,
coal), as it is very much a real-time (RT) product. The supply and demand, i.e.,
generation and consumption, have to match exactly at every instance to support
the stable operation of the power system and prevent involuntary load shedding
and blackouts. As electricity is not economically storable on such a large scale
as other commodities, generally, electric energy needs to be generated at the
same time as it is consumed (or consumed at the same time as it is generated).
This conventional truth is challenged by new techno-economic developments
leading to increased and improved storage capacities, but even then storage
levels still remain well below that of other energy commodities. To illustrate this,
Table 1.1 compares the currently available storage resources for electricity, gas,
and oil in Belgium, based on data from [1, 2, 3].1 At the Belgian average hourly
electricity consumption rate of 9.4GWh/h, enough electricity can be stored to
meet consumption for 0.6 h.2 For the average hourly gas and oil consumption
rates, storage durations of 421.5 h and 2721.0 h are available, respectively.
1Using a conversion factor of 10 kWh/m3 for gas, and 1629 kWh/boe for oil.
2This does not take into account the installed discharge power rating, which would further
limit this number, thereby making this comparison illustrative.
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Table 1.1: Electricity, gas, and oil consumption rates, storage capacities, and storage
durations, 2015, Belgium.
Electricity Gas Oil
Annual consumption [GWh/a] 82 000.0 151 000.0 393 020.7
Average hourly consumption [GWh/h] 9.4 17.2 44.9
Available storage capacity [GWh] 5.8 7 250.0 122 175.0
Average available storage duration [h] 0.6 421.5 2 721.0
For decades, the electricity industry was centrally planned and operated
by public or private vertically integrated and regulated utilities that had a
geographic monopoly. They were responsible for the generation, transmission,
distribution, and retail of electricity. Due to the promise of efficiency gains
in the form of lower costs and prices, and in line with transitions in other
industries, a liberalization process started, in Europe in the 1990s. In essence,
this liberalization process includes the (1) decoupling of generation and retail
from transmission and distribution, (2) introduction of competition and energy
markets for generation and retail, (3) installation of natural monopolies for
transmission and distribution, (4) organization of balancing markets as a tool
for grid operators to keep the system balanced, and (5) installation of regulators
to monitor both the market-based and regulated activities [4, 5].
In the liberalized era, different players (i.e., generators, traders, retailers,3
aggregators,4 grid operators,5 and large consumers) meet (virtually) in wholesale
energy and balancing markets to see whether a beneficial transaction can be
made that gives them an advantage (or at least no disadvantage) [4]. These
markets have undergone many design changes since the start of the liberalization,
and still undergo such changes at a rapid pace. They can be categorized in long-
term and short-term markets. Energy trading can start up to a few years before
delivery in the long-term forward and future markets, which usually continue
until one day before physical generation and consumption. In contrast, short-
term electricity markets take place from the day-ahead (DA) stage onwards.
These markets include DA, intra-day (ID), and RT balancing markets. In
Europe, the first two are managed by power exchanges, while the third is
operated by the local transmission system operator (TSO) [6].
Historically, electricity was generated by large centralized and controllable
thermal (e.g., gas, oil, coal, nuclear) and hydro power plants to match the
3Retailers buy electricity on the wholesale energy market, and sell it in the retail energy
market to (small) consumers not participating in the wholesale energy market themselves.
4Aggregators gather capacities of consumers, distributed generation, and storage, and
aggregate these to provide services in the wholesale energy and balancing markets.
5Grid operators participate in balancing markets, not in wholesale energy markets.
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inflexible consumption, with the help of fuel storage and pumped-hydro storage
(PHS) to compensate for the variability of consumption and flexibility limitations
of conventional power plants [6]. The consumption was (and largely still is)
inflexible as it was almost completely unresponsive to wholesale energy price
fluctuations, since the latter were not passed on to consumers [7]. Furthermore,
the consumption is variable in two ways: expected variability originates from
daily, weekly, and seasonal patterns, while unexpected variability follows from
its uncertain nature. The inflexibility of conventional generation lies in its
techno-economic operating constraints (i.e., minimum up and down times, start-
up and shut-down costs, minimum load requirements, and ramp rates and costs).
In such conventional power systems, the objective was twofold: achieving both
a reliable and an affordable supply. In contrast, the objective in current power
systems is threefold, with a supply that is reliable, affordable, and sustainable [8].
Trying to meet all three objectives in a balanced way represents the challenge
of current power systems.
In light of the growing importance of sustainability, there is an ongoing
transition towards variable renewable energy sources (RES), i.e., wind turbines
and photovoltaic (PV) systems, challenging the operation of the power
system. Their limited controllability and predictability results in an increasing
need for flexibility, i.e., the ability to provide upward and downward power
adjustments to compensate for temporary imbalances between generation and
consumption [9, 10]. At the same time, the flexibility offered by the generation
side is threatened by closure of conventional power plants that are currently
experiencing decreasing profitability due to lower electricity prices and a limited
number of operating hours, resulting from the so-called merit-order effect of
variable RES with close-to-zero marginal cost [11, 12]. Further, a paradigm
shift is taking place from a situation where generation was dispatched to follow
inflexible consumption at all times, to a situation in which flexibility is provided
by both generation and consumers, the latter through flexible consumption
processes. However, there is a need for electricity storage as well to fill the
remaining flexibility gap, and for the further development of interconnection
capacity and integration of adjacent markets to access flexible resources in
neighboring regions (Fig. 1.1) [13]. All flexibility sources are able to provide
power adjustments by interacting with some kind of energy buffer, and although
they may differ based on technical and economic characteristics, no source is
necessarily superior to another. Their value depends on the chosen application
and accompanying required technical performance, and on the cost [14].
Electricity storage is a subject currently undergoing intense study and debate.
However, this interest is not new. From the 1960s to the 1980s, this was
the case as well, with the vast majority of PHS capacity, which is the most
installed storage technology with ≥ 99% of global capacity, being constructed
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during this period to complement the development of inflexible nuclear power
plants, and due to relatively high fuel costs for peak generators. Since in
the late 1980s and 1990s nuclear development slowed down, and fuel costs for
peak generators decreased, PHS development decreased significantly [15, 16].
Siting difficulties and environmental impact presented additional barriers for
the further development of PHS [17, 18]. The current renaissance of electricity
storage, both in research and industry, can be attributed to a combination of
interesting techno-ecomic developments in storage technologies, and increasing
flexibility needs due to “new” relatively inflexible technologies, i.e., variable
RES. Wind power plants and PV systems are not at all subject to the same
level of operational constraints as nuclear plants, but their inflexibility lies in
their dependence on weather conditions and partial unpredictability. Due to
techno-economic constraints of power plants, and limited ability to foresee RES
generation, outages of power plants and grid elements, and load behavior, it
is in short-term electricity markets where this increased need for flexibility is
most apparent, and where storage is financially rewarded for its flexibility [6].
Intra-regional
Electricity storage
Flexible supply
Flexible demand
Grid capacity
Inter-regional
Electricity storage
Flexible supply
Flexible demand
Figure 1.1: Overview of the three power system flexibility sources, and the grid, which
serves as a “flexibility vehicle” enabling the access to these sources across regions.
The ongoing transition in power systems towards a more sustainable electricity
supply, techno-economic developments in electricity storage technologies, and
continuously changing design of the short-term electricity markets, set the
scene for this work. While pure engineering studies continue to contribute
in decreasing the investment cost, and improving the technical capabilities of
electricity storage technologies and technical aspects of their grid integration, this
work is positioned at the intersection of engineering, economics, and operations
research. It aims to provide novel insights in the participation and modeling
of electricity storage in short-term electricity markets, and power systems in
general, experiencing increasing shares of variable RES in the generation mix.
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1.2 Road towards this thesis
Both electricity markets and electricity storage are key research topics for the
energy groups at KU Leuven, and for EnergyVille, which unites the energy
research of KU Leuven, VITO, imec, and UHasselt. As such, previous works
have been done in both fields by several of my predecessors at Electa,6 many
under the supervision of Ronnie Belmans. This thesis further builds upon
their works. In particular, the dissertations of Leonardo Meeus [19], Leen
Vandezande [20], Cedric De Jonghe [7], Kristof De Vos [21], Frederik Geth [14],
and Arne van Stiphout [22] deserve special mentioning.
As there is a lot of interest in both electricity markets and electricity storage
from industry and policy-makers as well, this thesis benefited from the ample
opportunities at KU Leuven/EnergyVille for interaction with, and exposure to,
such organizations. More specifically, this work has been inspired, and partly
also made possible, by research projects conducted for (1) DEME, Engie, and
Ackermans & van Haaren, and (2) the Belgian Federal Public Service Economy,
SMEs, Self-employed, and Energy.7
International interactions and collaborations have contributed to this thesis
as well. Insights from, and discussions at, conferences, colloquia, courses,
seminars, and symposia, in Germany, Italy, Portugal, the United Kingdom
(UK), and the United States (US), and an extended period abroad as visiting
researcher in the US at The Johns Hopkins University with Sauleh Siddiqui
and Benjamin F. Hobbs, have helped in making this thesis a contribution to
the scientific literature on electricity storage and electricity markets.
1.3 Scope, outline, and contributions
This thesis aims to study the participation and modeling, and role and value,
of electricity storage in short-term electricity markets, including DA and ID
wholesale energy markets,8 and RT balancing markets. These markets are
important tools to deal with the variability in the system, in which the need
for flexibility is expressed and its provision is valorized. As such, they can
also be referred to as “flexibility markets”, and they are becoming increasingly
important with the ongoing integration of variable RES. The focus is on Belgium
6Electa stands for the Research Group Electrical Energy and Computer Architectures,
within the Department of Electrical Engineering (ESAT) of the KU Leuven.
7FOD Economie, KMO, Middenstand, en Energie.
8In the context of this thesis, DA and ID markets refer to those organized by the power
exchanges. Bilateral over-the-counter (OTC) trading, in which market players agree on a
trade contract by directly interacting with each other, is not in the scope of this thesis.
6 INTRODUCTION
(BE) and the Central Western European (CWE) region, which, consistent with
common definitions, includes the Belgian, French, German, and Dutch market
zones. By doing so, this thesis aims to contribute to the scientific literature
with novel insights to tackle current and future challenges, and it intends to
enable more informed decision-making by market participants (i.e., storage
operators and investors), and market organizers, coordinators, and facilitators
(i.e., policy-makers, power exchanges, and system operators).
The major contributions of this work can be found in Chapter 3 to Chapter 7,
each chapter being a peer-reviewed journal publication in either its published
form (Chapter 3, Chapter 4, Chapter 5, and Chapter 7) or submitted form
(Chapter 6). Aside from these five articles, three other peer-reviewed journal
publications that are not included in this thesis are a result of the work performed
during the course of this Ph.D. research. They can be found in the list of
publications, together with other contributions.
Thesis storyline and chapter positioning
First, in Chapter 2 the concept of electricity storage is discussed. Afterwards,
Chapter 3 digs deeper in the concept of storage by providing a quantitative study
on its system-level role, value, and benefits in the transition to, and operation
of, highly renewable power systems. After these discussions, its participation in
the short-term markets is studied from a storage operator’s perspective. For
such studies to be successful, and to give them an extra dimension, a deep
understanding of the functioning and design of the short-term markets, and
possible future changes, is imperative. As such, Chapter 4 first reviews the
design of these markets in the CWE region and analyzes the implications for
flexibility. Chapter 5 and Chapter 6 then study the storage participation,
including its trading and operation, in these markets. In Chapter 5, storage
systems are employed for a single application, i.e., day-ahead market arbitrage.
However, determining the true value of storage requires the aggregation of
applications, and their co-optimization as use for one might interfere with use
for others. As such, Chapter 6 extends the day-ahead market arbitrage models
to allow for the aggregation of arbitrage opportunities in the three short-term
markets. These models are used to analyze and understand the opportunities
for storage in the three short-term markets, and their combination, of the four
CWE market zones, while differences are linked to differences in market design
rules. The aggregation of applications can not only be achieved by one player,
but also through the co-operation and sharing of storage resources by different
players. As such, Chapter 7 discusses the design of a new market, or market
product within existing markets, to enable such a storage use, and thus also the
decoupling of storage investment and ownership from its trading and operation.
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Fig. 1.2 classifies Chapter 2 to Chapter 7 according to two dimensions: the
nature of their main contributions, and the nature of their analyses. In what
follows, each chapter’s content will be highlighted in more detail.
Qualitative
Quantitative:
system
perspective
Quantitative:
storage operator
perspective
Model development Storage role and value Market design
Chapter 2
Electricity storage
Chapter 3
Role of
electricity storage
Chapter 4
Short-term
electricity markets
Chapter 5
Single-application operation
Chapter 6
Multi-application operation
Chapter 7
Multi-player
operation
Figure 1.2: Classification of Chapter 2 to Chapter 7 according to the nature of the
main contributions (left-to-right) and performed analyses (top-to-bottom).
Chapter 2: Electricity storage
Before continuing to the article-based chapters of this thesis, Chapter 2 provides
a comprehensive introduction to electricity storage, accessible to a broad
audience, and in part inspired by two contributions: a book chapter and an
industry report. It provides a definition for electricity storage, and a discussion
and overview of the (1) applications for which storage systems can be used, (2)
techno-economic characteristics by which storage systems can be described, and
(3) storage technologies commonly discussed for grid integration.
Chapter 3: Role of electricity storage
Context and motivation
Before moving on to the true market-based analyses of this work in Chapters 4
to 7, Chapter 3 presents a system-perspective view on the role and benefits
of storage in RES-based systems for increasing RES shares, in both the (1)
short-term scheduling and operation phases, and (2) long-term planning phase.
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To be able to gain these insights in the role and value of storage, short-
term operating constraints and requirements, which are becoming increasingly
important in the context of RES-driven power systems, have to be accurately
represented in long-term planning models. However, large problem sizes and
computational barriers have limited the extent to which they are included in
conventional generation planning models. As such, they typically include a
simplified representation of short-term system operation and its costs, through
low temporal and operational detail.
Scope and contributions
The article in Chapter 3 presents the development of a long-term generation
planning model including an accurate representation of short-term operation
with high operational and temporal detail, that minimizes total cost. Whereas
short-term system operation is generally analyzed using a mixed-integer plant-
level formulation of the unit commitment (UC) problem, a more computational-
friendly formulation of the UC problem needs to be included next to the
investment problem within a planning model with high temporal detail. This is
because of the many and elaborate techno-economic constraints, and especially
because of the many binary commitment decisions for each unit for each time
step. In Chapter 3, short-term operation is modeled through a continuous
relaxation of the technology-clustered formulation of the UC problem, which
includes detailed frequency control reserve sizing, allocation, and supply.
This model is applied to a test system with system load and RES generation
characteristics from the Belgian power system in a greenfield setting, i.e.,
assuming no pre-existing capacities. The aim is not to determine likely
deployment scenarios or address optimal pathways towards the future, but
abstract from an actual system with capacity legacy to derive broadly applicable
conclusions on the benefits and role of storage at different RES penetration
levels, and to gain insight in the interdependency between flexibility options.
Both PHS and battery energy storage (BES) is considered, and their role in
providing energy services and frequency control is investigated.
Chapter 4: Short-term electricity markets
Context and motivation
In the CWE region, the need for and valorization of flexibility in electric
energy supply and demand is primarily expressed in the short-term markets,
including DA, ID, and RT balancing markets. Due to the ongoing integration of
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variable RES, the variability in the system is increasing, making these markets
increasingly important to keep the system balanced at different time scales. A
good understanding of their design, as well as of new developments, is essential
for analyses of the need for and supply of flexibility.
Although the design of short-term markets in the CWE region has been discussed
before, previous works focus on individual or a limited selection of (1) design
parameters, (2) sequential markets, or (3) geographical market zones. In
addition, the extent to which the market design affects the needs for and rewards
to flexibility is not considered. An integrated discussion of design parameters,
and their interaction with flexibility, for all three short-term markets and all
four CWE market zones has thus not been provided before.
Scope and contributions
The article in Chapter 4 answers two research questions. First, how are the
markets related to flexibility, i.e., the short-term markets, designed in the CWE
region? Second, how do these markets express the need for and reward the
supply of flexibility? The answers to these research questions provide insight in
whether flexibility is treated consistently and appropriately among the different
geographical and sequential markets. For each market, the focus is on the key
design features and parameters.
The intent is to encourage policy-makers to consider market reforms that
would facilitate the integration, availability, or valorization of flexibility, while
also contributing to the decision-making of flexibility investors and operators.
Furthermore, the article in Chapter 4 is a key reference for power system
modelers for three reasons: to better understand (1) market conditions under
which generators, consumers, and system operators have to operate, (2) results
of flexibility valuation models, and (3) the impact of new market design rules
on the value of flexibility.
After this in-depth discussion of the design of short-term markets, we move on
to the participation of electricity storage in these markets in Chapters 5 and 6,
and to the discussion of an innovative type of participation in Chapter 7.
Chapter 5: Single-application operation
Context and motivation
Electricity storage plants can be used for many applications, with DA market
arbitrage, i.e., the capturing of DA price spreads over time, being one of the
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most studied ones. The employed approaches range from a system perspective
to an individual storage operator perspective. The latter, in which storage
plants are scheduled to maximize profit based on price signals, is typically
referred to as the price-based UC (PBUC) formulation of the arbitrage problem.
Generally there are two main assumptions in PBUC formulations: the perfect
vs. imperfect price foresight assumption, which defines the operator’s assumed
knowledge of future prices, and the price-taking vs. price-making assumption,9
defining whether the operator recognizes that its actions may have an impact
on those prices. Additional storage capacity generally reduces price spreads by
increasing off-peak prices when charging as well as decreasing on-peak prices
when discharging. In price-taker PBUC models the storage operator is assumed
to self-schedule its (dis)charge actions against a set of expected prices, while in
price-maker PBUC models this self-scheduling occurs given a set of expected
market prices and price-effect data that reflects how those prices react to
changes in quantity. A large share of the literature assumes perfect foresight of
future prices, and no price-effect with a price-taker approach: i.e., the storage
plant to be small enough to not affect prices, or the prices to already include
the storage plant’s participation. While a relaxation of the perfect foresight
assumption has been studied extensively, much less attention has been given
to the study of the price-effect of storage transactions. Furthermore, while the
existing methodologies for the price-effect provide insight in the arbitrage value
and operation of large storage capacities, they include rather conceptual and
simplified price-effects due to a lack of market data or a different research scope.
Scope and contributions
The article in Chapter 5 provides a comprehensive PBUC formulation of the
arbitrage problem including detailed operating constraints, and the presentation
of a new methodology to account for the price-effect of storage actions. This is
done by considering real-world data, published in the form of hourly piecewise
linear relationships between quantity and price based on submitted bids, which
are referred to as market resilience functions. This is the most detailed available
price-effect data, as it is obtained by the power exchange running the market-
clearing algorithm again for alternative scenarios. It takes into account the (1)
aggregated supply and demand curves, (2) cross-border interaction through
market-coupling, and (3) dynamics of complex orders. Since this data is only
available ex-post, its application lies in (1) estimating the upper limit to the
arbitrage value of additional storage capacity in a certain market given current
9This is sometimes also referred to as the “exogenous price” vs. “price as a function of the
considered player’s decisions” assumption.
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conditions, and (2) the evaluation of the performance of the price-taking and
price-making assumptions based on more simplified price-effects.
In addition, as the piecewise linear nature of the market resilience data poses
computational challenges, a stepwise approximation is proposed which reduces
computational effort significantly, i.e., from mixed-integer nonconvex quadratic
programming (nonconvex MIQP) to mixed-integer linear programming (MILP),
while providing accurate lower and upper bound approximations to the piecewise
linear results. The analyses are executed for the Belgian DA market. The results
show the validity of the stepwise approximation, and the impact of the price-
effect on the operation and DA market arbitrage value of electricity storage.
Chapter 6: Multi-application operation
Context and motivation
Even though there is an increasing demand for flexibility and multiple markets
and applications exist for storage to participate in, recent studies point to
difficult business cases. The lack of the aggregation, or at least of an efficient
aggregation, of applications in a single operation strategy is usually identified
as a major barrier. This may be due to the presence of historical operation
patterns, complexity of revenue stacking, and accompanying risk. As such,
storage valuation models often underestimate the storage value due to the focus
on only a single application. Furthermore, most of the studies that do focus on
the aggregation of different applications, do not allocate the storage resources
by means of a continuous optimization process. Determining the true value
of storage requires the aggregation of multiple applications while accounting
for the interdependence between revenue streams. The latter means that the
value of individual applications cannot simply be added together, but need to
be co-optimized since different services can interfere with each other.
Scope and contributions
The article in Chapter 6 extends the work and results presented in Chapter 5,
and contributes to the current literature on electricity storage valuation in
short-term markets through three aspects.
First, PBUC model formulations are provided that allow to aggregate multiple
arbitrage opportunities for electricity storage in a single operation strategy.
All three short-term markets, i.e., the DA, ID, and RT balancing market, are
considered, as well as the opportunity to capture three types of price differences:
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(1) over time in a single market for all three markets, (2) over the three short-
term markets for the same time step, and (3) over time over the three short-term
markets. The developed models allocate a storage plant’s power and energy
ratings across the three short-term markets and three arbitrage types for each
time step, according to a daily performed multiperiod optimization.
Second, the price-effect of additional storage capacity has been considered before
in previous studies for the DA market (e.g., Chapter 5) with various levels of
detail, but not for the ID or RT balancing market. The article in Chapter 6
studies the price-effect with high detail for not only the DA market, but also
for the ID market, and for the RT balancing market by using custom-made
piecewise linear RT market resilience functions, based on real-world data.
Third, the developed models are applied to the four market zones of the CWE
region, thereby providing insight in the extent to which the three short-term
markets, and their combination, in these market zones are potentially interesting
for electricity storage arbitrage. This is intended to support market participants
in storage investment and operating decisions, and to inform policy-makers
about the impact of market design on the electricity storage arbitrage value.
Chapter 7: Multi-player operation
Context and motivation
Applications can not only be aggregated by one market player, but also over
multiple market participants. However, the sharing and operation of storage
resources by different players has only been studied to a very limited extent.
Scope and contributions
The article in Chapter 7 discusses the development of a new product to share
and co-operate storage resources among multiple players. It is based on the
design of a periodically organized auction with sequential market-clearings
to allocate storage resources (i.e., charge and discharge power rating, energy
capacity) through so-called “physical storage rights” between different players
and accompanying applications. Similar to the case of explicit auctioning of
cross-border capacity through physical transmission rights (PTRs), first the
right to use resources is auctioned, after which players can use these resources.
Such auctions can serve both settings where (1) multiple players share common
storage plants and (2) multiple suppliers of storage resources and prospective
consumers meet to trade physical storage rights. Players may be incentivized
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to participate as they can share the investment cost, mitigate risk, exploit
economies of scale, overcome regulatory barriers, and merge time-varying and
player-dependent flexibility needs.
An illustrative case study is provided in which three players share storage
resources that are allocated through a daily auction with hourly market-clearings.
The presented auction-based mechanism allocates the limited storage resources
to the most valuable application(s) for each market-clearing. First, the three
players’ individual PBUC optimization problems are formulated, including both
individual and shared constraints. The shared constraints limit the players’
combined physical storage rights by the maximum available rights, and allow an
auctioneer to allocate them. Second, the individual problems are combined in
an equilibrium problem. Such a problem allows to study the interaction between
a set of interrelated market players. More specifically, because of the shared
constraints, a Generalized Nash equilibrium problem (GNEP) is considered. The
GNEP is solved by formulating the problem as a mixed complementarity problem
(MCP). This is done by deriving the Karush-Kuhn-Tucker (KKT) conditions of
each player’s optimization problem and solving them simultaneously.
Chapter 8: Conclusions
Chapter 8 restates the main contributions, findings, and conclusions of this
thesis. Based on the obtained insights, it also suggests directions for further
research on electricity storage and electricity markets.

Chapter 2
Electricity storage
Electricity storage applications, characteristics, and
technologies
Inspired by two publications, including a book chapter [23] and an
industry report [24]:
[23] T. Brijs, A. Belderbos, K. Kessels, D. Six, R. Belmans, F. Geth, Energy
storage participation in electricity markets, Energy Storage Handbook, Wiley.
Accepted for publication (2016).
The first author is the main author of this book chapter. It is elaborated in cooperation with
the second and last author, with support and/or supervision from the third, fourth, and fifth
author. The contributions of the first author include the writing of the storage applications
section, and the co-writing of the storage characteristics and technologies sections.
[24] T. Brijs, K. De Vos, J. Driesen, Studie inzake de mogelijkheden tot opslag
van elektriciteit, Tech. rep., FOD economie, KMO, middenstand, en energie,
Brussels, Belgium (2015).
The first author is the main author of this industry report. It is elaborated in cooperation
with the second author, under supervision of the third author, and with support of other
researchers at EnergyVille. It is presented by the second author at a workshop organized by
the Belgian Federal Public Service Economy, SMEs, Self-employed, and Energy.
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2.1 Introduction
Electricity storage refers to systems, bidirectionally coupled with the power
system, which buffer energy. It includes both systems in which the electricity
consumption (i.e., charging) and generation (i.e., discharging) sides are physically
located at one site, e.g., PHS plants, or at multiple locations, i.e., power-to-gas
(P2G) systems in combination with a gas turbine or fuel cell [13].
The storage of electricity represents a combination of three functions [3, 9]:
consuming electricity, accumulating the energy in some form, and generating
electricity. Only part of the consumed electric energy is converted to energy
stored in the buffer during charging because of a charge efficiency 0 < ηc ≤ 1,
while only part of the stored energy is converted back into electric energy during
discharging because of a discharge efficiency 0 < ηd ≤ 1. The buffered energy
may also increase and decrease independent of the grid through exogenous
power flows p+t ≥ 0 (addition) and p-t ≥ 0 (removal), e.g., water inflow and
evaporation in the upper reservoir for PHS plants. The general power balance
of storage plants that consume electric power pct ≥ 0 and generate electric power
pdt ≥ 0, and store it in an energy buffer et ≥ 0, is then:
det
dt︸︷︷︸
4 Energy buffer
= pct · ηc︸ ︷︷ ︸
Addition
− pdt /ηd︸ ︷︷ ︸
Removal︸ ︷︷ ︸
Electric origin
+ p+t︸︷︷︸
Addition
− p-t︸︷︷︸
Removal︸ ︷︷ ︸
Exogenous origin
. (2.1)
This definition distinguishes electricity storage from the broader concept of
energy storage. The latter can be defined as taking energy in whatever form
it is available, converting it to whatever form is best for storage, and then
reconverting it to whichever form is best for use [16]. Energy storage may thus,
e.g., also refer to the storage of fuel in the natural gas grid or through coal
piles, or to the potential energy stored in the gravitational field in the case of
conventional hydro power plants.
Given nonzero energy losses, over time, electricity storage consumes more
electricity than it generates. As such, it can not be labeled as generation asset.
In fact, it is difficult to classify it as any type of power system asset. It can
act as generator when discharging, as consumer when charging, and as energy
buffer during storage. It also has similar characteristics to grid capacity as
both have the ability to move power: storage in time and the grid in space.
Therefore, the question arises whether storage needs to be treated as a separate
class of power system assets.
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However, it may be more relevant to ask whether electricity storage
fundamentally differs from the other power system flexibility sources. This is
not the case, as alternative means of flexibility can also be characterized by
the combination of three functions introduced above for storage: all are able
to provide downward and upward power adjustments by interacting with an
energy buffer, thereby shifting energy in time (Fig. 2.1). Although they may
differ based on technical and economic characteristics, no source is necessarily
superior to another. Their value depends on the match between the required
technical performance of the chosen application and their techno-economic
characteristics [14]. Electricity storage is only one solution to deal with increasing
flexibility needs, and alternative flexibility sources can be substitutes for certain
applications, but complements for others, given the wide range and quantity of
flexibility needs [16].
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Figure 2.1: Overview of power system flexibility sources. All can be characterized by
the same combination of three functions: providing downward power adjustments,
accumulating energy, and providing upward power adjustments.
This does not mean that no more work is to be done by policy-makers on
the regulation specifically for electricity storage. The unclear classification of
storage resources may currently affect its operation and development through,
e.g., eligibility of different types of players for storage ownership (i.e., can grid
operators own storage resources, and if so, for which applications?), and grid
tariffs (i.e., do storage resources have to pay tariffs for both generators and
consumers, one of both, none, or a different type of tariff?).
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2.2 Applications
Historically, electricity storage plants were considered as an alternative for
investing in peak load generation. They were operated to charge during off-peak
periods, thereby complementing inflexible base load generation, and discharge
during on-peak periods. However, due to the liberalization process and the
ongoing energy transition, distinct valorization paths for different applications
of storage emerged [10, 25, 26, 27]. These can be categorized in energy, network,
and reliability services, and they are discussed in detail in this section.
• Energy services include both arbitrage and portfolio management by
market participants.
• Grid services include the provision of frequency control, voltage support,
congestion management, and black-start capabilities to the TSO. The TSO
is responsible for the stable operation and maintenance of the transmission
system, and the interconnection with neighboring regions. In the future,
some of these services will likely also be provided to the distribution
system operator (DSO), which is responsible for the stable operation,
maintenance, and development of the low and medium voltage grids. The
provision of grid services to the DSO is quite innovative, as historically
the goal of the distribution grid was merely to distribute electric energy
delivered by the transmission level to consumers on the distribution level.
In contrast to this rather passive character of the distribution system
operation, an increased interest in the active operation of the distribution
system can be observed to accommodate increasing levels of distributed
energy sources, demand side management, and local storage.
• Reliability services include the support of reliability on both the local
level and system level: the former through the provision of back-up,
uninterruptible power supply (UPS), and power quality management, and
the latter by providing firm capacity to contribute to generation adequacy.
The extent to which different storage technologies can technically provide these
services depends on their technical characteristics, while the extent to which
they are well-suited for these services depends on their technical and economic
characteristics, and for some services on their location (i.e., transmission or
distribution grid, and the physical location within those grids) as well.
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2.2.1 Energy services
Arbitrage
Classic definitions of arbitrage denote making a riskless profit by simultaneously
buying and selling a similar commodity with net zero investment [28]. However,
any activity in which a player buys a commodity and sells a similar commodity,
or one in which the former can be converted, at a higher price for profit can be
referred to as arbitrage. This definition allows to include initial investments,
does not require simultaneity of the purchase and sale, and furthermore does
not restrict to a single commodity either [9].
This dissertation distinguishes four arbitrage types in electricity markets:
intertemporal, interzonal, intermarket, and intercommodity arbitrage (Fig. 2.2).
With intertemporal arbitrage, electricity price differences are captured over
time (e.g., 03:00 am to 04:00 am vs. 05:00 am to 06:00 am), while interzonal
arbitrage refers to the capturing of price spreads between adjacent market zones
(e.g., Belgium vs. France (FR)). Intermarket arbitrage refers to the activity in
which virtual bidders profit from price differences between different electricity
markets (e.g., DA market vs. ID market) by making trades in the opposite
direction to cancel outstanding positions. Finally, intercommodity arbitrage
is based on price differences between fuel (e.g., gas) and electricity. These
four basic arbitrage types can also be combined leading to hybrid types, e.g.,
intertemporal intermarket arbitrage is the capturing of electricity price spreads
over time over different markets (e.g., DA market 03:00 am to 04:00 am vs. ID
market 05:00 am to 06:00 am). Here, electricity storage arbitrage is defined to
include intertemporal, intermarket, and intertemporal intermarket arbitrage.
Type Example
03:00 am 04:00 am 05:00 am 06:00 am
DA (BE)Intertemporal Buy low Sell high
DA (BE)
DA (FR)Interzonal
Buy low
Sell high
DA (BE)
ID (BE)Intermarket
Buy low
Sell high
Gas
PowerIntercommodity
Buy low
Sell high
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Figure 2.2: Arbitrage in electricity markets.
Aside from the operational flexibility of a storage plant, which is determined by
its start-up and shut-down cost, minimum load requirements, ramp rates and
cost, and minimum up and down times, four factors related to the combination
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of storage technology, storage sizing, and market parameters, are identified,
that determine the profitability of electricity storage arbitrage.
1. The price spread between the buy price λbt and sell price λst, and the cost
due to energy losses if physical (dis)charge actions are required (i.e., with
intertemporal and intertemporal intermarket arbitrage). The cost due to
losses to arbitrage one unit of energy is calculated as (1/ηrt− 1) · λbt , with
ηrt the roundtrip efficiency.
2. The price profile, and the (dis)charge duration. Two price profiles,
containing identical prices but in a different order, result in different
arbitrage profits in case the (dis)charge duration is limiting the optimal
operation. E.g., a limited duration can cause the storage to be fully charged
prematurely in times of consistent low prices, making it impossible to
capture all present arbitrage opportunities.
3. The uncertainty and predictability of λbt and λst. In the DA market, which
is the most studied market for storage arbitrage, the uncertainty used to
be much lower, and the predictability much higher, because of clear daily
and weekly patterns of the system load and prices. However, the ongoing
energy transition makes prices more uncertain as the historically clear
patterns are becoming less obvious. This is even more challenging for ID
prices and especially RT imbalance prices.
4. The price-effect, and the buy and sell volume. Typically, additional buy
transactions increase λbt , and additional sell transactions decrease λst.
This price-effect is generally negligible for transactions that are small
compared to the market size, but can be significant for large-scale storage
transactions. Taking this into account results in a trade-off between the
remaining price spread and transaction size.
Portfolio management
Portfolio management by market participants is performed at different
timeframes, i.e., at the investment, scheduling, and operation phases, and covers
generation investment deferral, intertemporal energy shifting, and capacity
firming, respectively.
At the investment phase, storage may decrease the need for peak power plants
that are usually only operated to meet the peak demand. It can decrease the
need for such power plants by storing base load and RES generation in times
of low demand and high RES generation, and by replacing peak generation in
times of high demand and low RES generation. In addition, at future higher
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RES targets the “fuel cost” of storage, which is related to the energy losses
and the price at which energy is stored, decreases. This positive correlation
between the decrease in operational cost of storage and the integration of RES
presents an advantage compared to conventional power plants. The latter face
fewer operational hours due to the merit-order effect of RES, and a decreasing
profitability due to the lower electricity prices as a result of the close-to-zero
marginal cost of RES.
At the scheduling phase, generators can maximize the value of generation by
decoupling generation from grid injection, and consumers can minimize the
cost of consumption by decoupling consumption from grid offtake. This is
possible due to the intertemporal energy shifting ability of storage systems.
Among others, generators can schedule the more inflexible base load and mid
load generation technologies more efficiently through storage. The decoupling
of consumption from grid offtake can be profitable for large consumers that
directly participate in the wholesale markets, or for those that have a contract
with their supplier through which they are sensitive to price fluctuations. In
contrast, this would require more dynamic tariff structures or capacity-based
tariffs for residential consumers instead of the current (quasi) fixed tariffs, or
additional incentives for self-consumption in case of residential PV generation
to avoid consumers using the grid as an unlimited and free storage resource.
At the operation phase, market participants can use storage for capacity firming
purposes. Capacity firming may include both smoothing of generation or
consumption output, resulting in less volatile power profiles, and the ability to
follow predetermined output schedules to reduce imbalance positions in RT. The
smoothing of output profiles can especially contribute to an efficient operation
of conventional power plants because of their techno-economic operating
constraints. Imbalance positions in RT are settled by the system operator
imposing imbalance prices, which typically reflect the activation cost of reserves.
2.2.2 Grid services
Frequency control
To be able to satisfy the most important condition for a stable operation of
the power system, being the instantaneous balance between generation and
consumption of electric energy, system operators contract reserve capacity. These
reserves are activated to compensate for unforeseen variations in generation and
consumption. As these variations can occur on different time and duration scales,
system operators hold different reserve categories. In the synchronous zone of the
European network of transmission system operators for electricity (ENTSO-E),
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operating reserves are, besides the distinction between up and downward reserve,
categorized in frequency containment reserve (FCR), frequency restoration
reserve (FRR), and replacement reserve (RR).
FCR is activated automatically in a matter of seconds, in response to frequency
deviations for the entire synchronous zone. FRR is either activated automatically
(aFRR) or manually (mFRR), and restores the system frequency by restoring the
balance in the control zone, thereby relieving the activated FCR. Its activation
is triggered by the area control error (ACE), which is calculated as the difference
between the scheduled and actual power interchange of a control area. Finally,
RR can be used to relieve or support the activated FRR. Previously, FCR was
referred to as primary reserve, aFRR was called secondary reserve, and mFRR
and RR generally correspond to the concept of tertiary reserve (the former to
fast tertiary reserve, the latter to slow tertiary reserve). If electricity storage
plants meet the technical requirements to provide these reserve products, they
can provide frequency control to the system operator [6, 29].
Voltage support
In order to keep the voltage level throughout the grid within the technical
and contractual limits, the system operator contracts services to support the
voltage. Voltage support in transmission grids is typically performed through
reactive power control, i.e., generating and absorbing reactive power. In the
distribution grid, due to their more resistive nature, a combination of active
and reactive power control can be more effective. Next to the active power
dispatch capabilities inherent to electricity storage, the grid interface of the
storage system may also have reactive power control capabilities. In contrast to
frequency control, the location largely determines whether storage systems can
provide the appropriate amount of voltage support. Voltage has to be managed
locally since reactive power is difficult to transport.
Congestion management
Congestion management indicates the ability to reduce flows on congested lines.
Storage systems can provide this service if they are physically located in the
grid-constrained areas. The provision of congestion management is thus, similar
to voltage support, very location-specific. When considering a line that is often
congested, the congestion issue could be solved by increasing the line rating,
contracting flexible consumption capacity or installing generation capacity on
the demand side of the congested line, or installing storage capacity on either
side of the congested line. Contracting flexible consumption capacity would
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shift the demand from peak to off-peak periods, while installing generation
capacity at the demand side of the congested line would reduce flows on the
line, both relieving the issue. Storage capacity located at the demand side of
the congested line could be charged during off-peak periods, and discharged
during peak periods when the line would typically be constrained. Alternatively,
storage capacity on the supply side of the congested line could be charged
during peak periods when the line would typically be congested, and discharged
when it is not. Providing such services may improve the utilization rate of the
lines, and could also lead to investment deferral (or delay) in new lines or line
upgrades. The latter may be especially valuable when such congestion situations
occur in just a few hours or days per year, as the upgraded grid capacity would
otherwise be strongly underutilized [15, 30].1
Black-start capabilities
In the event of a black-out, the system operator has to re-activate the system
step-by-step. In order to do this, the system operator calls upon capacities that
can start without external electric supply. Units with generation capabilities
that have the ability to do this can provide the so-called black-start service to
the system operator. In case an electricity storage plant meets the technical
requirements to provide this service, and keeps a certain amount of energy
stored in the buffer at all times, it can provide this black-start service. This
includes an opportunity cost for the storage operator, since the reserved energy
capacity cannot be used to provide other services.2
2.2.3 Reliability services
Local level
On the local level, consumers can use storage systems to either improve the
quality of power used by its electric devices or to provide (or support) back-up
in case of a disruption in the supply of electric energy. The former is referred to
as power quality management, and is especially important to protect sensitive
processes and loads of consumers. It is based on the ability of storage to buffer
active power imbalances between demand and supply, and control reactive power
1Although this would also result in an underutilization of the storage system for solely this
application, it may be more straightforward for storage than grid capacity to capture additional
revenues by providing other services as well in combination with congestion management.
2However, in the case of PHS the effective head (i.e., elevation difference) is the lowest
when the upper reservoir is almost empty, i.e., when the limit of the black-start energy content
is reached. This lowers the opportunity cost for keeping a certain amount of energy stored.
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through its grid interface. The latter increases the reliability of the supply of
the consumer. Storage in combination with PV or wind can replace small-scale
back-up generators (i.e., usually diesel), while storage as UPS can give a back-up
generator (e.g., other storage system with a longer discharge duration, or diesel
generator) the time to come online. In addition, distributed storage is often
discussed to improve the energy-autonomy of prosumers, i.e., consumers who
also operate distributed generation.
System level
Reliability services on the system level include having firm capacity available
with the goal to ensure adequacy, i.e., installation of sufficient resources to
meet the demand during peak and other times. For this purpose, capacity
mechanisms are discussed and implemented throughout Europe, which provide
revenue streams for firm capacity that are either alternative (e.g., the Belgian
strategic reserve mechanism) or complementary (e.g., the UK capacity auction
mechanism) to energy and balancing market revenue streams. These mechanisms
provide a remuneration per unit of power [e/W], which is independent of the
energy output but values the availability of capacity. If storage plants meet the
technical requirements, and if they are allowed to, they can provide this service
and as such be remunerated for their discharge power capacity.
2.2.4 Aggregation of applications
This multitude of applications makes electricity storage plants an interesting
asset for a wide range of market participants. However, operating a storage plant
to provide just one of these services might not result in a positive business case:
profitability may require the aggregation of multiple applications. In addition,
when considering multiple applications, the value of individual applications
cannot simply be added as use for one application may interfere with use
for another. Therefore, it is necessary to co-optimize the scheduling of the
applications. Finally, applications cannot only be aggregated for a certain
storage plant by one market participant, but also over multiple participants.
While multiple studies acknowledge the fact that such aggregation is critical
in the value proposition for electricity storage, e.g., [30, 31, 32, 33, 34], the
following statement from the well-known3 THINK study [16] perfectly sets
the scene for the work in Chapter 3 on the role and system value of storage
considering a wide range of services, and the work in Chapter 6 and Chapter 7
on multi-application and multi-player storage operation, respectively:
3In the electricity storage community.
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“To reveal the overall value of storage for the whole system, it is necessary to
investigate the way to aggregate the benefits of storage for different services
or even different actors that encompass both regulated and competitive
activities. Today’s challenges for the business model for electricity storage
are (1) the aggregation of multiple services and (2) the maximization of
multi-income streams.”
2.3 Characteristics
Individual storage plants can be characterized by a set of technical and economic
characteristics. Typically, they include the charge and discharge power rating
and duration, energy storage capacity, losses and efficiency, calendar and cycle-
life, volume and mass, and investment cost.4
2.3.1 Charge and discharge power rating and duration, and
energy storage capacity
The (dis)charge power rating [W] represents the maximum amount of power
during (dis)charge, while the energy storage capacity [J] refers to the amount
of energy that can maximally be stored. In addition, the charge duration [s]
typically expresses the time needed for the storage system to be fully charged
at its power rating from being fully discharged, and vice versa for the discharge
duration [s]. It depends on the ratio of the energy capacity to the power rating,
and is therefore also referred to as the energy-to-power (E2P) ratio [s].
2.3.2 Losses and efficiency
The roundtrip efficiency [%] is defined as the ratio of the discharged electric
energy to the electric energy that needs to be charged first for this discharge
action to happen. It is strictly lower than 100% because of energy losses. Losses
in storage systems are incurred in multiple ways: during the conversion steps,
during storage, and because of auxiliary systems. E.g., in a BES the first two
sources of energy losses occur as follows. The grid’s alternating current (AC)
power is first converted to direct current (DC), after which the batteries convert
the electric energy to chemical energy. Then, during storage, there may be
continuous self-discharge. Finally, during discharging, the chemical energy is
4This list of characteristics is not meant to be exhaustive.
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put back into the grid after it has been converted again to DC power and
subsequently to AC power.
2.3.3 Lifetime
Storage plants have a limited lifetime, which is determined by the combination
of their calendar life [s] and cycle-life [-]. It indicates the time or use after
which the performance is decreased in such a way that it is not longer sufficient.
The calendar life is the maximum time that the storage plant can be used,
independent from use, while the cycle-life takes into account the deterioration
of the energy storage subsystem due to use. The former can be considered the
limiting factor in case of infrequent use, while it is the latter in case of frequent
use. However, the statement “not sufficient anymore” is very application specific.
E.g., for BES, the cycle-life is usually defined as the number of charge-discharge
cycles before the remaining usable capacity falls below 80% of the initial storage
capacity due to wear. Nevertheless, since some applications value power rating
more highly than energy storage capacity, this definition for lifetime may not
always suffice. Furthermore, unclear lifetime figures may result from the fact
that the lifetime of the power subsystem and energy storage subsystem may
differ.
2.3.4 Volume and mass
The energy density and power density of a storage technology can be specified
in terms of volume, i.e., [J/l] and [W/l], respectively, or mass, i.e., [J/kg] and
[W/kg], respectively. These quantities can be used to estimate the size and mass
of storage systems, and are important characteristics for applications requiring a
small and light storage system. Additional space use and mass can be incurred
because of the need for dedicated buildings, safety installations, and heating
and cooling systems.
2.3.5 Investment cost
The initial investment in a storage facility comprises two main components:
a cost per unit of power rating [e/W], and a cost per unit of energy storage
capacity [e/J]. E.g., for PHS, the power subsystem cost comprises all costs
related to pumps, turbines, motors, and generators, while the cost of the energy
subsystem depends on reservoir capacities and the elevation difference.
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2.4 Technologies
This section describes the general technological envelopes of electricity storage
technologies often considered for grid integration, while providing links to the
applications (Section 2.2) and techno-economic characteristics (Section 2.3)
where appropriate. These technologies include PHS, compressed air energy
storage (CAES), flywheels, supercapacitors, superconducting magnetic energy
storage (SMES), BES, fuel cells, and P2G. For additional information on these
technologies, the reader is referred to dedicated overview studies [30, 35, 36, 37,
38, 39, 40, 41, 42]. A summary and categorization is given in Table 2.1, based
on own insights and inspired by the references indicated above.
2.4.1 Pumped-hydro storage
PHS represents over 99% of the worldwide installed capacity of grid-connected
electricity storage, with currently 162GW of installed capacity [43]. It is a
mature technology, with limited energy losses (roundtrip efficiency of 65-85%),
and a long lifetime (40-60 years, and tens of thousands of cycles). In a PHS
plant, an electromotor consumes electricity to pump water from a lower reservoir
to an upper reservoir, storing energy. Electricity is generated again by releasing
the water to flow from the upper to the lower reservoir, using a turbine to drive
a generator [44]. The energy capacity is a function of the elevation difference
and volumetric capacity of the water reservoirs. PHS plants are employed to
provide a wide range of services, from grid services to the system operator (e.g.,
frequency control, black-start service), to energy services to the market (i.e.,
arbitrage) and generation portfolios (i.e., portfolio management), and reliability
services to the system (i.e., firm capacity).
In the industrialized world, most of the obvious locations may already have
been captured. Converting some of the current hydro power plants to PHS
plants is considered an attractive option to increase the available storage
capacity [45]. In addition, as a large share of the existing PHS capacity was
built decades ago, equipping it with new and more efficient technology presents
significant potential to increase and improve current PHS capacity. Due to their
geographical requirements, both hydro and PHS plants are typically found far
from population centers. Individual PHS plants have power ratings of up to
several GW during a few hours up to a few days. Improved PHS technologies
are developed, to increase the flexibility in terms of (1) services, and (2) land use
and location. Classically, in pumping mode the power output of a pump-turbine
set is fixed, i.e., inflexible. In contrast, variable speed technologies enable more
flexibility and improve the dynamic behavior. On the other hand, using the
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sea as a “reservoir” or using underground reservoirs can minimize land use and
environmental impact, and open up new suitable locations [18].
2.4.2 Compressed air energy storage
Although CAES is one of the most important storage technologies in terms of
installed capacity next to PHS, only two major plants are currently operational,
i.e., the 321MW Huntorf plant in Germany (DE) and the 110MW MacIntosh
plant in the US [18]. In a CAES plant, air is compressed by an electromotor
driving a compressor, and energy is stored due to the increased pressure. This
also increases the temperature, with the heat representing part of the energy
converted in the process. If after pressurizing and before injection in the
reservoir, the compressed air is cooled down without heat storage, the thermal
energy is lost and the roundtrip efficiency decreases [36]. To make up for the heat
loss, a fuel, typically natural gas, is used to reheat before and during expansion
of the compressed air. This expansion drives a turbine to generate electricity
again. The energy capacity is related to the volume and rated pressure of the
reservoir.
Typically, natural storage reservoirs are used, including salt caverns, former
mines, and former natural gas sites. Consequently, the application of this
technology is, similar to PHS, limited due to geographical requirements. E.g.,
both the Huntorf and MacIntosh plants use salt caverns as reservoirs. CAES
system ratings are in the range of hundreds of MW for a few hours up to a
day. CAES is competitive with PHS in terms of lifetime, sizing, applications,
and storage duration, and, similar to PHS, it is characterized by low energy
subsystem investment costs in case of favorable geographical conditions.
New developments in CAES technology aim to improve the roundtrip efficiency
and increase the flexibility in siting. The efficiency of conventional diabatic
CAES technology (40-60%) can be improved to about 70% by storing heat
from the compression in thermal storage systems, and releasing it again before
and during expansion to eliminate the need for additional fuel, i.e., adiabatic
CAES technology. In addition, artificial pressure tanks can be manufactured
for aboveground reservoirs to circumvent the geographical requirements. This
also enables the development of small-scale CAES plants [16, 46].
2.4.3 Flywheels
Flywheels have known limited success, with about 45MW of capacity installed
worldwide. Electricity is consumed by an electromotor to accelerate a rotor
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to very high speeds (up to 50 000 rpm), storing kinetic energy. The system
is discharged by using this energy to drive a generator, thereby reducing the
flywheel’s speed. The energy content depends on the rotational speed and the
moment of inertia of the spinning mass. Self-discharge is typically high, due
to the presence of friction-related losses [36, 40]. A thick steel containment
generally surrounds the flywheel to improve safety and performance. It stops or
slows down fractured parts in case of an incident, preventing or reducing injury
and damage, and reduces friction-related losses if placed under vacuum or if
filled with a low-friction gas, e.g., helium [30].
The advantages of flywheels include high power density, long lifetime (15-20
years, and hundreds of thousands to millions of cycles), a high roundtrip
efficiency of 80-95%, and very fast response times. The storage capacity of
individual flywheels is limited, with typical capacities between 0.5 kWh and
10 kWh [25]. Therefore, numerous flywheels are installed together to increase
the total capacity of a flywheel system. Flywheels are typically designed for
a (dis)charge duration of a few seconds up to an hour, and have a low energy
density. Consequently, they are used in applications for which a high number of
cycles is expected, and for which high power is more valuable than high energy
capacity. E.g., a 20MW flywheel plant, comprising 200 flywheels of 100 kW, is
in operation in the US (Stephentown, New York) since 2011 to provide primary
frequency control to the system operator [30, 47]. Other well-known applications
of flywheels are power quality management and UPS [16, 35].
2.4.4 Supercapacitors
Only limited grid-connected supercapacitor capacity is operational today. They
are often referred to as “supercaps”, and store energy in the electric field
between the two electrodes of a capacitor [39]. Similar to batteries, supercaps
contain two electrodes, an electrolyte ionically connecting both, and a permeable
membrane allowing ion transfer. The energy capacity is related to the electrode
surface area and voltage, and is inversely correlated to the distance between
the electrodes [38]. In contrast to batteries, not a chemical reaction but an
electrostatic action takes place. This makes the (dis)charge process easily
reversible without significant degradation, resulting in a very high cycle-life in
the same order of magnitude as flywheels, and a calendar life of about 20 years.
The efficiency is high as well at 85-95%, as is the power density, and they have
a very fast response time. Grid application necessitates putting a number of
capacitors in series since the voltage of a single basic unit is limited to a few Volt.
The most commonly cited limiting factors are the high self-discharge rate, high
cost of the energy storage subsystem, and low energy density [38, 39], which
most likely limit the use of supercaps to short (dis)charge duration applications,
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similar to flywheels. Often cited applications include primary frequency control,
voltage support, power quality management, and UPS [16, 35, 39].
2.4.5 Superconducting magnetic energy storage
Similar to supercaps, few SMES systems are currently in operation in the grid.
With SMES, energy is stored in the magnetic field of a direct current flowing in
a superconducting coil. The current magnitude increases during charging and
decreases during discharging, with the energy capacity being correlated to the
current rating and the inductance of the coil. To maintain superconductivity,
very low, i.e., cryogenic, temperatures are required [38, 48]. The complexity
of the cooling system and the related cost, and the cost of the energy storage
subsystem, currently limit SMES to high power applications, offering MW
ratings for just a few seconds. The response time and power density are very
high, as is the lifetime (similar to supercaps), with the coils not degrading
with age or use. Well-suited applications thus also include those requiring
frequent cycling, as with flywheels and supercaps. Although the efficiency is
very high as well at more than 95%, which is among the highest values of all
storage technologies, the cooling system leads to additional losses if cycling
is not frequent. Another often cited disadvantage includes the impact of the
magnetic field [39, 41].
2.4.6 Battery energy storage
Batteries consist of two electrodes, an electrolyte, and a permeable membrane.
When discharging, electrons flow through an external circuit from the negative
to the positive electrode, creating an electrical current from the positive to the
negative terminal, and the other way around during charging by applying an
external voltage over the electrodes, enabling (reversible) chemical reactions.
Simultaneously, ions flow via the electrolyte between the electrodes to maintain
charge balance. With BES, power ratings and energy capacity are typically
closely related, limiting the flexibility in sizing. In addition, the cycle-life of
BES is typically a limiting factor, with in general order of magnitudes of a few
thousand cycles. Therefore, when stating that a certain chemistry has a good
cycle-life, this has to be considered in the context of BES. Furthermore, BES is
typically characterized by very fast response times.
BES is considered to be very versatile and scalable, from kW to multi-MW
systems, because of the modularity of battery cells and the wide range of
chemistries. This section focuses on the chemistries that are most often
considered for power system applications. Lead-acid (Pb-acid) is a well-known
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technology and has been used the longest in power systems, with proven
applicability, but with limited deployment in terms of installed capacity. Until
recently, the less mature sodium-sulfur (NaS) was by far the most commonly
used technology with about 530MW deployed worldwide [49], but the more
recent lithium-ion (Li-ion) technology has caught up due to the large amount of
projects developed over the past few years as a result of its rapidly decreasing
cost and increasing performance [14, 30, 50]. In addition, flow batteries are
discussed as well as they have the potential for longer term storage and decoupled
power and energy ratings.
Lead-acid
Pb-acid is a well-known and relatively inexpensive technology, operating at
normal atmospheric temperatures. However, its energy and power densities,
and cycle-life (up to a thousand cycles), are low, but roundtrip efficiency is
good at 70-85%. Calendar life ranges from 5 to 15 years. In addition, because
of the lead, recycling, which is (luckily) very common, is needed to avoid a high
environmental impact [14, 41]. Common applications are those requiring power
for short periods of time, and limited cycles, e.g., power quality management,
black-start service, and UPS [16, 35].
Sodium-sulfur
NaS is a kind of high temperature chemistry that uses low cost, but somewhat
hazardous, materials. This chemistry offers good roundtrip efficiencies of 75-
90%, and a good energy density. Calendar and cycle-life are good as well at
10-15 years and a few thousand cycles. However, the heating system represents
additional costs and losses. NaS is operated worldwide, and is used to provide
grid services such as frequency control, or multi-hour energy services such as
portfolio management (e.g., optimizing the operation of wind power plants) not
requiring very frequent cycling. Typically, installed NaS systems have power
ratings from 1MW up to 50MW, with 6-7 h of storage capacity [14, 39, 49].
Lithium-ion
Li-ion refers to a class of BES in which Li-ions move between the electrodes,
operating at temperatures within the normal atmospheric range. Depending on
the active materials, different trade-offs of energy density, power density, and cost
are available. In general, Li-ion BES have a high roundtrip efficiency (85-95%),
power density, and energy density, but a significant energy subsystem investment
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cost. However, prices are decreasing quickly because of (1) economies of scale
linked to mass production, and (2) learning effects linked to the deployment of
electric vehicles [50]. Lifetime is good as well, in the same order of magnitude
as NaS. Li-ion systems have been demonstrated up to a few tens of MW with
15min up to about 10 h of storage capacity [14, 30]. This makes them suitable
for both power-based applications such as frequency control, and energy-based
applications such as arbitrage and portfolio management in case cycling is not
too frequent, given their limited cycle-life compared to, e.g., PHS.
Flow batteries
Flow batteries are based on a similar electrochemical process as conventional
BES, but have liquid electrolytes with dissolved active materials stored in two
separate tanks, which are pumped to the electrodes during operation. This
leads to lower self-discharge and the decoupling of power vs. energy sizing, with
the size of the tanks defining the energy capacity. This makes flow batteries
potentially more suitable for mid-to-long term storage compared to other BES
technologies [30]. The cycle-life, with an order of magnitude of ten thousand
cycles, and scalability, are very high, but the maturity is low (demonstration
or pre-commercial phase). Other drawbacks are the low energy density and
high complexity because of pumps and control systems. The investment cost
for the energy storage subsystem is significant as well, and flow batteries are
characterized by a good efficiency and calendar life of 70-85% and 10-20 years,
respectively. Typical flow battery system ratings range from hundreds of kW
to tens of MW for multiple hours. Most commonly used chemistries include
vanadium-vanadium (Va-Va) and zinc-bromine (Zn-Br) [14, 18, 25]. Due to
their scalability, flexible sizing, and long lifetime, flow batteries are expected to
become a BES technology that is well-suited to provide longer duration energy
services, at least in case sufficient space is available (due to their low energy
density), once they become mature.
2.4.7 Fuel cells
Just like BES, fuel cells are composed of individual electrochemical cells. In
contrast to BES, a fuel is used. Common fuels include hydrogen, methanol, and
natural gas. Fuel cells can discharge for as long as this fuel is supplied. Typically,
oxygen, taken from the atmosphere, is used as oxidant. Fuel cells are categorized
by the kind of electrolyte and fuel used, with common types including proton
exchange membrane fuel cells, direct methanol fuel cells, phosphoric acid fuel
cells, alkaline fuel cells, solid oxide fuel cells, and molten carbonate fuel cells [51].
In a unidirectional use of fuel cells, they function as generator given the input of
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fuel, not as electricity storage system. For the latter, unidirectional fuel cells can
be combined with P2G technology. Some fuel cell technologies can be directly
used in a bidirectional way, functioning as both generator and consumer: a
first chemical and electricity are consumed to produce a second chemical, and
the second chemical is consumed to generate electricity and produce the first
chemical [35].
Often cited advantages include a fuel cell’s flexible sizing, scalability (from a kW
to MW scale), and possibility for large energy capacities, while disadvantages
include the system’s roundtrip efficiency (lower than 50%), investment cost, and
the need for a complementary technology, e.g., electrolyzer, for a bidirectional
functioning. In addition, common values for the cycle-life are limited to a few
thousand cycles, and for the calendar life to 5-15 years. Today, only very limited
fuel cell capacity is grid-connected due to its limited maturity.
2.4.8 Power-to-gas
P2G technology stores energy in a chemical form, by converting electricity to
hydrogen and possibly to methane. In charge mode, electricity is consumed
in the electrolysis process by splitting water into hydrogen and oxygen. The
hydrogen can then be stored as such, or combined with carbon dioxide in a
methanation process to form methane, which is then stored. Since hydrogen
can only be injected to a limited amount into the existing natural gas grid, the
methanation step has the advantage that the storage capacity becomes, at least
compared to other electricity storage technologies, extremely large. In second
instance, storage capacities could even be increased when taking new reservoirs,
e.g., depleted oil fields, into account. The disadvantage of the methanation step
is the decreased efficiency. To convert the produced gas back to electricity in
discharge mode, it is used as fuel for a gas turbine or fuel cell. Often cited
roundtrip efficiencies range from 25% to 50% [52].
P2G is currently still in the demonstration phase with projects of several kW
up to 6MW of installed electrolyzer capacity. The modular configuration
of electrolyzers, composed of multiple small electrolyzer cells, allows for
future P2G systems ranging from several kW up to a GW. Although current
roundtrip efficiencies are very low, P2G may offer a high potential, since it
is considered to be the sole electricity storage technology that offers seasonal
storage capabilities [53, 54].5
5While PHS is usually considered to be a storage technology with (dis)charge durations of
several hours up to a few days, countries such as Norway and Switzerland may accommodate
PHS plants with much longer durations as well.
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Chapter 3
Role of electricity storage
Evaluating the role of electricity storage by
considering short-term operation in long-term
planning
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Abstract:
Short-term operating requirements and constraints in power systems are
becoming increasingly important with the greater flexibility needed due to
the integration of variable renewables. However, large problem sizes and
computational barriers have limited the extent to which they are included
in long-term planning models. Our objective is to understand the role of
electricity storage in future renewable-based systems by including an accurate
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representation of short-term operation with high temporal detail within a
long-term planning framework. Specifically, we discuss the development of a
long-term investment model including a continuous relaxation of the technology-
clustered formulation of the short-term unit commitment problem, including
detailed operating reserve sizing and supply. This model is solved for a full
year, and is applied to a test system with system load and renewable generation
characteristics from the Belgian power system in a greenfield setting, i.e.,
assuming no pre-existing capacities, to analyze the role of storage at different
renewable penetration levels. Both pumped-hydro storage and battery energy
storage are considered, and their role in providing energy services and frequency
control is investigated. We derive broadly applicable conclusions on the benefits
and role of electricity storage to motivate why it may be built and operated.
Results show that, in general, the integration of storage resources decreases total
system cost, partially replaces flexible power plants, facilitates the integration of
renewable energy sources, and allows inflexible technologies to perform better.
Positioning:
Qualitative
Quantitative:
system
perspective
Quantitative:
storage operator
perspective
Model development Storage role and value Market design
Chapter 2
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electricity markets
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3.1 Introduction
3.1.1 Motivation
Electricity storage refers to systems, bidirectionally coupled with the power
system, which buffer energy. The energy buffer can be implemented based
on a variety of physical principles: energy stored as thermal, chemical,
electrochemical, kinetic, or potential energy, or in the electromagnetic field [13].
Although PHS is currently the most installed storage technology with ≥ 99%
of global capacity, and significant potential for new PHS capacity may still
be present [3, 57], cost decreases and technological advancements are making
BES increasingly competitive. The storage of electricity is expected to play an
important role in the transition to power systems with high shares of variable
RES in the generation mix [58]. Variable RES technologies, i.e., wind turbines
and PV systems, are characterized by their dependency on weather conditions,
which lead to expected power variations and unexpected forecast errors, and as
such generally increase the variability in the system. This variability can be
dealt with by flexibility, which indicates the ability to provide power adjustments
to keep the system balanced at different time scales. Flexibility can be provided
by flexible supply, flexible demand, and storage, which can also be activated in
neighboring regions through the grid [9].
This chapter studies the role of storage in future RES-based systems by means
of a long-term investment model for generation and storage capacity, commonly
referred to as a generation expansion planning (GEP) model. Conventional
GEP models typically include a simplified representation of short-term system
operation and its costs, through low temporal and operational detail. However,
the ongoing integration of variable RES makes short-term system operation
increasingly important to consider in detail in long-term system planning [29, 59].
It is only by considering a high level of temporal and operational detail that
accurate insights can be obtained in the role of storage.
3.1.2 Literature review
Including temporal and operational detail in generation expansion planning
Four approaches can be identified for the temporal detail, each with a different
trade-off between computation time and the extent to which short-term
operation can be accurately considered. First, planners can use a load duration
curve (LDC), or residual LDC (RLDC) when considering variable RES. This
approach neglects the chronology of the generation and consumption balance,
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and thus does not allow to include intertemporal links and related costs (i.e.,
start-up and shut-down costs, minimum up and down times, ramp rates and
costs, and energy storage buffer dynamics) [22]. Second, some GEP models
represent the seasonal, weekly, and daily variability within a year by a limited
number of time slices [60]. The value for any time slice for the RES generation
and system load corresponds to the average value in the period considered in
the time slice. While this may not result in large approximation errors with low
shares of variable RES, with high shares of variable RES this underestimates the
variability of the residual load, and undervalues flexible technologies compared
to inflexible technologies [61, 62]. Third, GEP models can include a set of
representative periods (e.g., a few days or weeks), chosen such that their RLDC
approaches the RLDC of the entire year [22, 61]. The disadvantage is that
the selection of representative periods may be difficult to justify, and that it
is difficult to represent all variability in the system in a limited set of periods,
thereby leading to inaccuracies [60]. Fourth, the most accurate approach, but
also the most computationally intensive one, is the use of hourly time steps for
the entire year. While this is common practice in short-term models, it is not
for long-term models due to the increase in problem size.
The operational detail determines how accurately technical constraints on the
power plant level (i.e., commitment decisions, generation limits, ramp rates,
minimum up and down times, energy storage buffer dynamics) and system level
(i.e., power balance, reserve balance) are taken into account. High operational
detail is typically present in short-term power system models, i.e., UC and
economic dispatch models, which can assess the impact of RES integration on
system operation, and thus on the scheduling of power plants. They are generally
used to focus on issues related to flexibility adequacy, i.e., the short-term ability
to keep the system balanced. In contrast, long-term power system models,
i.e., investment and GEP models, can assess the impact of RES integration
on system planning, and thus on the generation mix. They are generally
used to focus on issues related to system adequacy, i.e., the ability to meet
peak demand. To keep computation efforts within limits, they typically do
not consider the same level of operational detail as short-term models [63].
Historically, low operational detail could be present in GEP models without
large approximation errors [64, 65]. However, this is not the case with the
greater flexibility required due to the integration of variable RES: short-term
operation becomes increasingly important to consider in long-term planning [66].
Not considering this leads to an underestimation of the need for and value
of flexibility [29, 59]. In this regard, two approaches to increase operational
detail in GEP can be identified [61]. In the first approach, the investment and
operation problem are considered separately and sequentially, i.e., the results of
the investment problem are ex post used as input for the operation problem.
This is referred to as the so-called soft-linking of both problems, which can also
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be solved iteratively [67]. In the second approach, the operation problem with
high operational detail and the investment problem are solved together and
simultaneously.
Role of electricity storage in power systems
The role and value of storage has already been studied in the existing literature
with varying levels of capacity expansion opportunities and temporal and
operational detail.
First, many studies have examined the benefits of storage on system operation
by considering predetermined generation and storage portfolios, not allowing for
endogenous capacity expansions (e.g., [68, 69, 70, 71, 72, 73]). This is typically
done by comparing results, in terms of operational costs, dispatch schedules, or
RES curtailment, of a reference case without storage with one or multiple cases
including storage.
Second, others focus exclusively on the storage sizing problem given exogenously-
defined generation portfolios. Ref. [74] optimizes storage investments considering
the residual load and using a simplified representation of short-term operation,
with storage as a way to compensate excess RES generation. In [75] storage
sizing is based on the system’s variability, while in [76] it is based on the system’s
uncertainty, and [77, 78, 79] consider both to determine storage requirements
over different time scales.
Third, the final category of studies co-optimizes storage with generation
investments. Ref. [80] uses some form of RLDC method, neglecting the
chronology of the required power balance over time, thereby not capturing
intertemporal links and related costs. Ref. [81] does not consider any operational
detail in the planning of storage, generation, and grid capacity. Ref. [82]
considers an hourly power balance, subject to operational constraints, but does
not consider reserve requirements. In [83], a detailed combined investment and
dispatch model is proposed, which neglects commitment decisions, minimum
load levels, and minimum up and down times, but aims to compensate
this shortcoming through ramping penalties. Ref. [84] includes a detailed
representation of system operation, but considers exogenous investments in RES
and endogenous investments in selected conventional generation technologies and
CAES, and includes simplified reserve modeling. In [85] and [34, 86], a detailed
short-term operation is included, but only a limited number of representative
days is considered. This may lead to inaccurate representations of consumption
and RES generation variations, and may not fully capture the added value of
the ability of mid-to-long-term storage to shift energy between more distant, or
longer, periods of time. Finally, [87] includes a lot of operational detail, but only
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considers four representative weeks, and assumes fixed E2P ratios for storage,
making it difficult to gain insight in optimal storage sizing for energy-related
vs. power-related services. In addition, whereas we focus on RES generation
targets, [87] focuses on CO2 emission goals.
3.1.3 Scope and contributions
This chapter’s scope and contribution is the illustration of the role of electricity
storage in future RES-based systems by including an accurate representation of
short-term system operation within a long-term planning framework.
We first discuss the development of a combined, and simultaneously solved,
long-term investment and short-term operation model with high temporal and
operational detail. We consider hourly periods for a full year, and consider high
operational detail in line with what is considered in a short-term power system
model. In order to be able to solve numerically for meaningful optimization
horizons, short-term operation is modeled through a continuously-relaxed and
technology-clustered approximation of the conventional mixed-integer plant-
level UC problem. This model is able to capture the increasing impact of
flexibility needs in both the close-to-RT scheduling phase (i.e., energy market)
and RT operation phase (i.e., reserve market), following the ongoing integration
of variable RES, and includes a detailed representation of the flexibility supply
by both generation and storage technologies. The representation of operating
reserves is unparalled in that it includes detailed exogenous and endogenous
reserve sizing, and periodical (i.e., for multiple hourly periods) reserve allocation
to providers, in line with the market design in Europe.
Second, we apply this model to a test system with system load and RES
generation characteristics from the Belgian power system in a greenfield setting,
i.e., assuming no pre-existing capacities. We do not aim to determine likely
deployment scenarios or address optimal pathways towards the future, but to
derive general conclusions on the benefits and role of storage at different RES
penetration levels, and to gain insight in the interdependency between flexibility
options.1 Both PHS and BES are considered, and their role in providing energy
services and frequency control is investigated. We consider different storage
scenarios with regard to the available natural potential for PHS and decreasing
cost of the energy storage subsystem of BES.
1Nevertheless, the developed model can be used for a wide range of other studies as well,
such as analyses on the value of RES in different flexibility scenarios, the impact of policy
decisions and market design rules, and the impact of technological breakthroughs.
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3.2 Methodology
The developed model is a partial equilibrium model, focusing solely on the
electricity sector. It decides on the investments in and dispatch of generation
and storage capacity to meet the demand for energy and reserves at lowest
total system cost, while respecting detailed short-term operation constraints,
and reaching increasing RES targets. Results from such a system perspective
approach may serve as a proxy for the outcome in a vertically integrated
environment, an unbundled environment with a centralized electricity pool model
(e.g., the PJM market), or a liberalized market with bilateral and exchange-based
trading (e.g., the European market) assuming perfect competition [88].
All technologies are defined as either injection or offtake technologies. In the
developed model injection technologies include dispatchable and intermittent
generation, and storage discharging. In real power systems they also include
import from adjacent markets through interconnection capacity, and the
postponing of flexible consumption. Offtake technologies include storage
charging, but in real systems they also include export to adjacent markets, and
the forwarding of flexible consumption.
3.2.1 Continuously-relaxed and technology-clustered UC for-
mulation
The mixed-integer plant-level UC problem alone is already computationally
challenging to solve for significant optimization horizons, even in its deterministic
form and without grid representation. This is in part due to its many and
elaborate techno-economic constraints, but especially because of the many
commitment decisions represented by binary variables for each unit for each
time step. Therefore, a more computational-friendly formulation of the UC
problem needs to be included as a subproblem next to the investment problem
within a GEP model with high temporal detail. To reduce problem size and
facilitate manageable computation times, we couple a continuous relaxation
of the technology-clustered formulation of the UC problem to the investment
problem.2
2Although this continuously-relaxed and technology-clustered approximation should not
be used to analyze actual system operation, it is valuable to include short-term operation in
long-term planning.
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Technology-clustered UC formulation
A technology-clustered formulation combines identical or similar units into
clusters, which assumes nonbinding transmission constraints, i.e., a copper
plate, and identical techno-economic characteristics of units within a cluster.
The latter introduces approximation errors for existing capacity, as for this
capacity differences among units exist due to project-specific elements, but not
for new capacity, as for this capacity it is common practice in planning studies
to use generalized data. The use of technology-generalized data thus impacts
the results in long-term GEP with capacity legacy, but does not introduce errors
compared to plant-level formulations in long-term greenfield GEP [22, 63, 89].
Approximation errors occur because of the inherent mathematical difference
between plant-level and clustered formulations. However, [22, 89] show that a
clustered formulation only results in minimal errors (i.e., near or below 1%)
while needing significantly less computation time (i.e., up to 2 000 times), which
is also confirmed by [90], thereby justifying the use of a technology-clustered
UC formulation in GEP models.
Clustering reduces the problem size in two ways. First, the large set of binary
variables representing the commitment decision of individual units (i.e., 0 or 1)
is replaced by a smaller set of integer variables that represent the commitment
decision of a cluster (i.e., from 0 to the number of units in the cluster). Second,
clustering also reduces the number of continuous equations and variables, as
all decisions except a unit’s commitment (i.e., power output, reserve provision)
apply to the small number of clusters rather than the large set of individual
units. Commitment decisions are still captured at the unit level.
Continuously-relaxed UC formulation
In addition, to include the UC problem in an investment framework, computation
times are further reduced by replacing the integer commitment variables by
linear commitment variables. Such a linearized technology-clustered formulation
of the short-term UC problem coupled to the long-term investment problem
has already been successfully used in [29, 91]. Of all short-term operating
constraints, [91] found that relaxing integers provides the best accuracy vs.
computation time trade-off for power system planning purposes, and concludes
that a continuously-relaxed and technology-clustered formulation is strongly
advised for GEP studies focusing on flexibility.
METHODOLOGY 45
3.2.2 Objective function
The objective of the developed model is to determine the generation and
storage mix, output schedules, and reserve provision, such that the demand
for energy and reserve capacity is met at the lowest total system cost over
the full optimization horizon |H| · T h (3.1). The total system cost consists
of the following costs for all injection and offtake technologies: the power-
related investment cost, fixed operation and maintenance (O&M) cost, fuel cost,
variable O&M cost, ramp cost, start-up cost, and shut-down cost; the following
additional costs for all storage technologies: the energy-related investment cost,
and depreciation cost following excessive storage cycling; and finally the load
shedding cost in case of insufficient available supply, and curtailment cost in
case of excess renewable generation:
min
[∑
i∈I
[
(C inv,inji + C
fom,inj
i ) · pinst,inji +
∑
h∈H
[
(Cfuel,inji + C
vom,inj
i ) · pinji,h · T h
+Cra,inji · (pru,inji,h + prd,inji,h ) + Csu,inji · psu,inji,h + Csd,inji · psd,inji,h
]]
+
∑
o∈O
[
(C inv,offo + Cfom,offo ) · pinst,offo +
∑
h∈H
[
(Cfuel,offo + Cvom,offo ) · poffo,h · T h
+Cra,offo · (pru,offo,h + prd,offo,h ) + Csu,offo · psu,offo,h + Csd,offo · psd,offo,h
]]
+
∑
s∈S
(C inv,es · einsts ) +
∑
h∈H
(
C ls · plsh +
∑
i∈II
C li · pl,inji,h
)]
/(|H| · T h)
+
∑
s∈S
ccycs . (3.1)
3.2.3 Power system constraints
Three requirements are considered on the system level. First, an hourly power
balance between scheduled generation and consumption is included, i.e., the
energy market-clearing constraint (3.2), ensuring that the expected variability
in the system is dealt with. Second, an hourly balance between the demand
for and supply of reserve capacity is included, i.e., the reserve market-clearing
constraint (3.3), ensuring that the unexpected variability in the system is dealt
with. ENTSO-E categorizes reserves into three groups. FCR, i.e., primary
control, is activated automatically to stabilize the frequency in a matter of
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seconds. FRR is either activated automatically (aFRR), i.e., secondary control,
or manually (mFRR), i.e., fast tertiary control, and restores the system frequency
by restoring the balance in the control zone, thereby relieving the activated FCR.
Finally, RR, i.e., slow tertiary control, can be used to support or relieve the
activated FRR [29]. In the developed model the demand for reserves includes
an exogenously-determined component in line with current system imbalances
(SIs), and an endogenously-determined component to deal with additional SI
volumes due to forecast errors of increasing levels of RES generation. The latter
is endogenously-determined as it depends on the installed RES capacity, which
is decided upon during the optimization and increases with the RES generation
target. The sizing of both components is discussed in Section 3.2.7. Third, a
system-wide RES generation target is imposed to ensure that a predefined share
of the consumption is covered by RES (3.4):
∑
i∈I
pinji,h −
∑
o∈O
poffo,h = Dh − plsh , ∀h ∈ H, (3.2)
∑
i∈I
rinjr,i,h +
∑
o∈O
roffr,o,h = Rexr +
∑
i∈II
(Renr,i · pinst,inji ), ∀ r ∈ R,h ∈ H, (3.3)
∑
h∈H
∑
i∈II
pinji,h ≥ Sres ·
∑
h∈H
Dh. (3.4)
3.2.4 Dispatchable injection and offtake constraints
Flexibility is provided through cycling, which can be defined as changing the
output by starting up, shutting down, or ramping up and down. Techno-
economic constraints that limit this cycling include commitment decisions,
start-up and shut-down costs, minimum and maximum output levels, minimum
up and down times, and ramp rates and costs. Since the modeling of dispatchable
injections and offtakes is quite similar, only the constraints for the former are
described here. They only differ in the provision of reserve capacity: while a
potential increase in injection output contributes to the provision of upward
reserve, a potential increase in offtake output contributes to the provision of
downward reserve, and vice versa for a potential decrease in output. While the
operation of dispatchable generators is fully described by (3.5)-(3.31), storage
operation is additionally subject to the offtake constraints and the constraints
discussed in Section 3.2.6.
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Commitment constraints
A cluster’s number of online units can change by starting up oﬄine units or
shutting down online units (3.5). It is limited to the maximum available number
of online units, determined by the ratio of the installed capacity and typical
unit size (3.6). The number of oﬄine units that can start up, or be reserved to
start up to provide reserve, is limited to the units that have been oﬄine for at
least the minimum down time (3.7). Similarly, the number of online units that
can shut down, or be reserved to shut down to provide reserve, is limited to the
units that have been online for at least the minimum up time (3.8):
ninji,h+1 = n
inj
i,h + n
su,inj
i,h − nsd,inji,h , ∀ i ∈ ID,h ∈ H, (3.5)
ninji,h ≤ pinst,inji /P inji , ∀ i ∈ ID,h ∈ H, (3.6)
nsu,inji,h +
∑
r∈RU
nsur,injr,i,h ≤ pinst,inji /P inji − ninji,h −
∑
z∈Z
nsd,inji,h−z, ∀ i ∈ ID,h ∈ H, (3.7)
nsd,inji,h +
∑
r∈RD
nsdr,injr,i,h ≤ ninji,h −
∑
w∈W
nsu,inji,h−w, ∀ i ∈ ID,h ∈ H. (3.8)
Output level constraints
A cluster’s output level can change by ramping online units up or down, starting
up oﬄine units, or shutting down online units (3.9). The output level is limited
by the generation limits of the online units (3.10)-(3.11). Units starting up have
to at least reach the minimum output level, and are constrained by the start-up
ramp rate (3.12)-(3.13). A technology’s start-up ramp rate is defined as the
maximum of the required ramp rate to reach the minimum output level over
one time step and the spinning ramp rate to allow all technologies to start-up
in a single hourly time step. Similarly, units shutting down have to be able
to ramp down to a zero output level from at least the minimum output level,
and are constrained by the shut-down ramp rate (3.14)-(3.15), which is defined
similar to the start-up ramp rate. Ramping online units up and down is limited
by the spinning ramp rate, while ensuring that ramping ability reserved for
reserve provision is accounted for separately from the ramping that occurs in
the scheduling phase to provide energy services (3.16)-(3.17). In addition to
the spinning ramp rate, the ramping ability for online units is also constrained
by the capacity available to perform spinning ramping (3.18)-(3.19):
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pinji,h+1 = p
inj
i,h + p
ru,inj
i,h − prd,inji,h + psu,inji,h − psd,inji,h , ∀ i ∈ ID,h ∈ H, (3.9)
pinji,h ≥ ninji,h · Pmin,inji · P inji , ∀ i ∈ ID,h ∈ H, (3.10)
pinji,h ≤ ninji,h · P inji , ∀ i ∈ ID,h ∈ H, (3.11)
psu,inji,h ≥ nsu,inji,h · Pmin,inji · P inji , ∀ i ∈ ID,h ∈ H, (3.12)
psu,inji,h ≤ nsu,inji,h ·Rsu,inji · T h · P inji , ∀ i ∈ ID,h ∈ H, (3.13)
psd,inji,h ≥ nsd,inji,h · Pmin,inji · P inji , ∀ i ∈ ID,h ∈ H, (3.14)
psd,inji,h ≤ nsd,inji,h ·Rsd,inji · T h · P inji , ∀ i ∈ ID,h ∈ H, (3.15)
pru,inji,h +
∑
RU
rs,injr,i,h ≤ (ninji,h − nsd,inji,h ) ·Rs,inji · T h · P inji , ∀ i ∈ ID,h ∈ H, (3.16)
prd,inji,h +
∑
RD
rs,injr,i,h ≤ (ninji,h − nsd,inji,h −
∑
RD
nsdr,injr,i,h )
·Rs,inji · T h · P inji , ∀ i ∈ ID,h ∈ H, (3.17)
pru,inji,h +
∑
RU
rs,injr,i,h ≤ (ninji,h − nsd,inji,h ) · P inji
−(pinji,h − psd,inji,h ), ∀ i ∈ ID,h ∈ H, (3.18)
prd,inji,h +
∑
RD
rs,injr,i,h ≤ (pinji,h − psd,inji,h −
∑
RD
rsd,injr,i,h )
−(ninji,h − nsd,inji,h −
∑
RD
nsdr,injr,i,h ) · Pmin,inji · P inji , ∀ i ∈ ID,h ∈ H. (3.19)
Reserve provision constraints
Dispatchable injection technologies provide upward reserve through online units
that can increase their output and oﬄine units that can start up (3.20), and
downward reserve through online units that can decrease their output or shut
down (3.21). Contracting FCR with injection technology i is limited by the
technology’s FCR-specific spinning ramp rate (3.22), (3.25), while contracting
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FCR plus aFRR is limited by the aFRR-specific spinning ramp rate (3.23), (3.26),
and contracting FCR plus aFRR plus mFRR is limited by the mFRR-specific
spinning ramp rate (3.24), (3.27). Units providing reserve through starting up
or shutting down are also limited by this reserve-specific ramping ability, and
need to be able to overcome at least the minimum output level (3.28)-(3.31):
rinjr,i,h = r
s,inj
r,i,h + r
su,inj
r,i,h , ∀ r ∈ RU, i ∈ ID,h ∈ H, (3.20)
rinjr,i,h = r
s,inj
r,i,h + r
sd,inj
r,i,h , ∀ r ∈ RD, i ∈ ID,h ∈ H, (3.21)∑
r∈RUF
rs,injr,i,h ≤ (ninji,h − nsd,inji,h ) ·Rs,r,injfcr,i · P inji , ∀ i ∈ ID,h ∈ H, (3.22)
∑
r∈RUA
rs,injr,i,h ≤ (ninji,h − nsd,inji,h ) ·Rs,r,injafrr,i · P inji , ∀ i ∈ ID,h ∈ H, (3.23)
∑
r∈RU
rs,injr,i,h ≤ (ninji,h − nsd,inji,h ) ·Rs,r,injmfrr,i · P inji , ∀ i ∈ ID,h ∈ H, (3.24)
∑
r∈RDF
rs,injr,i,h ≤ (ninji,h − nsd,inji,h −
∑
r∈RD
nsdr,injr,i,h )
·Rs,r,injfcr,i · P inji , ∀ i ∈ ID,h ∈ H, (3.25)∑
r∈RDA
rs,injr,i,h ≤ (ninji,h − nsd,inji,h −
∑
r∈RD
nsdr,injr,i,h )
·Rs,r,injafrr,i · P inji , ∀ i ∈ ID,h ∈ H, (3.26)∑
r∈RD
rs,injr,i,h ≤ (ninji,h − nsd,inji,h −
∑
r∈RD
nsdr,injr,i,h )
·Rs,r,injmfrr,i · P inji , ∀ i ∈ ID,h ∈ H, (3.27)
rsu,injr,i,h ≥ nsur,injr,i,h · Pmin,inji · P inji , ∀ r ∈ RU, i ∈ ID,h ∈ H, (3.28)
rsu,injr,i,h ≤ nsur,injr,i,h ·Rs,r,injr,i · P inji , ∀ r ∈ RU, i ∈ ID,h ∈ H, (3.29)
rsd,injr,i,h ≥ nsdr,injr,i,h · Pmin,inji · P inji , ∀ r ∈ RD, i ∈ ID,h ∈ H, (3.30)
rsd,injr,i,h ≤ nsdr,injr,i,h ·Rs,r,injr,i · P inji , ∀ r ∈ RD, i ∈ ID,h ∈ H. (3.31)
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3.2.5 Intermittent injection constraints
Renewable generation volumes are driven by weather conditions and support
schemes, rather than by electricity prices. As such, they are usually modeled as
negative load, resulting in a residual load to be met by dispatchable units.
However, the renewable generators’ participation in electricity markets is
becoming increasingly active, with the possibility to curtail output. They
have close-to-zero (or even negative if subsidized) marginal costs, a time-varying
maximum power output, and limited operating constraints. The time-varying
RES output is calculated by using a normalized feed-in profile, which is scaled
by the installed capacity. This available output can either be injected in the
grid to be consumed, or curtailed in case of oversupply (3.32):
pinji,h + p
l,inj
i,h = A
res
i,h · pinst,inji , ∀ i ∈ II,h ∈ H. (3.32)
Although RES may provide contracted reserve to the TSO if tender periods are
sufficiently short (e.g., hours), they are not able to contribute in the provision
of reserve in the analyzed case study due to the assumed monthly contract
periods (Section 3.2.7). In current markets especially wind generators already
provide downward reserve through noncontracted reserve for short periods of
time. In the future, these may provide upward reserve as well when constantly
performing under their availability limit, and PV systems may also provide
reserve through improved control and aggregation.
3.2.6 Electricity storage constraints
Storage systems are subject to energy buffer dynamics and a limited cycle-life.
Furthermore, a symmetrical development of charge and discharge power ratings
is assumed.
During charging, only part of the consumed electric energy is converted to
energy stored in the buffer due to a charge efficiency, while during discharging,
only part of the stored energy is converted back into electric energy due to
a discharge efficiency (3.33). These additions and removals have to respect
the minimum and maximum storage capacity, while the available range to
provide energy services is constrained in both directions by the margins that
are contracted for reserve provision (3.34)-(3.35). Linear ramping is assumed
from the current output level to the output after activation in T 1,rr . The energy
capacity that is reserved for reserve provision is assumed to be the energy
required for both the linear ramping and to maintain reserve provision up to
T 2,rr (Fig. 3.1).
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Storage plants have a limited lifetime, which is either determined by the calendar
life in case of infrequent use or by the cycle-life in case of frequent use. The
calendar life is the maximum time that it can be used, independent from the
operation, while the cycle-life takes into account the deterioration of the energy
storage subsystem due to use [9, 92]. While the cycle-life limits the operation of
BES, for PHS the cycle-life is sufficiently large such that the depreciation cost
following cycling patterns is negligible. Although there is no direct constraint
on the number of cycles during the considered optimization period, due to the
limited cycle-life a constant targeted cycling rate is implied throughout the
lifetime. If the cycling rate is lower than or equal to this targeted cycling rate, the
additional depreciation cost from cycling is zero, otherwise it is positive (3.36):
es,h+1 = es,h + (ηoffs · poffs,h − pinjs,h/ηinjs ) · T h, ∀ s ∈ S,h ∈ H, (3.33)
es,h ≥ (1/ηinjs ) ·
∑
r∈RU
[
(rinjr,s,h · T 1,rr )/2 + rinjr,s,h
·(T 2,rr − T 1,rr )
]
, ∀ s ∈ S,h ∈ H, (3.34)
es,h ≤ einsts − ηoffs ·
∑
r∈RD
[
(roffr,s,h · T 1,rr )/2 + roffr,s,h
·(T 2,rr − T 1,rr )
]
, ∀ s ∈ S,h ∈ H, (3.35)
ccycs ≥ C inv,es · (ηoffs ·
∑
h∈H
poffs,h/N
cyc
s − einsts /N cal,injs ), ∀ s ∈ S. (3.36)
3.2.7 Reserve sizing
FCR sizing
The required FCR is determined on the ENTSO-E level, and is set at 3GW
for the synchronous area of continental Europe, covering the outage of two
of the largest elements (i.e., an N-2 criterion). This effort is shared over the
different control zones according to their share in the system [93, 94]. In line
with the volume currently contracted by Elia, an exogenously-determined FCR
requirement of 100MW in both the up and downward direction is included in
the analyzed case study. Since Elia does not expect significant changes in the
need for FCR [95], the endogenously-determined FCR requirement is zero.
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Figure 3.1: Energy storage capacity that needs to be reserved to provide reserve
capacity (A + B).
FRR and RR sizing
The sizing of FRR and RR is the responsibility of the TSO, subject to ENTSO-E
guidelines, and is based on both a deterministic and probabilistic assessment.
The deterministic assessment considers the largest possible SI due to the loss of a
single grid element. For Belgium the loss of a 1GW interconnector is considered
(i.e., the future Nemo interconnector). The FRR to be contracted has to at
least be sufficient to cover such an event in both directions. The probabilistic
assessment is based on recent historical SI time series of at least a full year, and
determines the combined amount of FRR and RR to be contracted. ENTSO-E
requests that the contracted amount of FRR and RR at least should be able
to cover 99% of the observed SIs in both directions (Fig. 3.2a), which is also
imposed in the considered case study. In case the reserve sizing based on the
probabilistic assessment results in lower reserve needs than the deterministic
assessment, the latter is kept as a minimum for the amount of FRR that
needs to be contracted. Although RR may be contracted to cover the gap
between both in case the probabilistic assessment results in higher reserve
needs than the deterministic analysis, this gap may also be covered by FRR as
contracting RR capacity is not required. Since Elia does not contract RR, it is
not considered here [93, 94]. Similar to the approach used by Elia [93], after
having determined the total FRR need, a time series of the difference between
the SI of consecutive quarter-hourly periods, representing the volatility of the
SI, is considered to determine the share of aFRR (Fig. 3.2b). The aFRR to be
contracted is determined by the required capacity to cover a certain percentage
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of the volatility of the SI in both directions. In the analyzed case study this
percentage is assumed to be 80%, in line with information provided by Elia [95].
The remaining FRR to be contracted to cover the total FRR need determines
the amount of mFRR (Fig. 3.2c).
99% 99%
aFRR
neg pos
mFRR
neg
mFRR
pos
RR
neg
RR
pos
[W]
Occurrence of SI
[% of time]
Power
deficit
Power
surplus
(a) Probabilistic sizing.
Q1 Q2 Q3 Q4
SI
aFRR
input
Time [s]
[W]
(b) SI volatility.
80% 80%
aFRRaFRR
neg pos
[W]
Occurrence of SI volatility
[% of time]
Incremental
change
Decremental
change
(c) Sizing of aFRR.
Figure 3.2: Probabilistic reserve sizing in line with the approach used by Elia.
Since the previously discussed sizing determines the FRR need for the
current situation, it represents the exogenously-determined aFRR and mFRR
requirements. In contrast to FCR, the endogenously-determined aFRR and
mFRR requirements are nonzero due to increasing absolute levels of forecast
errors with larger RES penetrations. For each intermittent RES technology a
probability density function (PDF) of the normalized forecast errors is introduced
by comparing the DA forecast with the RT output and describing the error
by means of a normal distribution. Similar to the method for the exogenous
component, the 99% quantile in both directions determines the total endogenous
FRR requirement. Afterwards, this total FRR requirement is again translated
to endogenously-determined aFRR and mFRR needs. Again, the aFRR to be
contracted is determined by the required capacity to cover 80% of the forecast
error’s volatility. This is then complemented by mFRR to meet the total
endogenously-determined FRR needs. It is assumed that variable RES only
increase the need for upward reserve. In case of unexpected excess generation,
the market design is expected to incentivize RES to curtail output if insufficient
alternative downward flexibility is available.
Sizing and contract periods
In the analyzed case study the reserve requirements are sized on a yearly
basis, while, in line with current reserve procurement trends in Europe, shorter
contract periods (here monthly) for reserve capacity are considered. Abstraction
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is made from which share of the reserve requirements is to be procured by the
TSO as a frequency control service to balance its control zone, or by market
participants to keep their portfolio balanced.
3.3 Data, scenarios, and assumptions
3.3.1 Data
Four dispatchable generation technologies are taken into account, i.e., base, mid,
peak, and high peak load, each having different techno-economic characteristics,
and ordered in terms of decreasing fixed cost and increasing variable cost. The
first two technologies are nuclear and coal power plants, respectively, whereas
peak and high peak load technologies correspond to combined cycle gas turbines
(CCGTs) and open cycle gas turbines (OCGTs), respectively. In addition,
three variable RES technologies, i.e., onshore wind, offshore wind, and PV, and
two electricity storage technologies, i.e., PHS and Li-ion BES, are considered.
Although many different estimates for the cost data and technical parameters
are available, the assumed input data is inspired by [61, 96, 97, 98], and is shown
in Table 3.1 and Table 3.2. These values may deviate from actual levels, but the
relative levels for the different technologies are believed to be representative.
To limit the reserve capacity that can be provided, the ramp rate on a minute
basis Rm,inji /Rm,offo is used. In line with guidelines from the Belgian TSO
Elia [99], we assume that capacity providing reserve has to be able to perform
the promised change in power output in T 1,rr , being 0.5min for FCR, 7.5min
for aFRR, and 15min for mFRR (Fig. 3.1). As such, the technologies’ spinning
ramp rate for each reserve category Rs,r,injr,i /Rs,r,offr,o can be derived (e.g., R
s,r,inj
r,i =
Rm,inji ·T 1,rr ). Since the ramp rate on a minute basis is usually defined as being
faster compared to the hourly ramp rate for continuous operation to provide
energy services in the scheduling phase, the reserve-specific spinning ramp rate
is then limited by this continuous operation ramp rate to avoid situations in
which more ramping is possible in 7.5min or 15min than in an hour. While
those fast ramp rates on a minute basis may be appropriate for infrequent use
(i.e., reserve provision), they are believed to be too high for continuous operation
(i.e., electricity generation), potentially incurring additional O&M costs.
We use hourly RES power output data from Elia [100] and consumption data
from ENTSO-E [101], for Belgium for 2014. For this period PV is characterized
by 1 054 full load hours, while onshore and offshore wind are characterized by
2 046 and 3 600 full load hours, respectively. Average consumption is 9 539MW,
fluctuating between a minimum of 6 623MW and a maximum of 13 110MW.
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Table 3.2: Technical input parameters. Electricity storage charge and discharge (i.e.,
offtake and injection) parameters are assumed to be identical, except for the minimum
load requirement (Pmin,inji /Pmin,offo ). In addition, T
mut,inj
i corresponds to |W|, while
Tmdt,inji corresponds to |Z|.
Name P inji P
min,inj
i R
s,inj
i R
m,inj
i η
inj
s T
mut,inj
i T
mdt,inj
i N
cyc
s
[MW] [%] [%/h] [%/min] [%] [h] [h] [-]
Base 400 50 33 3 - 24 24 -
Mid 300 50 50 4 - 6 4 -
Peak 200 50 80 6 - 4 1 -
hPeak 100 10 100 10 - 1 1 -
BES 10 0 100 100 95 0 0 3000
PHS 100 30/70 100 50 87 0 0 ∞
Using data from Elia, the exogenous aFRR and mFRR requirements are 157MW
and 843MW, respectively, in both directions, while the endogenous aFRR and
mFRR requirements amount to 0.01MW and 0.12MW per MW PV, 0.02MW
and 0.15MW per MW onshore wind, and 0.05MW and 0.33MW per MW
offshore wind, respectively, all in the upward direction.
Since a high RES curtailment cost corresponds to today’s electricity markets
with subsidies, and a zero (or low) RES curtailment cost corresponds to future
markets without subsidies but with active RES participation, we assume a RES
curtailment cost of 0 e/MWh. Finally, the cost of involuntary load shedding is
set at 3 000 e/MWh, based on the price cap in the DA market of the CWE
region.
3.3.2 Scenarios
The portfolio and operation of the system is optimized with an hourly time
resolution. Five increasing targets for the share of RES in the final consumption,
ranging from 0 % to 50 %, are considered. Furthermore, four storage scenarios
are considered. The reference storage scenario, in which no storage is available
to be installed, serves as benchmark. By comparing it with the results of
the other three scenarios, the role and value of electricity storage can be
analyzed. In scenario 1 both PHS and BES are available to be installed, while in
scenario 2 the available PHS energy capacity is limited to 8.7GWh. The chosen
upper limit is based on the conventional Belgian PHS capacity, considering the
currently developed capacity, i.e., Coo-Trois-Ponts I and II, and Plate-Taille,
and the recently proposed extension of the Coo-Trois-Ponts PHS plant [3].
Finally, scenario 3 studies the impact of a future reduction of the energy-related
investment cost of BES from 300e/kWh to 150e/kWh, while keeping the upper
limit for PHS at 8.7GWh.
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3.3.3 Assumptions
First, although the test system includes system load and RES generation
characteristics for Belgium, we abstract from an actual system with capacity
legacy but instead adopt a long-term greenfield approach. While this does
not allow to derive deployment scenarios or optimal pathways, it gives
broadly applicable system-independent insights in the role and value of storage
technologies, and in the interdependency of the included flexibility options. The
developed GEP model however allows to include capacity legacy by imposing
starting values per technology, and can thus also be used for studies that focus
on optimal future portfolios for specific countries or regions.
Second, since not all services that storage can provide are considered (e.g.,
voltage support, congestion management, and black-start capabilities), this
analysis may underestimate the total value of storage for the system.
Third, since the different flexibility sources are to some extent interchangeable,
the transition to a RES-based power system can be achieved through various
portfolios of flexibility sources. As flexible demand is not considered, the results
may overestimate the absolute supply of flexibility by storage. In addition, since
exchange with neighboring regions is not considered, the possibility to import
flexibility supply or to smoothen system variability is neglected, thereby most
likely overestimating the need for local flexibility. Furthermore, the linear scaling
of historic RES generation profiles further overestimates absolute flexibility
needs, as it neglects possibly smoother RES generation profiles by future changes
in geographical distribution.
Fourth, in GEP it is common practice to ignore the internal grid, to not constrain
the applicability of the results by the current network. We assume a copper
plate as the grid can be upgraded in the long-run and we aim to derive broadly
applicable insights, and in order to be able to solve numerically for a full year
with high operational detail. Instead, GEP is typically considered separately
from network expansion planning, with the GEP output serving as input for
the network expansion planning model. We thus do not distinguish between
the locations or voltage levels to which generation and storage capacities are
connected. In real systems the total flexibility need may consist of needs at
the transmission and distribution level, possibly requiring different technical
solutions.
Fifth, the various sources of uncertainty (e.g., load, RES generation) are
addressed with a deterministic approach, given the computational complexity
due to the included high temporal and operational detail. This is in line with
other GEP works including such detailed short-term operation, as for these
models it is computationally impractical to consider the recent developments
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in stochastic UC formulations. Decisions are based on expected values of
probabilistic input parameters, but three reserve products are contracted and
scheduled to deal with deviations from these expected values, and thus to deal
with uncertainty. The reserve sizing includes a deterministic and probabilistic
assessment, and considers unexpected outages and unexpected variations in
the load and RES generation. It provides both exogenous and endogenous
reserve requirements. The latter increase with the installed variable RES
capacity to deal with the increasing uncertainty in the system due to its limited
predictability.
These simplifications contribute to the computational solvability of the presented
combined long-term investment and detailed short-term operation model for
a full year, and to the traceability of results. The aim is to derive general
conclusions on the role and value of electricity storage in renewable power
systems, thereby not focusing on absolute numbers in the results of individual
scenarios, but on orders of magnitude and differences between the four scenarios.
3.4 Results
3.4.1 Total system cost
The availability of electricity storage lowers total system cost (Fig. 3.3). This
is true for all three storage scenarios, and its explanation is threefold. First,
storage can compensate the system’s expected variability by storing base load
and RES generation in times of low residual load, and (partly) replacing peak
and high peak load generation in times of high residual load. As such, the
rather inflexible base and mid load generation technologies can be operated
more efficiently, while the need for flexible peak and high peak load generators
decreases. The negative correlation among RES penetration and storage fuel
cost, the latter being related to the energy losses and the price at which energy is
stored, represents a valuable advantage for storage that increases with the RES
target. Second, storage can compensate the system’s unexpected variability by
providing reserve. As such, inefficient scheduling to keep conventional generators
online (partly-loaded) to provide spinning reserve can be reduced.3 This lowers
the incompressible part of supply, thereby decreasing RES curtailment in times
of low residual demand, and contributes to efficient merit-order scheduling.
Third, less RES capacity needs to be installed to reach the imposed RES targets.
Excess RES generation that otherwise had to be curtailed can now be stored,
3Upward FCR and aFRR is provided as spinning reserve by base, mid, and peak generators
as they cannot start-up in time to provide them as nonspinning reserve. In addition, all
downward reserve categories are provided as spinning reserve by all conventional generators.
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or simply generated to be consumed since the incompressible part of supply is
lower with storage as flexibility provider compared to conventional generators.
Scenario 1 leads to the lowest system cost, while scenario 2 is still characterized
by significant cost savings compared to the reference scenario but ends up at a
higher total cost than scenario 1. Finally, in scenario 3, the total system cost
decreases again compared to scenario 2 but remains well above scenario 1.
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Figure 3.3: Total system cost relative to the case with a 0% RES target in the
reference scenario.
3.4.2 Generation and storage mix
Fig. 3.4 shows the installed capacities for the reference scenario and the three
storage scenarios, based on which four observations can be made. First, when
storage resources are available, less RES capacity is needed to reach the imposed
RES target. Depending on the storage scenario, this leads to 9.7%-10.4%,
10.8%-16.7%, and 9.5%-17.0% less installed RES capacity to reach a 30%,
40%, and 50% RES target, respectively. This may be important in countries
where the available land area for wind turbines or PV systems is scarce or faces
opposition. Second, storage resources allow base load plants to remain in the
optimal mix to a larger extent. Depending on the storage scenario, its installed
capacity increases by 67.2%-67.9%, 76.2%-88.7%, and 244.0%-369.3% for a
0%, 10%, and 20% RES target, respectively. In addition, in scenario 1 base load
is even included (to a very limited extent) up to a 30% RES target compared
to only a 20% RES target for the other scenarios. Third, storage reduces the
need for peak and high peak generators. Depending on the storage scenario,
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the installation of such power plants decreases by 43.1%-62.6%, 38.7%-74.4%,
and 36.0%-76.6% for a 30%, 40%, and 50% RES target, respectively. The
impact of observations one to three is always the largest in storage scenario
1 and the smallest in scenario 2, with the impact in scenario 3 in between.
Fourth, when the maximum available PHS energy capacity is limited due
to geographical constraints, PHS is mainly replaced by peak and high peak
generation capacity, and only to a limited extent by BES at the current energy-
related BES investment cost. At a future lower investment cost of the BES
energy storage subsystem again less peak and high peak generation is needed
while the installed BES power rating even surpasses PHS from a 30% RES
target onwards.
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(a) Reference scenario.
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(b) Storage scenario 1.
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(c) Storage scenario 2.
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(d) Storage scenario 3.
Figure 3.4: Optimal mix in different storage scenarios given a variety of RES targets.
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Fig. 3.5 shows that a relationship between the imposed RES target and installed
flexible resources (i.e., peak and high peak generation, PHS, and BES) can
be observed independent from the analyzed scenario. This may represent the
flexibility need at different RES targets, met by the different flexibility sources.
Although no absolute numbers can be concluded upon since this is most likely
dependent on the residual load profile, it shows that flexibility sources are to
some extent interchangeable. This is important for regulators and policy-makers
to take into account, e.g., when deciding on capacity markets, as these generally
result in current gas-fired conventional generators being contracted to remain
operational (e.g., strategic reserve in Belgium, capacity auction in the UK). As
such, this may constrain the development of alternative and (potentially) more
economically viable flexibility sources.
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Figure 3.5: Relationship between the installed flexible capacity and imposed RES
target.
Finally, an analysis of the energy, power, and E2P ratio characteristics of the
installed storage resources in the three storage scenarios is provided in Table 3.3.
First, in scenario 1 a significant amount of PHS is developed, both in terms of
energy and power, which includes an E2P ratio between 4.56 h and 8.39 h. The
developed PHS is used for both energy-related and power-related services. In
contrast, BES energy capacity and power rating is only developed to a limited
extent, with the former being small compared to the latter. The resulting
E2P ratio is between 0.24 h and 0.47 h, as BES is almost exclusively used to
provide power-related frequency control in this scenario. Second, in scenario
2 the total available PHS energy capacity is immediately developed from a
0% RES target, while the accompanying installed PHS power rating increases
moderately with the RES target. This leads to E2P ratios between 2.80 h and
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4.49 h. Scenario 2 includes both higher BES energy capacity and power rating
levels compared to scenario 1, but E2P ratios have similar orders of magnitude
(i.e., 0.25 h-0.82 h). While BES takes over part of the power-related services
of PHS, flexible generators cover its energy-related services. Third, scenario 3
shows that the available PHS energy capacity is fully developed from the start
even at a lower energy-related BES investment cost, but less power rating is
developed. This leads to higher E2P ratios for PHS compared to scenario 2, i.e.,
4.09 h-6.43 h. Significantly more BES energy capacity is developed, surpassing
the maximum available PHS energy capacity at a 50% RES target, as well
as more power rating, surpassing the installed PHS power rating at high RES
targets. Although the BES E2P ratio increases to 1.10 h-2.26 h, it is still well
below the PHS E2P ratio. This analysis shows that both short-to-mid and
mid-to-long-term storage is needed: even when PHS would be available to an
unlimited extent, BES is developed, and even when the energy-related BES
investment cost would decrease towards the future, the available PHS energy
capacity is still fully developed. Although these sources compete to provide
some flexibility services, they complement each other to meet the system’s total
flexibility demand in the most efficient way.
3.4.3 Reserve provision
Fig. 3.6, Fig. 3.7, and Fig. 3.8 show the average FCR, aFRR, and mFRR
provision, respectively, by the different generation and storage technologies for
the different scenarios.
In the reference scenario, upward FCR is provided by online conventional
generators that have head room available to provide this reserve. At low RES
targets it is mainly provided by mid load plants, while at high RES targets a
significant share is provided by high peak load plants. The different storage
scenarios show that when storage is available, BES is about the sole provider,
with PHS providing a minor share in scenario 2. In contrast to conventional
generation technologies and PHS, BES does not have to be committed to provide
upward FCR. In the reference scenario, and in the different storage scenarios at
low RES targets, downward FCR is provided by online generation capacity, as
they can provide this service fairly easy by ramping down. At high RES targets,
and when storage is available to be installed, storage provides the largest share
of downward FCR. As such, no conventional generators have to stay online
(must-run) to solely provide this service, especially taking into account the
assumed monthly contract periods. In scenario 1 and 2 both PHS and BES
provide downward FCR, with the latter providing the major share, while at
reduced energy-related BES investment costs it takes over PHS’s share.
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In the reference scenario upward aFRR is provided by online high peak load
plants, while storage is the major upward aFRR provider in the different storage
scenarios. In scenario 1 PHS is the main provider, while in scenario 2 its share
decreases at the expense of BES, and upward aFRR provision is shared. In
scenario 3 BES is the main provider. Similar to FCR, at low RES targets
the downward component is provided by ramping down base and mid load
plants that are online most of the time anyway. When storage is available, and
at higher RES targets, base and mid load power plants would no longer be
constantly online following efficient scheduling. Here, PHS provides the largest
share in scenario 1, while both PHS and BES provide a large share in scenario
2 and 3, with BES becoming downward aFRR’s main provider at high RES
targets.
If storage resources are not available to be installed, upward mFRR is provided
by high peak load generators, as they do not have to be committed at part-load
but can start up fast enough. In storage scenario 1, the share of PHS of this
energy-intensive reserve increases with the RES target. When the PHS energy
capacity is limited, peak and high peak load plants again provide the largest
share with PHS providing the remaining upward mFRR, and at lower BES
energy-related investment cost they may provide a share of upward mFRR as
well at the expense of high peak load generators. Again, downward mFRR is
mostly provided by online conventional generators. When storage resources
are available they provide an increasing share of downward mFRR as the RES
target increases, since the amount of conventional generators that have to
remain online for a month can be decreased. At current costs PHS is about the
sole storage technology providing downward mFRR, while in scenario 3 BES
provides a significant share as well.
3.5 Conclusions
In the context of RES-driven power systems, short-term operating constraints
and requirements are important to consider during long-term planning analyses.
They are key drivers for flexibility, but large problem sizes and long computation
times have limited the extent to which they are included in policy and planning
models. We present the development of a combined, and simultaneously solved,
long-term investment and short-term operation model with high temporal and
operational detail. It decides on the installed generation and storage capacities
to cover the demand for energy and reserve capacity at lowest cost, given
short-term operating constraints and residual demand variations, for increasing
RES generation targets. Short-term operation is modeled through a continuous
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relaxation of the technology-clustered formulation of the UC problem. This
allows for a better insight in the role and value of storage as flexibility source.
The availability of storage resources lowers the overall system cost. We show
that this can be explained through its contribution to compensate the system’s
expected and unexpected variability, and because less RES capacity needs to
be installed to reach the imposed RES targets. First, storage has the ability to
compensate the former by storing base load and RES generation in times of low
residual demand, and by partly replacing peak and high peak generation in times
of high residual demand. Second, storage has the ability to compensate the
latter by providing reserves, thereby reducing the need for inefficient scheduling
to accommodate must-run (partly-loaded) conventional generators to provide
spinning reserve. Third, less RES needs to be installed to reach RES targets,
as excess RES generation that otherwise had to be curtailed can now be stored,
or simply generated to be consumed since the incompressible part of supply is
lower.
The detailed modeling of frequency control allows for two main conclusions.
First, independent from the storage scenario BES provides a significant share
of FCR, while it is only when PHS is geographically constrained that BES
provides significant shares of aFRR as well. Finally, when in addition the cost
for the energy storage subsystem decreases, BES appears to be well-suited to
provide FCR and aFRR, as well as mFRR. This provides conditions for which
BES is a favorable technology to provide the different reserve products. Second,
we quantitatively show how the interaction between energy and reserve markets
leads to storage contributing to the provision of upward reserve at all RES
targets, and to the provision of downward reserve only at high RES targets.
Results show that there is a need for both short-to-mid-term BES and mid-
to-long-term PHS. PHS plants mainly provide energy services to the system,
i.e., shifting energy in time, and energy-intensive reserve products, while BES
systems mainly provide power-related reserve products. Even when the available
PHS energy capacity would not be restricted by geographical conditions, BES
is developed, and even when the energy-related BES investment cost would
decrease towards the future, the available PHS capacity is still fully developed.
Although these sources compete to provide some flexibility services, they
complement each other to meet the system’s total demand for flexibility.
Furthermore, we conclude that a relation is present between the imposed RES
target and installed flexible resources, independent from the analyzed scenario.
This confirms that flexibility sources are to some extent interchangeable. It can
be hypothesized that if due to capacity legacy or market design conventional
flexible capacity remains operational in the system, this affects the development
of alternative and (potentially) more economic flexibility sources.
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4.1 Introduction
Electricity markets differ from other commodity markets because electric
energy is a RT product. Therefore, it is necessary to maintain a balance
between generation and consumption at all times. Historically, electricity
was generated by large centralized thermal and hydro power plants to match
demand, with the help of fuel storage and PHS plants to compensate for the
variability of consumption and the partial inflexibility of conventional power
plants. The ongoing transition towards variable RES, i.e., wind turbines and PV
systems, challenges the reliable operation of the power system. Their limited
controllability and predictability results in an increasing need for flexibility, i.e.,
the ability to provide upward and downward power adjustments to compensate
for temporary imbalances between generation and consumption [9, 10]. At
the same time, the flexibility offered by the generation side is threatened by
closure of conventional power plants that are currently experiencing decreasing
profitability due to lower electricity prices and a limited number of operating
hours. The former is due to the close-to-zero marginal cost of RES, while the
latter can be attributed to the merit-order effect of RES [11, 12]. Further, a
paradigm shift is taking place from a situation where generation was dispatched
to follow inflexible demand to a situation in which flexibility is provided by
both generation and consumers. However, there will be a need for electricity
storage as well to fill the remaining gap, and for the further development of
interconnection capacity and integration of adjacent markets to access flexible
resources in neighboring regions [13].
4.1.1 Scope and motivation
In Europe, market players self-schedule their generation, consumption, and
storage assets as a result of trading, which starts years prior to delivery and
continues almost until RT. This is accomplished by a series of sequential markets,
of which the earliest are the so-called unstandardized forward and standardized
future markets. These markets usually continue until one day before delivery,
when the power exchange holds its centrally organized DA market. After
clearing of the DA market, ID trading is possible until close-to-RT. After gate
closure of the ID market, the TSO is responsible to keep the system balanced.
To maintain this balance, the TSO contracts and activates reserve capacity from
balance service providers (BSPs) at the procurement side, and settles imbalance
positions with balance responsible parties (BRPs) at the settlement side of the
balancing market [102, 103]. We focus on the CWE region, which, consistent
with common definitions (e.g., [104, 105, 106]), includes the Belgian, French,
German, and Dutch market zones.
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Due to techno-economic constraints of power plants, and limited ability to
foresee renewable generation, outages of power plants and grid elements,
and load behavior, it is in short-term electricity markets where the need for
flexibility is most apparent, and providers of flexibility are financially rewarded.
These markets are generally defined as those taking place from the DA stage
until physical generation and consumption in RT, i.e., including DA, ID, and
RT markets.1 Currently these markets are becoming more important due
to increasing levels of variability in the system, resulting from the ongoing
integration of variable RES. A good understanding of the current design and
functioning of these markets, as well as of possible future developments, is a
foundation for analyzing the need for and provision of flexibility.
4.1.2 Context: the theory of short-term energy pricing and
rewarding of flexibility
Despite the attention that the literature pays to the need for more flexibility in
power markets, we must first ask why that flexibility would not be forthcoming
in pure energy markets, and why additional products (e.g., the flexible ramping
products traded in some markets in the US) may be needed. Indeed, if the
issues of within-interval ramps and abrupt changes in demand at the start and
end of intervals are disregarded, then in theory, energy prices alone can support
optimal flexible operation of generating resources without a need for separate
payments for flexibility. Furthermore, energy prices can also support optimal
investment in flexible vs. inflexible capacity. In brief, the proof of these perhaps
surprising propositions proceeds as follows.
Assume that all resources make truthful offers to the market; there are no floors
or caps to prices; consumers bid their true willingness-to-pay, so that in cases
of shortage, prices rise to the marginal value of consumption; and there is no
uncertainty.
These results follow from formulating the generation capacity expansion problem
as a linear program, including continuous capacity, discrete chronologic intervals
(e.g., hours), ramp rate limits, and, if desired, convex approximations of
commitment constraints. This linear program yields a primal solution that is
not only the social least-cost solution, but also represents a market equilibrium
among price-taking generators who compete to supply a fixed demand in each
hour [107]. The model also yields energy prices (the Lagrange multipliers
associated with the hourly energy balances) that support the optimal solution.
1In the context of this chapter DA and ID markets refer to those organized by the power
exchanges. Bilateral OTC trading, in which market players agree on a trade contract by
directly interacting with each other, is not in the scope of this chapter.
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“Support” refers to the property that each generator’s capacity and operating
decisions are profit maximizing for that generator, given the prices: a generator
cannot earn more profit by deviating in a feasible way from the primal solution.
The only revenue earned by generators is from energy sales, showing that in
theory only energy prices are needed to support optimal schedules, even when
there is highly variable net demand with steep ramps. For instance, negative and
positive price spikes associated with steep net load ramps will theoretically send
the correct signals for operation and ultimately investment in this simplified
world. Flexible generators earn more revenue and can justify their higher
capacity costs because they can turn down and up to avoid negative price spikes
and grab positive price spikes, respectively.
This result generalizes to a world of uncertainty with risk-neutral (expected
profit maximizing) generators. If the generation capacity expansion model is
formulated as a linear stochastic program with random (e.g., Markovian) net
demand and RES generation, then it can be shown that the resulting stochastic
prices support the optimal operations and capacity decisions by generators.
Therefore, justifications for the creation of flexibility products or paying sepa-
rately for flexibility in addition to energy commodity prices require a rationale
based on market failures. Such failures could include (1) lumpy/nonconvex
investment and commitment decisions that are not appropriately reflected in
prices; (2) price caps and floors that suppress spikes; (3) dispatch intervals
(e.g., one hour) that are too long and average out spikes so that flexibility
is not rewarded; or (4) failures in the investment market, e.g., political or
highly risk-averse decision-making. The extent to which these failures provide
distorted incentives for supplying flexibility has not been quantified and is an
open research topic. In this chapter, we review the design and performance of
existing short-term markets in the CWE region, focusing on how they reward
flexibility, and where they might be reformed to provide improved incentives
for providing that flexibility.
4.1.3 Literature review and contributions
Literature review on the design of short-term markets
In this section, we begin our review of how short-term markets in the CWE region
incentivize flexibility by providing a comprehensive overview of the literature
on the design of short-term markets in Europe. We divide the literature into
three groups in the following three paragraphs. The focus of each reference
is briefly highlighted, with Table 4.1 classifying those that consider particular
market zones and short-term markets according to these two dimensions.
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The first group of works discusses the short-term market design for individual
market zones. Ref. [103] analyzes the occurrence of negative balancing prices in
Belgium, while discussing the functioning of its balancing market. Ref. [108]
reviews changes to the balancing market in France to enhance transparency and
competition. Ref. [109] focuses on the DA market in Germany and investigates
the impact of offshore wind, and in [110] a brief overview of the functioning of
the different German markets is given. Ref. [111] analyzes the implementation
of a German discrete ID auction, while discussing the functioning of both
auction-based and continuous ID trading. Refs. [112, 113, 114] focus on a
variety of design parameters of the German balancing market’s procurement
side. Ref. [115] analyzes the German balancing mechanism while focusing on the
interplay between imbalance pricing and congestion. Ref. [116] discusses three
interactions between variable RES and balancing markets, and [117] studies
the impact of the balancing market design on the participation of flexible
consumption, both with a focus on Germany. Ref. [118] analyzes incentives to
behave strategically in the German balancing market, while [119] discusses its
design together with historical data. Ref. [120] reviews a general set of principles
of the different markets in the Netherlands (NL), but only considers limited
design parameters, while in [121] the Dutch balancing market is discussed.
Ref. [122] focuses on the procurement side of the Dutch balancing market
and the participation of electric vehicles. Turning to discussions of individual
market zones outside the CWE region, [123] analyzes the participation of RES
in the Spanish ID market, while providing an overview of the Spanish short-
term markets. Ref. [124] reviews the Spanish balancing market, and identifies
market attributes that may hinder RES participation, while [125] provides an
overview of the procurement side of the Spanish balancing market. Ref. [126]
provides a general overview of the Nordic short-term markets and analyzes
the participation of wind generators, with a focus on the ID market, and [127]
provides an overview of the procurement side of the Nordic balancing market.
The second group of studies focuses on design of short-term markets that include
multiple market zones. Ref. [128] discusses general principles of the Dutch
markets, and of the German ID market, while assessing wind generator bidding
strategies. Ref. [11] analyzes negative prices that occasionally occur in DA, ID,
and RT markets in Belgium, France, and Germany, and generally describes these
markets. In [106], the implementation of flow-based market-coupling (FBMC)
in the CWE DA markets is discussed. Ref. [102] analyses DA and ID market
liquidity in France, Germany, Scandinavia, Spain, and the UK, while discussing
a selection of design attributes. In [129], ID trading activity and prices are
analyzed for a variety of market zones in Northern Europe, while also discussing
the impact of imbalance settlement rules in the Nordic countries on ID trading.
Ref. [130] compares balancing market design parameters across 28 countries
in Europe, while [131, 132, 133, 134, 135, 136] include empirical analyses of
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ID and RT markets in Germany, Italy, Poland, Spain, the Netherlands, and
the UK, respectively. Ref. [137] compares the settlement side of the Dutch,
German, and Nordic balancing markets. In [138], a valuable discussion on a
variety of design parameters for the three short-term markets is provided, based
on observations from Germany, Italy, the Netherlands, Poland, Spain, and the
UK, to identify aspects which may benefit from harmonization. In addition, in
2014 the Belgian, German, and Dutch TSOs published a study on potential
cross-border cooperation [99], in which the design of their RT balancing markets
is discussed. Finally, [139] compares the European DA market design with
designs adopted in the US.
The third group of references are not zone-specific, but of a more general focus.
In [140] a variety of market design issues for RES integration are discussed,
while [141] analyzes the impact of RES support schemes and certain market
design parameters on RES integration. Ref. [142] analyzes expected trading
volumes in different European ID markets, while the general functioning of
continuous and auction-based ID markets is explained. Ref. [143] discusses
different design parameters for balancing markets, in order to facilitate wind
integration, while [144] identifies important balancing market design parameters
for both individual control areas and cross-border cooperation. Finally, [145]
assesses different alternatives to allocate cross-border transmission capacity in
Europe, and [146] analyzes the impact of imbalance pricing on the behavior of
market participants.
Table 4.1: Literature review classification.
DA market ID market RT market
BE [11], [106] [11] [11], [99], [103], [130]
FR [11], [102], [106] [11], [102] [11], [108], [130]
DE [11], [102], [106], [109], [110], [11], [102], [110], [111], [128], [11], [99], [110], [112], [113],
[138] [131], [138] [114], [115], [116], [117], [118],
[119], [130], [131], [137], [138]
NL [106], [120], [128], [138] [120], [128], [135], [138] [99], [120], [121], [122], [128],
[130], [135], [137], [138]
Other [102], [123], [126], [138], [139] [102], [123], [126], [129], [132], [123], [124], [125], [126], [127],
[133], [134], [136], [138] [130], [132], [133], [134], [136],
[137], [138]
Research gap in market design analyses and contributions
Although the design of short-term markets in the CWE region has been discussed
before, previous works focus on individual or a limited selection of (1) design
parameters, (2) sequential markets, or (3) geographical market zones. In
addition, the extent to which the market design affects the needs for and
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rewards to flexibility is not considered. An integrated discussion of design
parameters, and their interaction with the demand for and supply of flexibility,
for all three short-term markets and all four CWE market zones has thus not
been provided before. As such, this chapter answers two research questions.
First, how are the markets related to flexibility, i.e., the short-term markets,
designed in the CWE region? Second, how do these markets express the need
for and reward the supply of flexibility? The answers to these research questions
provide insight in whether flexibility is treated consistently and appropriately
among the different geographical and sequential markets.
Section 4.2 focuses on the DA markets, while Section 4.3 studies the ID markets,
and Section 4.4 encompasses the settlement and procurement side of the RT
balancing markets. In each section we focus on the key design features and
parameters. The structure of the discussion for each parameter is as follows: we
first summarize the design for the CWE market zones, and then hypothesize and
analyze the implications for flexibility. The intent is to encourage policy-makers
to consider market reforms that would facilitate the integration, availability,
or valorization of flexibility, and also to contribute to the decision-making of
flexibility investors and operators. In addition, at the end of each short-term
market’s discussion, we provide a summarizing table, and present the trading
volume as a share of the consumption for 2012-2015 to give an idea of its size.
Finally, Section 4.5 states the conclusions.
4.2 Day-ahead markets
In the DA market, which is a double-sided blind auction facilitated by power
exchanges, market players trade hourly and multi-hourly products to adapt their
position from the previously held forward and future markets. These positions,
resulting in scheduled output profiles, can be adjusted by submitting demand
and supply quantity-price bids before DA market closure, which is at noon
(12:00 pm) D-1 in the CWE region [147]. The price in a demand bid indicates
the highest price a buyer is willing to pay, while the price in a supply bid
indicates the lowest price at which a seller is willing to sell. The intersection of
the aggregated demand and supply curve determines the market-clearing volume
and price. The DA market is based on a pay-as-cleared principle, through which
all cleared demand bids in a market zone pay a uniform market-clearing price,
while all cleared supply bids in a market zone are remunerated by that same
price. In the CWE region the market zones coincide with the countries, except
for the German market zone, which includes Germany, Austria, and (part of)
Luxembourg. However, there are plans to split the German market zone in 2018
in order to create a separate market zone for Austria [148]. While DA market
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trading within market zones is not constrained by the internal electric grid, its
interaction with neighboring market zones is constrained due to the limited
interconnection capacity. As a result, DA prices may differ between market
zones when interconnection lines are congested [11, 149]. Since the planned
output schedules after gate closure of the DA market may lead to congestion
within a zone, the TSO may be required to perform redispatch actions to clear
that congestion [150].
In the remainder of this section we discuss the CWE DA markets’ order types,
temporal resolution, cross-border trading, price cap and floor, and trading
volumes.
4.2.1 Day-ahead market order types
The standardized orders in DA markets are limit orders, i.e., hourly offered
or requested quantities at a certain price limit. Besides these hourly products,
power exchanges may also allow so-called complex orders. In the CWE region
these include block orders, linked block orders, and exclusive block orders. Block
orders are used to link several hours, whose quantity may differ for each hour,
on an all-or-nothing basis. That is, either the bid is matched on all hours or is
entirely rejected. The acceptance of a block order depends on its bid price and
the volume-weighted average DA price in the hours contained in the block. A
linked block order is a block order that is part of a set of multiple block orders
that have a linked clearing constraint, while an exclusive block order is part of
a set of block orders of which, at most, one can be cleared [9, 151]. Complex
orders allow the implicit inclusion of cost nonconvexities and intertemporal
links. These include start-up and shut-down costs, ramp rates, minimum load
levels, minimum up and down times, and energy buffer dynamics [152]. In
addition, they provide a means for more robust bidding under price uncertainty.
However, the amount of complex orders is limited per market participant for
computational reasons [153].
In addition, the introduction of so-called storage orders is currently being
discussed [154]. This market product would require storage operators to provide
technical parameters (i.e., stored energy at the start of the delivery day, energy
and power bounds, (dis)charge efficiency, and exogenous power flows) and
economic parameters (i.e., the price below which charge bids and above which
discharge bids may be cleared). Given these parameters, storage participation
can be decided upon by the market-clearing algorithm.
In contrast to block bids, so-called multi-part bids (which are present in some US
and European (e.g., Spain) markets) allow players to explicitly include technical
and economic parameters in their bids [155, 156, 157]. As block bids require
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available flexibility to be offered in a standardized format, which may not allow
to represent all technological capabilities, we argue that block bidding systems
prevent the full available capacity and flexibility from being offered to the
market. By allowing current generation, storage, and consumption capacities
to formulate their availability more accurately without being restricted by the
rigidity of current bid types, part of the future need for flexibility can already
be accommodated [138]. In contrast, it has also been argued that a design with
a limited number of standardized products may prove more advantageous as
transaction costs may be lower, transparency may be higher, and markets may
be more easily harmonized and coupled [139]. This is a fundamental debate,
and represents a difference in philosophy between what broadly can be called
the European and US approaches to DA market design.
4.2.2 Day-ahead market temporal resolution
The DA market is based on hourly market periods, but the settlement period
over which market participants are responsible to have a balanced portfolio,
are quarter-hourly periods in Belgium, Germany, and the Netherlands, and
semi-hourly periods in France. We argue that shorter market periods would
allow for an improved alignment with the settlement period, because when
market players have the opportunity to trade at a sub-hourly time scale, besides
inter-hourly, this allows intra-hourly expected power variations to be dealt with
by means of trading in the DA market. While not having this possibility may
not be a problem for players with self-balancing capabilities, other (usually
smaller) players face the financial risk of being dependent on the TSO to deal
with those variations in RT by activating reserves, thereby facing the imbalance
price. It is clear that this is especially the case if the ID market is based on
hourly market periods as well, or if sub-hourly ID products are characterized
by low liquidity.
The illustrative example provided in Fig. 4.1 shows that hourly DA market
periods challenge players who face intra-hourly power variations, with limited
self-balancing capabilities, to avoid imbalance positions (Fig. 4.1a). While this
player has a net balanced position, on average, over the DA market period
10:00 am-11:00 am, imbalances occur in each quarter-hourly imbalance settlement
period due to discrepancies between the temporal resolutions. If the DA market
period and imbalance settlement period would be aligned, such imbalance
positions can be avoided (Fig. 4.1b).
Quarter-hourly intervals would thus shift some of the flexibility demand from
the TSO in RT to the DA market, and some of the flexibility supply from
self-balancing to the market and from BSPs to DA market participants. As
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we argue in Section 4.1.2, a finer temporal resolution would also improve the
extent to which the value of flexibility for the system is reflected and rewarded,
because the resulting price signals would represent the physics of the system
more accurately [138, 140]. While a finer temporal resolution would improve
the valorization of flexibility in the DA market, its additional value as part of a
portfolio compared to standalone flexible capacity might decrease. This can be
explained as intra-hourly variations can then also be dealt with through trading,
not only through self-balancing using one’s own flexible resources.
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(a) Hourly DA market.
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(b) Quarter-hourly DA market.
Figure 4.1: Impact of the misalignment between DA market periods and RT imbalance
settlement periods.
All of this leads to the hypothesis that BRPs with limited self-balancing
capabilities and TSOs may thus advocate for a finer DA temporal resolution
aligned with the imbalance settlement period. Contrarily, challenges may arise
for players whose resources are subject to intertemporal links and nonconvex
costs, e.g., their start-up cost has to be recovered within the bid of a shorter
period. However, the latter counter-argument can be dealt with by the
availability of adequate market products to deal with such constraints (i.e.,
sufficient complex orders, multi-part bidding).
4.2.3 Cross-border trading in the day-ahead market
Through the so-called price coupling of regions (PCR) initiative, 23 European
countries2 are currently coupled through the implicit auctioning of interconnec-
tion capacity [158, 159]. This means that all bids of the participating exchanges
are considered in the same market-clearing algorithm to optimize the utilization
of interconnection capacity available to the power exchanges. Market players
2These include Austria, Belgium, Czech Republic, Denmark, Estonia, Finland, France,
Germany, Hungary, Italy, Latvia, Lithuania, Luxembourg, the Netherlands, Norway, Poland,
Portugal, Romania, Slovakia, Slovenia, Spain, Sweden, and the UK.
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only provide bids for electric energy, while interconnection capacity is allocated
implicitly to individual bids to maximize social welfare. As a result, electric
energy is exchanged in case of a price difference between geographical markets
until the price difference is eliminated or until all available interconnection
capacity is used. In contrast, explicit auctioning indicates that interconnection
capacity is allocated to individual market players that have obtained the right
to use it, after which they can use this capacity to capture price differences
between market zones. Such explicit auctioning was the basis for managing
limited interconnection capacity prior to the establishment of the European
market-coupling-based system [9, 104, 160].
The interconnection capacity available for trade is challenging to determine as
electric energy flows according to Kirchhoff’s laws, i.e., over all parallel paths in
the network, not according to commercial flows, i.e., directly from generator
to consumer. In addition, this determination has to make assumptions about
the within-zone distribution of generation and consumption. Since May 2015,
market-coupling of the DA markets in the CWE region is based on FBMC
instead of the Available Transfer Capacity (ATC) method. The ATC value
on a border represents the maximum commercial exchange between the two
adjacent market zones, taking into account expected market outcomes, security
margins, and long-term transmission capacity nominations. The TSOs calculate
this ATC value prior to the market-clearing process for each direction on each
border of their control areas. In contrast, in the FBMC method, a simplified
representation of internal grid constraints, i.e., the collection of critical lines, is
included in the market-clearing process. Prior to the market-clearing the TSOs
determine the FBMC parameters that define the so-called “FBMC flow domain”,
in which each boundary refers to the limit of a critical line, while during market-
clearing all critical lines are taken into account. In general, FMBC is believed
to result in more available interconnection capacity for trade, increased social
welfare, and increased price convergence between market zones [106].
Interconnection capacity can either be allocated through PTRs or financial
transmission rights (FTRs) via long-term (i.e., yearly and monthly) auctions.
At the time of writing, part of the available interconnection capacity at the
French-Belgian and Dutch-Belgian borders is allocated through FTRs (since
January 2016), while at the Dutch-German and French-German borders this
is done through PTRs. A PTR includes the exclusive right to use part of the
transmission line. In the CWE region, PTRs are subject to a use-it-or-sell-
it principle, which means that if a PTR holder does not actually nominate
the corresponding capacity, it is transferred to the power exchange to use in
the market-clearing, in addition to the capacity not sold through long-term
auctions. In case of a positive price difference between the two market zones in
the direction of the PTR, the PTR holder is paid this price difference for all
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non-nominated capacity. Contrarily, FTRs are financial instruments, so they
do not give their holder the exclusive right to use part of the line. All physical
capacity subject to the FTRs is transferred to the power exchange, thereby
not interfering with optimal market-clearing. What the FTR holder is entitled
to is a payment equal to the price difference between the two locations for all
transmission capacity subject to the FTR in case of a positive price difference
between the two market zones in the direction of the FTR. This use of FTRs is
consistent with the US system, where it is believed that separating financial
rights from physical operation results in a more efficient use of the grid and
hedging of risks [145, 161, 162].
Since variability is spread over a larger area through market-coupling, non-
correlated power variations are smoothed and opposite power variations
compensate each other. We conclude that this results in lower total flexibility
needs. In addition, interconnection capacity is a “vehicle” for flexibility.
Flexibility in neighboring areas can be used to compensate for the local system’s
variability, allowing the sourcing of cheaper flexibility abroad. Alternatively,
local flexibility providers have the opportunity to offer services to other regions
as well. This reasoning shows that market-coupling thus impacts flexibility
demand and supply by enlarging the relevant geographical market to trade
flexibility [160].
4.2.4 Day-ahead market price cap and floor
The DA markets in the CWE region include a price cap of 3 000e/MWh [147].
Such a cap is usually implemented to avoid excessive pricing by generators,
especially when the price elasticity of demand is rather low.3 Although in
general price caps should be set at the value of lost load (VOLL) [164] in order
to encourage investment in needed peaking plants, they can be set lower if the
purpose is market power mitigation. The VOLL represents the average value
that consumers attach to a unit of electric energy not supplied, and thus reflects
their willingness-to-pay to avoid demand curtailment. Although country-specific
estimates are available in the existing literature, and they depend on many
specifics (e.g., notification time, duration, time of the day), they are typically
between 2 000e/MWh and 20 000e/MWh [140, 165]. Because of the large-scale
integration of variable RES in the generation mix, conventional power plants
currently experience diminishing profitability due to a decreasing number of
operating hours and lower electricity prices [103]. The imposed price cap should
thus be high enough to allow these conventional power plants to recover their
3The price elasticity of demand refers to the relative change in demand due to a relative
change in price, and is typically negative, as the demand for most commodities decreases with
the price [163].
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investment cost over a decreased number of operating hours. Although capacity
mechanisms are currently also discussed and implemented in the CWE region
to ensure generation adequacy [166, 167], such markets are out of the chapter’s
scope as we focus on flexibility, not adequacy. It is possible for capacity markets
to be designed to incent investment and retention of flexible capacity, as in
California, but this is not presently done in Europe [168]. Next to system
adequacy, we argue that, when set too low, price caps interfere with the market
signal representing the scarcity of upward flexibility.
The price floor is set at -500e/MWh [147]. In contrast to price caps, [140] argues
there is no incentive to impose price floors in electricity markets. Negative prices
occur when conventional generators are willing to pay to generate in order to
avoid costly shut-downs or downward ramping, and when renewable generators
are willing to pay up to the subsidies they receive in order to generate [11, 103].
When set too high, we argue that price floors interfere with the market signal
representing the scarcity of downward flexibility, and may result in the arbitrary
curtailment of generators during excess generation periods, rather than having
a pricing mechanism determine who values most being kept on.
4.2.5 Day-ahead market trading volume and summary
The DA market plays an important role in terms of trading volume. Based
on hourly traded volume data from the power exchanges [169, 170, 171], and
country-specific hourly consumption data from ENTSO-E [101], Fig. 4.2 shows
the hourly traded volume as a share of the hourly consumption for 2012-2015.
The trading volume in the German and Dutch market zones represents a larger
share of the consumption than that of the Belgian and French market. However,
in the latter countries this share has been increasing significantly in recent years,
while for Germany it has remained constant and for the Netherlands the share
seems to be decreasing.
To summarize, Table 4.2 provides an overview of the key characteristics of the
DA markets in the CWE region.
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(a) Belgian DA market.
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(b) French DA market.
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(c) German DA market.
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(d) Dutch DA market.
Figure 4.2: Hourly DA market trading volume as share of the hourly consumption,
for Belgium (Fig. 4.2a), France (Fig. 4.2b), Germany, Austria, and Luxembourg
(Fig. 4.2c), and the Netherlands (Fig. 4.2d).
Table 4.2: Key characteristics of the (fully harmonized) CWE region’s DA markets.
BE FR DE NL
Power exchange BELPEX EPEX SPOT EPEX SPOT APX
Market closure 12:00 pm D-1 12:00 pm D-1 12:00 pm D-1 12:00 pm D-1
Market period 1 h 1 h 1 h 1 h
Price cap [e/MWh] 3 000 3 000 3 000 3 000
Price floor [e/MWh] -500 -500 -500 -500
Block orders X X X X
Linked block orders X X X X
Exclusive block orders X X X X
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4.3 Intra-day markets
After the DA market-clearing, each BRP is required to submit a balanced
position to the TSO for each settlement period. These so-called “nominations”
provide information on the planned schedules for every individual unit, and
usually differ from the accepted bids in the DA market as they take into account
all transactions, including the volumes traded in the previously held long-term
markets and through bilateral contracts. However, these nominations can still
be adjusted through trade in the ID market based on updated information (e.g.,
more accurate RES generation forecasts). ID trading is the last opportunity
for market-based transactions before submitted schedules become financially
binding.4 After gate closure of the ID market, the TSO takes over the
responsibility to keep the system balanced. It is clear that the possibility
of ID trading may shift a share of the flexibility needs away from RT to the ID
stage, i.e., from the TSO to BRPs, and likewise for the supply of flexibility, i.e.,
from BSPs to ID market players.
This section discusses the CWE ID markets’ market types, order types and
temporal resolution, cross-border trading, price cap and floor, and trading
volume.
4.3.1 Intra-day market types
While the Belgian, Dutch, and French ID markets are based on continuous
trading, the German ID market includes both continuous trading and a discrete
auction. With continuous trading, market participants submit supply and
demand bids to a central platform, and matching bids are continuously cleared
on an individual basis. Continuous trading is possible from 02:00 pm D-1 in
Belgium, and from 03:00 pm D-1 in France, Germany, and the Netherlands.5
This trading can occur until close-to-RT, i.e., until 5min to RT in Belgium
and the Netherlands, and until 30min to RT in France and Germany. The
continuous trading order book is visible to all market participants, and
contains all submitted bids that have not cleared yet. In addition, players
can cancel submitted noncleared bids at any time. Continuous trading bids are
matched according to a price-time priority: orders are matched in order of the
attractiveness of their price, with the time of submission to the central platform
being a tie-breaker if there are two identical price offers. A continuous trading
ID market may thus result in different prices for each trade, with the price being
4Submitted schedules are not physically binding, unfulfilled positions (i.e., imbalance
positions) are settled at the imbalance price set by the TSO (see Section 4.4.2).
5While hourly products can be traded from 03:00 pm D-1 in the German continuous ID
market, quarter-hourly products can only be traded from 04:00 pm D-1.
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the price of the bid that initiated the match (i.e., the first of the two involved
bids, or the “initiator”), which may be referred to as pay-as-bid. The discrete
auction implemented in the German ID market since December 2014 is based
on principles similar to the DA market. Players submit supply and demand
bids, with gate closure at 03:00 pm D-1. These bids are then aggregated to
form the supply and demand curve. The intersection determines the uniform
market-clearing price [111, 138, 172].
We argue that there are four implications of these designs for flexibility. First,
compared to a discrete auction, continuous trading may pose less risk to
flexibility consumers and suppliers as they can procure and valorize flexibility
immediately instead of having to wait until market-clearing, that is, if there still
is a market-clearing to come. Second, when bidding truthfully, nonmarginal
flexibility providers may face lower remuneration for their services compared
to an auction-based ID market including pay-as-cleared pricing if they are
the initiator. Meanwhile, nonmarginal flexibility consumers may satisfy their
flexibility need at a higher cost if they are the initiator. Naturally, in such cases
the (second-mover) counterparty faces more favorable prices compared to a
discrete auction, but risks losing the opportunity to match bids if it waits too
long. Thus, continuous trading may incentivize players to not bid truthfully,
which may result in incorrect flexibility demand and supply signals. Third,
a market based on continuous trading instead of discrete auctions includes a
certain first-come-first-serve characteristic, as matching bids are immediately
cleared, which may not lead to welfare maximization and optimal allocation
of flexibility, especially in illiquid markets. Finally, an important question
regarding the organization of ID auctions that is not answered yet includes the
optimal number of auctions and their timing, taking into account the impact
on liquidity.
4.3.2 Intra-day market order types and temporal resolution
The Belgian, French, and Dutch continuous ID markets include both hourly and
multi-hourly (i.e., block) products, while the German ID market also includes
quarter-hourly products. In contrast to the DA market, the German ID auction
includes 96 quarter-hourly market periods. Block bids have not been introduced
yet in that auction [111, 172].
While market participants have the opportunity to update their nominations,
which are submitted after clearing of the DA market, on an hourly basis, this does
not allow them to tailor output schedules through market-based transactions to
the temporal resolution on which their imbalance positions are calculated. The
presence of quarter-hourly products in the German ID market provides this
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opportunity, as players are able to compensate for the misalignment between
the DA market periods and RT settlement periods (Fig. 4.3), and incorporate
updated information on an intra-hourly basis. As such, players with limited
self-balancing capabilities can be less dependent on the TSO to balance their
imbalance positions, and are thus less exposed to imbalance prices. Following
this reasoning, lower reserve needs are expected for the TSO in RT. Similar to
the DA market, we hypothesize that a finer temporal resolution would improve
the valorization of flexibility in the ID market due to price signals, but might
reduce the additional value of flexibility in a portfolio compared to standalone
flexible capacity. This is because intra-hourly variations can now also be dealt
with through ID trading, not just through self-balancing.
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Figure 4.3: Impact of the misalignment between ID market periods and RT imbalance
settlement periods.
4.3.3 Cross-border trading in the intra-day market
In contrast to the DA market, ID markets are currently less well aligned and
integrated [138], and no interconnection capacity is reserved for the ID market.
Only the residual cross-border capacity is made available to the market. In the
CWE region, continuous ID markets are, depending on the considered border,
coupled through the explicit or implicit allocation of remaining interconnection
capacity, which is calculated according to the ATC method. Here, explicit means
that market players can obtain remaining interconnection capacity for free on
a first-come-first-serve basis, after which they can engage in cross-border ID
trading. If however a player does not use the obtained capacity, this unfulfilled
position will be settled (i.e., penalized) at the imbalance price since allocated
transmission capacity automatically means nominated capacity [173]. On the
other hand, with ID implicit allocation, orders in one zone are automatically
matched with orders in the neighboring zone, as long as transmission capacity
is available. Unlike explicit cross-border transactions, players do not need to
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obtain the interconnection capacity before making a transaction. On the Dutch-
Belgian border, implicit continuous capacity allocation applies [174], while on
the Dutch-German and the French-Belgian border, explicit allocation is in
place [175, 173]. Finally, on the French-German border, implicit allocation runs
in parallel with explicit allocation, the latter for OTC trading purposes [176].6
With continuous trading, the value of the transmission capacity is captured
by the first mover in case of explicit auctioning and by the first matching
cross-border bids under implicit auctioning. In general, this fails to maximize
welfare because the capacity is not necessarily allocated to the most valuable
transactions. In addition, this does not provide revenues to the owner of the
interconnector (that could be used to lower costs for consumers or incentivize
new investments in interconnection capacity), as is the case in the DA market
through the sale of transmission rights. In contrast, it has been argued that the
use of discrete ID auctions could facilitate the most efficient allocation of the
remaining interconnection capacity and remunerate the owner similar to the
situation in the DA market [111, 138].
When the ID market is rather illiquid, flexibility consumers may not find
a counterparty, and as such become exposed to imbalance penalties, while
flexibility suppliers may not be able to valorize their flexibility. It is obvious
that this can be dealt with by matching bids over a larger geographical area
through cross-border ID trade.
4.3.4 Intra-day market price cap and floor
In the CWE region, the continuous ID market price cap is set at 9 999e/MWh,
and the price floor at - 9 999e/MWh, which represents a wider range compared
to the DA market, while for the German ID discrete auction these price limits are
more similar to the DA market at 3 000e/MWh and - 3 000e/MWh, respectively.
A similar reasoning as for the DA market applies with respect to the rationale
behind price limits and their interaction with flexibility.
4.3.5 Intra-day market trading volume and summary
The ID market plays a minor role in terms of trading volume, but it is
an important tool to guarantee the reliable operation of the power system:
each trade may contribute to a reduction in the activation of reserves by
the TSOs. Based on hourly and quarter-hourly traded volume data from the
power exchanges, and country-specific hourly consumption data from ENTSO-E,
6This is changing rapidly, with an observed transition from explicit to implicit allocation.
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Fig. 4.4 shows the traded volume as a share of the hourly consumption for 2012-
2015.7 While for all four market zones the role of the ID market has increased
in 2014-2015 compared to 2012-2013, a much larger share of the consumption
is traded in the German ID market compared to the other market zones (note
that the y-axis of Fig. 4.4c has a different scale). This may result from the fact
that Germany experiences larger shares of RES generation, and includes more
ID trading possibilities due to the presence of quarter-hourly ID products. The
large increase from 2014 to 2015 is in part due to the implementation of the
discrete auction in December 2014.
While in 2015 continuous trading remains more important in terms of trading
volume in Germany compared to the discrete auction, the latter already
represents a nonnegligible share (Fig. 4.5a). In addition, Fig. 4.5b shows that
market players seem to have a large interest in quarter-hourly products (i.e.,
both in the continuous and auction-based ID market), which take a significant
share of the trading volume.
Table 4.3 summarizes the major attributes of the ID markets in the CWE
region.
Table 4.3: Key characteristics of the (partially harmonized) CWE region’s ID markets.
BE FR DE DE NL
Power exchange BELPEX EPEX SPOT EPEX SPOT EPEX SPOT APX
Continuous trading X X X X X
Market opening 02:00 pm D-1 03:00 pm D-1 04:00 pm D-1 03:00 pm D-1 03:00 pm D-1
Market closure 5min to RT 30min to RT 30min to RT 30min to RT 5min to RT
Market period 1 h 1 h 15min 1 h 1 h
Price cap [e/MWh] 9 999.99 9 999 9 999 9 999 9 999.90
Price floor [e/MWh] -9 999.99 -9 999 -9 999 - 9 999 -9 999.90
Block orders X X X X X
Discrete auction 7 7 X 7 7
Market closure - - 03:00 pm D-1 - -
Market period - - 15min - -
Price cap [e/MWh] - - 3 000 - -
Price floor [e/MWh] - - -3 000 - -
Block orders - - 7 - -
7Data for the continuous ID markets in Germany/Luxembourg and Austria are provided
together as one market, but they might be disconnected temporarily due to measures performed
by the TSOs [177].
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(a) Belgian ID market.
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(b) French ID market.
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(c) German ID market.
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(d) Dutch ID market.
Figure 4.4: Hourly ID market trading volume as share of the hourly consumption,
for Belgium (Fig. 4.4a), France (Fig. 4.4b), Germany, Austria, and Luxembourg
(Fig. 4.4c), and the Netherlands (Fig. 4.4d).
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(a) Continuous vs. auction-based.
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(b) Hourly vs. quarter-hourly.
Figure 4.5: Hourly German ID market trading volume (Fig. 4.5a) continuous vs.
auction-based trading, and (Fig. 4.5b) hourly vs. quarter-hourly products, both
expressed as share of the total ID trading, 2015.
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4.4 Real-time balancing markets
After gate closure of the ID market, unforeseen differences between scheduled and
actual generation or consumption may occur. These differences may originate
from (1) unexpected RES generation variations, (2) unexpected consumption
variations, (3) unplanned outages of generation and consumption capacity, and
grid elements, (4) discrepancies between the duration of DA/ID market periods
and RT settlement periods, and (5) the discretization of continuous time in
discrete market periods [113].
These events are dealt with in RT by the balancing market, which is coordinated
by the TSO. First, the TSO calculates the total SI, i.e., the demand for flexibility
in RT, resulting from the aggregated individual imbalances of BRPs. The TSO
then compensates for this SI by activating reserves, i.e., the supply of flexibility
in RT, that may have been contracted ahead of time from market participants
who provide balancing services, i.e., BSPs. In general, this demand for the
activation of reserves is rather small compared to the system load, and is
highly volatile and price inelastic as well [117]. The reservation and activation
of reserve capacity is referred to as the procurement side of the balancing
market. Afterwards, the TSO settles individual imbalances with BRPs by
applying imbalance prices to their imbalance positions. This is referred to as the
settlement side of the balancing market. BRPs thus “trade” balancing energy
with the TSO, which in turn procures these services from BSPs [103, 113, 143].
BRPs can also deal with unexpected power variations by activating flexibility
in their own portfolio instead of relying on the TSO to provide flexibility at the
settlement side of the balancing market.
4.4.1 Control areas
Belgium, France, and the Netherlands each consist of one control area, each
managed by one TSO, i.e., Elia, RTE, and TenneT, respectively [121]. In
contrast, Germany includes four control areas, each being operated by its
own TSO: Amprion, 50 Hertz, TenneT, and TransnetBW. The German TSOs
cooperate to keep their control areas balanced through the so-called Grid Control
Cooperation (GCC). The GCC includes four modules that were introduced one
after the other, and focuses on aFRR, i.e., secondary control.8 The objective of
the first module, imbalance netting, is to reduce the total activation of reserve
capacity by avoiding counteracting activations. The second module includes a
common reserve sizing and access to reserve capacity in other control zones in
case of a local shortage. The third module procures reserves using a common
8The different reserve categories are described in Section 4.4.3.
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market, i.e., bids are accessible to all TSOs. The implementation of the fourth
module leads to a common merit-order for the activation of reserve capacity
in order to activate the cheapest bids, respecting limits on the connecting
transmission lines [113, 119, 178]. In contrast, the activation of mFRR, i.e.,
fast tertiary control, is currently still done in a decentralized way, but is based
on common rules. This advanced inter-TSO cooperation also includes a single
imbalance price over the different control zones, whose calculation is discussed
in Section 4.4.2. We conclude that such cooperation is likely to provide similar
benefits as market-coupling in the DA and ID market, and similar impacts on
the need for and supply of flexibility.
4.4.2 Settlement side
At the settlement side of the balancing market, the BRPs’ imbalance positions
and the imbalance prices are determined. As stated before, BRPs have to submit
nominations for planned grid-exchanges on the plant-level to the TSO after
DA market-clearing, and again after transactions in the ID market. Although
this detailed plant-level information has to be reliable in order for the TSO to
effectively analyze congestion on the internal grid of its control area, there is
no incentive for BRPs to do this on a plant-level, since they can only be held
accountable for imbalance positions aggregated over their portfolio. Although it
has not been quantified to which extent this may be a problem, a requirement for
plant-level balance responsibility might ensure that TSOs receive more reliable
information [138].9
A BRP’s imbalance position is the difference between the nominated position
after closure of the ID market and the actual net exchange of electric energy
with the grid in RT. During each settlement period, a BRP can have a long,
short, or balanced position. A long position indicates a positive imbalance,
thereby injecting more and/or withdrawing less than planned. A short position
indicates a negative imbalance, in which the BRP injects less and/or withdraws
more than planned. Both long and short imbalance prices have to be determined
by the TSO. BRPs with a long position in RT receive the long imbalance price,
while BRPs with a short position in RT pay the short imbalance price [146].
Through the imbalance settlement, the TSO allocates the activation cost of
reserve capacity (in e/MWh) to responsible BRPs, while reservation costs (in
e/MW) associated with contracting reserves are recovered through grid tariffs.
Imbalance prices are available shortly after RT in Belgium, France, and the
Netherlands, while German imbalance prices are only published a few weeks
after delivery [99, 130]. As the former provides BRPs with valuable market
9But this might have disadvantages as well.
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information soon after RT, which can be used to make informed decisions with
respect to their portfolio, we hypothesize that BRPs prefer this to the latter.
In the remainder of this section we discuss the settlement side’s temporal
resolution, pricing rules, and price cap and floor.
Imbalance settlement temporal resolution
The Belgian, Dutch, and German balancing markets are based on quarter-
hourly market periods, while semi-hourly periods are used in France [130]. Since
imbalances vary on a continuous basis, instantaneous imbalance positions of
BRPs differ from measured net imbalance position over the settlement period.
As BRPs are only held accountable for the net imbalance position over a period,
players that caused large instantaneous imbalances, and thus the activation of
additional reserves, may not be charged for the costs they have caused. As this
issue is related to intra-settlement period imbalances, it is expected to occur
less with shorter settlement periods [20]. These provide an incentive to BRPs
to keep their portfolio balanced on shorter time frames, thereby most likely
increasing the demand for flexibility by BRPs, either as part of their portfolio
or by means of ID trading, which in turn would lower the flexibility needs of
the TSO in RT.
Single-pricing vs. dual-pricing
Imbalance prices can either be calculated through a dual or single-pricing scheme.
In a dual-pricing scheme, the imbalance price applied to BRPs’ imbalance
positions in the same direction as the SI is based on the activation cost of reserve
capacity, while the imbalance price applied to BRPs’ imbalances in the opposite
direction of the SI is typically based on the DA price. In contrast, within a single-
pricing scheme, a uniform imbalance price, based on the activation cost of reserve
capacity, is applied to all BRPs having an imbalance position [103, 113, 143].
In France a dual-pricing scheme is applied,10 while the calculation of the
imbalance price in Belgium, Germany, and the Netherlands is each based on a
single price that applies to all imbalances [103, 130]. However, the imbalance
pricing scheme in the Netherlands is not a pure single-pricing mechanism, since
in case both up and downward reserves are activated the prices differ: the long
imbalance price equals the marginal activation price for downward reserve while
the short imbalance price is the one for upward reserve [172].
10The French imbalance pricing mechanism changed in April 2017 [179]. Nevertheless, this
chapter’s insights in single-pricing vs. dual-pricing are valid independent from the considered
geographical market zone.
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In addition, in Belgium and the Netherlands, the imbalance price applied to
short and long positions differs in the event of large imbalances, thereby moving
from a single to a dual-pricing scheme. This is done by including a balance-
incentivizing component, to either punish BRP imbalances in the same direction
as the SI or to incentivize all BRPs to keep their balance. Although such a
component is applied in Germany as well, it does not result in different short
and long imbalance prices. The imbalance price is increased for all BRPs if
the system is short, and decreased for all BRPs if the system is long [119]. In
France, the imbalance price applied to BRP imbalances in the direction of the
SI is adjusted by a multiplier 1 +K, set at 1.08 since July 2011 [180].
To lessen the need for activation of reserve capacity on the procurement side
of the balancing market, BRPs can help the TSO keep the system balanced
by intentionally incurring imbalance positions in the opposite direction of the
SI, which can be referred to as “passive balancing” [181]. However, we argue
that with dual-pricing there is unfortunately little incentive to provide passive
balancing since the DA price is applied to imbalances in the opposite direction of
the SI. In contrast, single-pricing schemes incentivize BRPs to perform passive
balancing. The reasoning for this proposition proceeds as follows.
• In case of a negative SI, the TSO activates upward reserve. Typically,
this is activated at a higher price compared to the DA price, and a larger
quantity of activated upward reserve results in a higher imbalance price, as
it is typically selected according to a merit-order of increasing activation
prices. This incentivizes BRPs to have a long position.
• In case of a positive SI, the TSO activates downward reserve. Typically,
this is activated at a low price compared to the DA price, and a larger
amount of activated downward reserve results in a lower imbalance price,
as it is typically selected according to a merit-order of increasing activation
prices from the TSO point of view, i.e., decreasing resulting imbalance
prices when considering downward reserve capacity. This incentivizes
BRPs to have a short position.
However, some regulators prefer a dual-pricing scheme (e.g., France), as this
avoids BRPs to be incentivized to speculate on the direction of the SI [20]. In
addition, in Germany BRPs are contractually not allowed to deviate from their
nominated position to benefit from favorable imbalance prices, even though that
might help the system [138]. Instead, both countries rely solely on the TSO to
balance the system by activating reserve capacity, which can be justified in two
ways. First, deviations based on passive balancing are not communicated to the
TSO, which makes congestion management difficult due to the lack of reliable
information. Second, forecasts of different players on whether to incur a long or
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short position for passive balancing are often based on similar algorithms. In
case the algorithms suggest the wrong direction, the need for balancing services
would be further increased, while when multiple BRPs provide such passive
balancing and their forecasts about the system state is correct, they may turn
oversupply into undersupply situations and vice versa, instead of decreasing
the absolute value of the SI. In contrast to Germany where this is not allowed,
and to France where the dual-pricing scheme does not provide an incentive, in
Belgium and the Netherlands passive balancing is possible and allowed. Those
countries believe that such behavior can serve a valuable social purpose and
contributes to the valorization of flexibility.
Finally, it has to be noted that in Belgium, Germany, and the Netherlands,
BRPs can still change their submitted nominations after gate closure of the ID
market, even after RT, by means of a so-called OTC “day-after” market [99, 130].
This trading of individual BRP imbalances has no physical meaning, but changes
the accounting in the settlement process. The volume traded in this market is
small (or negligible) if market participants have an idea of the level of imbalance
prices, as there are no win-win situations in case of single-pricing. In case the
imbalance price is positive, the player with a long position is not willing to
lose its long position since he receives the imbalance price. Meanwhile, in the
case in which the imbalance price is negative, the player with a short position
receives an income because of its imbalance as he pays the imbalance price.
In Germany, day-after trading can reduce the uncertainty until the imbalance
price is known a few weeks after delivery. However, as shown in [118], there is a
high predictability of the approximate level of imbalance prices, rendering this
market largely irrelevant in Germany as well [116, 119].
Marginal pricing vs. average pricing
When the imbalance price reflects the procurement cost of the activated reserve
capacity, it is either based on the marginal or average activation price [103,
113, 143]. With marginal pricing, the imbalance price is set to the price of
the marginal accepted bid, while for average pricing the imbalance price is
calculated by dividing the net total activation costs of the TSO by the net
activated reserve volume. The imbalance price is based on marginal pricing
in Belgium and the Netherlands, while France and Germany apply average
pricing [115, 117, 130, 146].
In general, there is a widely held view that marginal pricing provides BRPs
with more accurate signals into the cost to cope with their imbalances, and
as such gives a greater incentive to avoid imbalance positions [20, 117]. Since
in single-pricing schemes it may be profitable for BRPs to deviate from their
REAL-TIME BALANCING MARKETS 95
submitted schedules for passive balancing, it is clear that profits would rise
with more extreme imbalance prices. Marginal pricing leads to more extreme
prices compared to average pricing in case of TSO balancing actions in one
direction, while in situations where the TSO activates both up and downward
reserve capacity this may not always be true. However, with average pricing,
the imbalance price is often capped by the marginal activation price (e.g.,
Germany). Therefore, we conclude that marginal pricing may be preferred
by BRPs wishing to perform passive balancing actions, while average pricing
appears to be advantageous for BRPs having limited access to flexible resources
to avoid the risk of being exposed to more extreme (unfavorable) imbalance
prices.
Imbalance price cap and floor
The imbalance price in the Belgian RT balancing market includes a price cap
of 3 000e/MWh, and price floor of - 3 000e/MWh. Contrarily, the Dutch
imbalance price is less heavily bounded, with a (theoretical) price cap and
floor of 100 000e/MWh and - 100 000e/MWh, respectively [121]. The German
imbalance price is, after calculation according to the average pricing principle,
limited by the marginal activated up and downward reserve bid. Afterwards,
this capped price is compared to the average volume-weighted ID price. In case
the net regulation volume (NRV) is positive (i.e., SI is negative), the ID price
represents a lower limit, while if the NRV is negative (i.e., SI is positive), the
ID price represents an upper limit. Any remaining reserve activation costs that
are not covered by the settlement mechanism are recovered through grid fees
together with the reservation costs to contract reserve capacity [115]. In France,
if the SI is positive, the imbalance price for BRPs with a long position is capped
by the DA price, while if the SI is negative, the imbalance price for BRPs with
a short position must at least equal the DA price [180]. High imbalance prices
are market signals that represent a relative scarcity of cheap upward flexibility
when facing negative SIs, while negative imbalance prices signal the scarcity of
cheap downward flexibility with positive SIs [103].
4.4.3 Procurement side
At the procurement side of the balancing market, the TSO procures and activates
reserve capacity from BSPs.11 Besides the distinction between up and downward
reserve, ENTSO-E further categorizes reserve capacity into three groups. FCR,
11We focus on frequency control, as other grid services (i.e., black-start capabilities, voltage
support, and congestion management) are not within the scope of this chapter.
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i.e., primary control, is activated automatically in a matter of seconds, in
response to frequency deviations for the entire synchronous zone, and needs
to have the ability to be fully operational in 0.5min. FRR is either activated
automatically (aFRR), i.e., secondary control, or manually (mFRR), i.e., fast
tertiary control, and restores the system frequency by restoring the balance in
the control zone, thereby relieving the activated FCR. Its activation is triggered
by the ACE, which is calculated as the difference between the scheduled and
actual power interchange of a control area. While aFRR capacity needs to be
fully operational in 5-15min, for mFRR capacity this is in 7.5-22.5min, both
depending on the control zone. Finally, RR, i.e., slow tertiary control, can be
used to support or relieve the activated FRR. RR is not further discussed as it
is currently not used by the Belgian, German, and Dutch TSOs. Instead, they
expect BRPs to already offset part of their imbalances by means of self-balancing
and trading on the ID market [29, 99].
In what follows we discuss the procurement side’s reserve remuneration, contract
periods, selection and activation mechanism, cross-border cooperation, and
market size.
Reserve remuneration
In general, BSPs providing FCR only receive a reservation payment. This
is because no activation payment applies since up and downward FCR
activations are expected to compensate each other and only represent very
small volumes [118, 143]. However, this is not the case in France, where the
DA price serves as proxy for activation payments [182]. For contracted aFRR
and mFRR, both reservation and activation payments apply.
Payments are either based on a fixed regulated price, pay-as-bid pricing, or
pay-as-cleared pricing.12 The reservation of FCR is remunerated pay-as-bid
in Belgium, Germany, and the Netherlands, and through a regulated price in
France. Both the reservation and activation remuneration of aFRR is pay-as-bid
in Belgium and Germany, while in the Netherlands pay-as-bid applies to the
reservation and pay-as-cleared to the activation. In France the provision of
aFRR is remunerated by means of regulated prices. For mFRR the reservation is
remunerated pay-as-bid in all market zones except for France, where a regulated
price applies, while the activation is remunerated pay-as-bid in Belgium, France,
and Germany, and pay-as-cleared in the Netherlands [113, 130, 146, 183].
We identify several reasons for the presence of reservation payments. First, in
the case of FCR, a reservation payment is needed since usually no activation
12For a discussion on the different pricing rules in reserve markets, we refer the reader
to [113].
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payments apply. Second, reservation costs compensate BSPs’ opportunity costs
to keep the contracted capacity available. Third, they lower a BSP’s risk by
yielding a guaranteed income, instead of having to rely on non-guaranteed
activations. Fourth, they may contribute to efficient dispatch in the presence
of cost nonconvexities. Fifth, capacity payments may be a means to recover
costs in case BRPs cannot pass on all of their costs via activation bids because
of price limits [143]. In contrast, the main disadvantage of reservation costs is
the difficulty in accurately allocating them to responsible BRPs, as they are
currently just spread over all system participants through grid fees.
Reserve contract periods
Recently, there has been a move from long-term contracting to more frequent
tenders for shorter durations. Currently, FCR is contracted on a weekly basis
in Belgium, the Netherlands, and Germany, while aFRR is contracted for the
duration of a year in the Netherlands, and a week in Belgium and Germany.
While mFRR is contracted for the duration of a year in the Netherlands, and
in Belgium both monthly and yearly contracts apply, in Germany daily tenders
are organized for six 4 h periods. In France, the provision of FCR, aFRR,
and mFRR is mandatory [99, 117, 130, 183]. Next to contracted reserves, in
Belgium and the Netherlands (for aFRR and mFRR), and in France (for mFRR),
noncontracted voluntary bids are allowed until close-to-RT. In contrast, the
German TSOs only consider contracted reserves [99].
We identify four advantages of shorter contract periods. First, they allow TSOs
to size reserve needs more accurately for the upcoming period. This may lead
to lower total reserve needs, as with longer periods reserve requirements may be
oversized for part of the period subject to the sizing. Second, when considering
the supply of flexibility, shorter periods allow BSPs to better estimate their
opportunity cost and thus more accurately price their service [116, 184]. Third,
they also lower the availability risk for BSPs, decreasing entry barriers and
fostering competition. Fourth, shorter contract periods allow to more often and
accurate arbitrage between different services, thereby improving the allocation
of resources to the most profitable ones at each time step. In contrast, we
identify two arguments against more frequent tender periods. First, financing
new investments in flexibility requires accurate expectations of (future) revenue
streams, which is easier with longer contract periods. Second, TSOs may prefer
longer contract periods as this guarantees the access to sufficient reserve capacity
for a longer period of time [185].
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Reserve selection and activation mechanism
FCR is contracted according to a merit-order of increasing prices in the
Netherlands and Germany, starting with the lowest, and is co-optimized together
with aFRR in Belgium to minimize total combined reservation costs. The latter
allows BSPs to better deal with short-term operating constraints. In the
Netherlands, aFRR is contracted such that its reservation cost is minimized,
which may include an overshoot since bids may not be fully divisible. This may
lead to situations where the lowest bid is not necessarily always selected first.
An identical approach applies to the reservation of mFRR in both Belgium
and the Netherlands. In contrast, in Germany aFRR and mFRR are reserved
according to a merit-order of increasing prices, with the lowest bid selected
first [99].
While the reservation of reserve is based on the reservation price, the activation
of reserve is based on the activation price. While contracted aFRR is activated
simultaneously and pro rata in Belgium and France, it is activated sequentially
according to a merit-order in the Netherlands and Germany. In contrast, mFRR
is subject to a sequential merit-order activation in all market zones. It is
important to note that while contracted aFRR is activated pro rata in Belgium,
noncontracted aFRR is subject to merit-order activation [99, 130, 186]. In
general, pro rata activation inherently results in a more flexible reserve portfolio,
but as all contracted sources are activated every time the reserve product is
activated, we argue that this can pose a barrier to BSPs operating so-called
limited energy resources that prefer infrequent activations.
Cross-border reserve procurement
Given the full harmonization of DA markets in the CWE region, and plans for
increasingly coupled and harmonized ID markets, the next logical step would
involve the RT markets. Although some initial steps have already been taken
in this direction, much more work is required. In 2012, the TSOs from multiple
neighboring countries, among which TenneT NL and Elia, joined the first
module of the GCC, leading to the international GCC (IGCC) [103]. Besides
this, TenneT NL (2014) and Elia (2016) joined the existing FCR common
procurement platform of the German, Austrian, and Swiss TSOs, for a share
of their FCR obligations [138]. The participation of RTE is planned for 2017.
Further international integration, along the line of all four GCC modules of
the German TSOs (see Section 4.4.1), is expected to result in less total reserve
activations, more efficient sizing, and the reservation and activation of the most
efficient bids across all participating zones.
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4.4.4 Real-time market size and summary
Based on RT market data from the TSOs [100, 180, 187, 188], and consumption
data from ENTSO-E, Fig. 4.6 shows the NRV as share of the consumption
for 2012-2015. In general, this share has been decreasing in recent years. We
explain this as follows: improved RES forecast accuracy, better profiling in the
DA and ID market, increased liquidity in the ID market, increased international
cooperation, and increased passive balancing by BRPs. We argue that TSOs
may further incentivize the latter by reacting slower to SIs, thereby temporarily
keeping the SI at a higher level to attract additional passive balancing.
Table 4.4 gives an overview of the key characteristics of the RT markets in the
CWE region.
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(a) Belgian RT market.
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(b) French RT market.
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(c) German RT market.
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(d) Dutch RT market.
Figure 4.6: Quarter-hourly NRV as share of the quarter-hourly consumption, for
Belgium (Fig. 4.6a), France (Fig. 4.6b), Germany (Fig. 4.6c), and the Netherlands
(Fig. 4.6d), for the period 2012 - 2015.
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Table 4.4: Key characteristics of the (mostly nonharmonized) CWE region’s RT
balancing markets.
BE FR DE NL
G
en
er
al Control areas 1 1 4 1TSO Elia RTE 50 Hertz, Amprion, TenneT
TenneT, TransnetBW
Market period 15min 30min 15min 15min
Se
tt
le
m
en
t Pricing Single Dual Single Single
Pricing Marginal Average Average Marginal
Price limits ±3 000e/MWh DA price Marginal activated ±100 000e/MWh
bids, ID price
Pr
oc
ur
em
en
t
FCR contract period Weekly Mandatory Weekly Weekly
FCR reservation Pay-as-bid Regulated Pay-as-bid Pay-as-bid
FCR activation - Regulated - -
aFRR contract period Weekly Mandatory Weekly Yearly
aFRR reservation Pay-as-bid Regulated Pay-as-bid Pay-as-bid
aFRR activation Pay-as-bid Regulated Pay-as-bid Pay-as-cleared
mFRR contract period Monthly/yearly Mandatory Daily (4 h) Yearly
mFRR reservation Pay-as-bid Regulated Pay-as-bid Pay-as-bid
mFRR activation Pay-as-bid Pay-as-bid Pay-as-bid Pay-as-cleared
4.5 Conclusions
In the CWE region, the need for and valorization of flexibility in electric energy
supply and demand is primarily expressed in the short-term markets, defined
as those taking place from the DA stage until delivery, including DA, ID, and
RT markets. Due to the ongoing integration of variable RES, the variability in
the system is increasing, making these markets increasingly important to keep
the system balanced at different time scales. A good understanding of their
design, as well as of new developments, is essential for analyses of the need for
and supply of flexibility. This chapter therefore provides a detailed overview
of the design of the three short-term markets for the four market zones of the
CWE region, while focusing on their interaction with flexibility.
Considering the DA market, we discuss its general functioning, and review its
specific features, including available order types, temporal resolution, cross-
border trading, and price caps and floors. For the ID market, a similar set of
topics is considered, while also discussing the difference between its two market
types, i.e., discrete auctions and continuous trading. Finally, RT balancing
markets include both an imbalance settlement and reserve procurement side.
Considering the former, we analyze how the BRPs’ imbalance positions and the
imbalance prices are determined, while for the latter, we investigate how the
TSO procures, activates, and remunerates reserve capacity from BSPs.
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While other potentially desirable reforms can be identified when considering the
implications for flexibility discussed throughout this chapter, we conclude that
policy-makers should focus on four design improvements. The first one is the
temporal resolution. As BRPs are only held accountable for the net imbalance
position over a settlement period, and not for instantaneous imbalances, quarter-
hourly settlement periods in the French RT market would increase the extent to
which BRPs are charged for the reserve activation costs they cause. In addition,
the introduction of quarter-hourly products in the Belgian, French, and Dutch
continuous trading ID markets would allow players to align hourly DA output
schedules through market-based transactions to the temporal resolution of the
imbalance settlement, and improve the extent to which capacity is rewarded
for its flexibility. The second recommended improvement is the introduction
of an ID auction for Belgium, France, and the Netherlands. As the impact on
liquidity needs to be taken into account, further integration of the CWE ID
markets through market-coupling naturally follows, which would also promote an
efficient allocation of flexibility and interconnection capacity. Third, as passive
balancing can serve a valuable social purpose and improve the valorization of
flexibility, incentivizing design changes should be considered for the French and
German balancing markets. Fourth, more cross-border inter-TSO cooperation
should be promoted on the procurement side in the CWE region’s balancing
markets, similar to the cooperation of the four German TSOs. Such cooperation
is expected to contribute to more efficient reserve sizing, reservation, and
activation.
In terms of relative size of the three markets, trading volume analyses show
that the DA market is an important market in the CWE region. In 2015, it
comprised on average 28.19% (BE), 23.48% (FR), 46.21% (DE), and 38.47%
(NL) of the hourly consumption. Although the ID market still plays a minor
role in terms of trading volume, i.e., in 2015 on average 0.81% (BE), 0.94%
(FR), 5.90% (DE), and 0.83% (NL) of the hourly consumption, these volumes
have been increasing steadily over the past few years, and are expected to
keep on growing. In Germany the ID market is relatively large due to the
demand for ID flexibility resulting from high RES penetrations, and because
of its relatively sophisticated market design including both continuous trading
and a discrete auction, and both hourly and quarter-hourly products, all of
which facilitate trade. Finally, the RT balancing market’s size, measured in
terms of the NRV, has seen its share of consumption decrease from 2012 to 2015,
with average shares falling from 1.33% to 0.95% (BE), from 1.19% to 1.05%
(FR), from 1.38% to 0.63% (DE), and from 0.49% to 0.44% (NL). This can be
attributed to more accurate RES generation forecasts, improved profiling in the
DA and ID market, increased liquidity in the ID market, increased international
cooperation, and increased passive balancing by BRPs.
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We conclude that the details of market design are crucial to the successful
integration of variable RES, as they determine the rules by which flexibility
providers must play, and define the opportunities for these sources to valorize
flexible operations.
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Single-application operation
Price-based unit commitment electricity storage
arbitrage with piecewise linear price-effects
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Abstract:
Electricity storage plants can be used for many applications, with one of the
most studied applications being arbitrage in the day-ahead market. Although
the arbitrage value is related to the presence of price spreads, it also depends
on the effect of (dis)charge actions on prices, as arbitrage generally reduces
price spreads by increasing off-peak prices when charging and decreasing peak
prices when discharging. As such, there are two important assumptions in price-
based unit commitment arbitrage models: first, whether the storage operator is
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assumed to have perfect knowledge of future prices, and second, whether they
recognize that their (dis)charge actions may affect those prices, i.e., the price-
taking or price-making assumption. This chapter proposes a comprehensive
formulation of the arbitrage problem including detailed operating constraints,
and focuses on relaxing the price-taking assumption by considering real-world
price-effect data, published in the form of hourly piecewise linear relationships
between quantity and price based on submitted bids, which are referred to
as “market resilience functions”. These can be used to (1) evaluate the price-
taking and price-making assumptions based on simplified price-effects, and
to (2) provide an upper limit to the arbitrage value under the assumption
that prices and price-effects are known at the decision stage. In addition, a
stepwise approximation to the piecewise linear functions is developed to reduce
computation time, i.e., from mixed-integer nonconvex quadratic programming
to mixed-integer linear programming, while providing lower and upper bound
approximations to the arbitrage value. The developed models are applied to
the Belgian day-ahead market for 2014, and show that the price-effect has a
strong impact on the operation and arbitrage value of large-scale storage.
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storage operator
perspective
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5.1 Introduction
5.1.1 Motivation
The storage of electricity represents a combination of three functions [3]:
consuming electricity, accumulating the energy in some form, and generating
electricity. Only part of the consumed electric energy is converted to energy
stored in the buffer during charging because of a charge efficiency 0 < ηc ≤ 1,
while only part of the stored energy is converted back into electric energy during
discharging because of a discharge efficiency 0 < ηd ≤ 1. The buffered energy
may also increase and decrease independent of the grid through exogenous
power flows p+t ≥ 0 (addition) and p-t ≥ 0 (removal), e.g., water inflow and
evaporation in the upper reservoir for PHS plants. The general power balance
of storage plants that consume electric power pct ≥ 0 and generate electric power
pdt ≥ 0, and store it in an energy buffer et ≥ 0, is then:
det
dt︸︷︷︸
4 Energy buffer
= pct · ηc︸ ︷︷ ︸
Addition
− pdt /ηd︸ ︷︷ ︸
Removal︸ ︷︷ ︸
Electric origin
+ p+t︸︷︷︸
Addition
− p-t︸︷︷︸
Removal︸ ︷︷ ︸
Exogenous origin
. (5.1)
In recent years there has been a renewed interest in electricity storage due to the
liberalization of electricity markets and the integration of variable RES. Their
expected and unexpected variability results in an increased need for flexibility,
which is the ability to provide power adjustments to deal with temporary
imbalances between generation and consumption of electric energy [190, 191].
Electricity storage plants can provide this flexibility by charging and discharging
through interaction with an energy buffer. However, flexibility can also be
provided by flexible generation and consumption, and by the electric grid
through which flexible capacity in neighboring regions can be accessed (Fig. 5.1).
Market participants are only incentivized to integrate new flexible resources
when the investment is profitable. Although electricity storage plants can be used
for many applications (e.g., arbitrage, portfolio management, frequency control,
voltage support, black-start service [10, 25]) and maximizing the value of storage
requires the aggregation of different applications, one of the most studied and
well-known applications is arbitraging DA market electricity prices [192, 193].
This chapter focuses on the arbitrage application as the sole revenue source.
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Figure 5.1: Overview of power system flexibility sources.
5.1.2 Scope and approach
Classic definitions of arbitrage denote making a riskless profit by simultaneously
buying and selling a similar commodity with net zero investment. However, in a
broader context any activity in which a player buys a commodity at a relatively
low price and sells a similar commodity, or commodity in which the former can
be converted, at a relatively high price for profit can be referred to as arbitrage.
This broader definition allows to include initial investments, does not require
simultaneity of the purchase and sale, and furthermore does not require a single
commodity either (i.e., so-called intercommodity arbitrage) [28]. In the context
of this chapter, arbitrage is defined as the capturing of price spreads over time
in a single market, being the DA market, by means of electricity storage plants.
Although the arbitrage value is directly related to the presence of these price
spreads, it also depends on the price-effect of (dis)charge actions, as additional
storage capacity generally reduces price spreads by increasing off-peak prices
when charging as well as decreasing on-peak prices when discharging.
In contrast to cost-based UC, which refers to the scheduling of generation
capacity to meet system load at minimum cost, the single-player self-scheduling
problem with the objective to maximize profit based on price signals is referred
to as PBUC [194]. The arbitrage application is widely discussed in the literature,
both from a system perspective (e.g., [195, 196, 197, 198, 199, 200]) and from an
individual storage plant’s PBUC perspective, the latter being the focus of this
chapter. Generally, there are two important assumptions in PBUC arbitrage
models: the first is related to the storage operator’s assumed knowledge of
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future prices, i.e., the (im)perfect price foresight assumption, while the second
is related to whether they recognize that their (dis)charge actions may affect
those prices, i.e., the price-taking or price-making assumption [201, 202].1
A large share of the existing PBUC work assumes perfect foresight of future
prices, and no price-effect with the storage plant to be a price-taker: i.e., it is
small enough to not affect prices, or its price-taking participation is already
included in the prices (e.g., [203, 204, 205, 206, 207, 208]). Reference [203]
provides an estimate of the arbitrage value in 14 deregulated markets, [204]
considers the Danish market, [205] analyzes the arbitrage value in the PJM,
ERCOT, and CAISO markets in the US, [206] considers different markets in
the US and compares them with the UK, Norway, Canada, and Australia, [207]
focuses on the UK and Wales, and finally [208] considers the UK market for
arbitrage purposes.
In addition, quite some studies discuss a relaxation of the perfect price foresight
assumption (e.g., [201, 209, 210, 211, 212, 213, 214]). References [201, 209]
use a backcasting approach and analyze the PJM market. The method used
in [210, 211] is based on average prices of a user-specified period around which
a price at which is bought and at which is sold is defined, and is applied to 13
DA markets in [210] and to Denmark in [211]. In [212] a price forecast method
is applied to Ontario, while [213] studies the NYISO market and forecasts the
peak hours based on historical data. Finally, [214] includes a variety of random
normally distributed forecast errors.
Although many works study a relaxation of the perfect foresight assumption,
less attention has been given to the study of the price-effect in PBUC arbitrage
models. However, either large-scale or multiple small-scale storage plants that
are operated cooperatively could benefit from considering the price-effect of
storage actions. Even when deciding on the storage actions as a price-taker, if its
participation is assumed to not be included yet in the observed prices considering
the price-effect in the ex-post calculation of the realized profit is relevant for
additional large storage capacities, as it may reduce observed price spreads.
First, [201, 215] introduce a method to account for this price-effect based on an
observed linear relationship between the system load and price. Second, [32]
introduces a constant so-called market resilience factor to represent the price-
effect of (dis)charge actions. Third, [216] and [217] propose methodologies to
relax the price-taking assumption by taking into account the residual inverse
demand function. Although these methodologies provide insight in the arbitrage
value and operation of large storage capacities, due to a lack of market data or
a different research scope they are based on rather conceptual and simplified
1The second assumption is sometimes also referred to as the “exogenous price” vs. “price
as a function of the considered player’s decisions” assumption [59].
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price-effects and therefore result in (1) a suboptimal (dis)charge schedule and
accompanying arbitrage value with respect to the actual price-effect, and (2)
an ex-post gap between the expected and realized profit.
Therefore, this chapter focuses on considering the price-effect by including real-
world market resilience data, which illustrates the impact on the DA price of a
change in offer or demand volume for each hour, published by several European
power exchanges.2 This data represents the most detailed available price-effect
data, as it is obtained by the power exchange running the market-clearing
algorithm again for alternative scenarios, and thus takes into account (1) the
hourly aggregated supply and demand curves, (2) interaction with neigboring
markets through market-coupling, and (3) the presence of complex orders.
This chapter focuses on the arbitrage value of additional storage capacity in
the DA market, but does not aim to provide bidding strategies for storage
plants (e.g., [218]). Instead, the storage operator is assumed to self-schedule his
(dis)charge actions against a set of DA prices and market resilience functions
that reflect how prices react to changes in quantity.
5.1.3 Contributions
The main contributions of this chapter with respect to previous research on
electricity storage arbitrage is a comprehensive formulation of the electricity
storage arbitrage problem including detailed operating constraints, and the
presentation of a new methodology to account for the price-effect of (dis)charge
actions. Since the latter is based on the implementation of real-world market
resilience functions in the PBUC arbitrage model, it includes the most detailed
available price-effect data. As such, this chapter presents a measure to (1)
evaluate the performance of the price-taking assumption and price-making
assumptions based on more conceptual and simplified price-effects, and to (2)
provide an upper limit to the arbitrage value, given current market conditions, if
both the hourly prices and price-effects are assumed to be known at the decision
stage. The former is done for a storage operator that assumes to be a price-taker
in the market by using the price-effect data to ex-post calculate the realized
profit, as opposed to the expected profit based on prices that would occur in the
absence of (dis)charge actions. In addition, as the piecewise linear nature of the
market resilience data poses computational challenges, a stepwise approximation
of the piecewise linear functions is proposed which reduces computational effort
significantly while providing lower and upper bound approximations to the
piecewise linear results. The analyses are executed for the Belgian DA market,
2In contrast to the considered market resilience data, the price elasticity of demand refers
to the relative change in demand as a result from a relative change in the price, and is typically
negative as the demand for most commodities decreases as the price increases [163].
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and show that the price-effect has a strong impact on the operation and arbitrage
value of large-scale storage.
Section 5.2 discusses the price-effect in PBUC formulations of the arbitrage
problem. Next, Section 5.3 provides a comprehensive formulation of the
arbitrage problem with a price-taking assumption, while Section 5.4 extends this
formulation by including the price-effect through piecewise linear and stepwise
approximated market resilience functions. Section 5.5 discusses the results, and
Section 5.6 provides conclusions.
5.2 The price-effect of storage actions
5.2.1 Literature review
Although a relaxation of the price-taking assumption (Fig. 5.2a) has been studied
extensively in other frameworks (e.g., equilibrium models [219, 220, 221]), it
has only been studied to a limited extent in PBUC electricity storage arbitrage
models. First, references [201, 215] assume a monthly linear relationship between
the price and system load for the DA market in the PJM region in the US,
obtained by using ordinary least squares (OLS) regression. The slope associated
with the OLS function is assumed to be non-decreasing and to capture the
price-effect of (dis)charge actions (Fig. 5.2b). Second, [32] considers the Belgian
DA market and defines a constant market resilience factor as price-effect for
all (dis)charge volumes for the entire year (Fig. 5.2b). This factor is based on
the DA market resilience data discussed in Section 5.1, but does not consider
its time-varying and piecewise linear nature. Third, two approaches include
the price-effect by considering residual inverse demand curves. In [216] the
price-effect is studied for the Iberian DA market MIBEL, and is defined by a
residual inverse demand curve that depends on the slopes of the demand and
supply curves, and which is modeled through an approximated sigmoid function.
Contrarily, [217] studies the price-effect in the context of the Greek DA market.
The demand curve is assumed to be perfectly inelastic, while the mirrored image
of the stepwise supply curve from other generation is assumed to represent
the residual inverse demand curve. The resulting price is determined by the
intersection of the stepwise supply curve and the vertical demand curve, with
the latter’s position depending on the storage plant’s actions (Fig. 5.2c).
When considering generation capacity, a similar approach to [217] is applied
in [222, 223] for a conventional hydro power plant. In addition, [224] discusses
a methodology for generation companies to provide hourly offers by considering
a series of possible residual inverse demand curves. These are selected from
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recent days similar to the considered day in terms of hourly demand, and are
thus based on historical offers submitted by competing players.
ChargeDischarge
Price
MRP
(a) No price-effect (price-taker).
ChargeDischarge
Price
MRP
(b) Linear price-effect.
ChargeDischarge
Price
MRP
(c) Stepwise price-effect.
ChargeDischarge
Price
MRP
(d) Piecewise linear price-effect.
Figure 5.2: Overview of the price-taking vs. different price-making assumptions. The
market reference point (MRP) refers to the situation without participation of the
additional storage capacity, and is located at the origin.
Due to either a lack of available market data or the focus on a different
research scope, the existing approaches include simplified representations of
the price-effect. This may result in suboptimal (dis)charge schedules and
resulting arbitrage value when evaluating against the actual price-effect, and
incorrect estimates of the realized profit. When calculating the change in price,
inaccuracies may originate from not considering (1) the time-varying aggregated
supply and demand curves, (2) the acceptance of new block orders and rejection
of currently cleared ones, and (3) changes in cross-border flows due to the
coupling of geographically adjacent markets.
5.2.2 Hourly piecewise linear market resilience functions
The degree to which additional demand and supply would affect the Belgian DA
price is captured by the market resilience data, published in the form of hourly
piecewise linear functions (Fig. 5.2d) by the BELPEX power exchange [169].3 As
3Such market resilience data is also published by the APX [170] and EPEX SPOT [171]
power exchanges for other European countries.
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stated before, this data is obtained by rerunning the market-clearing algorithm
for six different scenarios (i.e., 50 MWh, 250 MWh, 500 MWh additional offer or
demand volume at any price), and takes into account the aggregated supply and
demand curves, interaction with neighboring markets through market-coupling,
and presence of complex orders (e.g., block orders). Contrarily, only using the
published aggregated offer curves from within a single market omits changes in
cross-border flows due to market-coupling as well as the change in clearing of
complex orders for the following reasons.
• The BELPEX DA market is coupled with other European power exchanges.
The market-clearing algorithm combines the supply and demand bid
information of the different exchanges to optimize the utilization of the
available interconnection capacity. In case of a price difference between
geographical markets, electric energy is exchanged until the price difference
is eliminated or all available interconnection capacity is used. Consequently
the effect of a local increase in offer or demand may not only affect the
local market price but also the price in the coupled markets.4 Since the
price-effect in one market is a function of the market resilience of the local
market as well as of the coupled markets, and the available interconnection
capacity, merely considering the local power exchange’s aggregated curves
results in an overestimation of the total price-effect, including the impact
of changed imports and exports.
• The standardized orders in DA markets are limit orders, i.e., hourly offered
or requested quantities with a certain price limit. Besides these hourly
orders, most exchanges also allow other, more complex, orders [225]. The
most common one is a block order, which consists of quantities that
are offered or requested in multiple hours at an average price limit and
which has to be accepted completely or not at all. Due to their specific
nature, such accepted sale and buy block orders are introduced in the
aggregated supply and demand curve at the minimum and maximum
price, respectively, thereby ignoring their price-sensitive character. If
the price-effect would be simulated by simply shifting aggregated supply
and demand curves, this would not capture the extent to which initially
rejected block orders may be accepted and accepted block orders may now
be rejected.
It is important to note that noniteratively solved PBUC formulations of the
arbitrage problem assume that other players do not change their behavior with
4Since a demand increase in a market would result in an increased local price, this leads
to an increased import (if interconnection capacity is available) which in turn increases the
price in the exporting market and (partially) offsets the price increase in the local market. A
similar reasoning holds for a supply increase.
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participation of the additional storage capacity. PBUC models considering
a price that is determined exogenously, i.e., independent of the considered
storage plant’s (dis)charge actions, assume a price-taking assumption and are
useful to represent perfect competition conditions. In contrast, PBUC models
in which a storage operator maximizes profit while considering its price-effect
given the decisions of the competing players represent so-called leader-in-price
models [59, 226]. In more complex games other players might react and change
their behavior in response to entry of additional storage capacity.5
5.3 Day-ahead electricity storage arbitrage
The continuous time dimension, represented by time index t, is discretized,
with h representing the discrete index, while the model formulations assume
a fixed time step length T h of one hour (Fig. 5.3). The storage operator uses
electricity storage resources to maximize the arbitrage value on a daily basis
over an optimization horizon of 48 hourly time steps (∀h ∈ H). In order to
ensure that energy stored at the end of each 24 hour optimization period has
so-called carryover value [201], each optimization is done with a 48 hour horizon
to determine the dispatch of each 24 hour period. The storage operator is thus
assumed to decide upon the charge power pch and discharge power pdh based on
short-term DA price differences throughout the day, and is assumed to have a
perfect knowledge of these prices for the upcoming optimization period.6
Optimization horizon
Time
12:00 am
01 Jan
12:00 am
02 Jan
12:00 am
03 Jan
Optimization
period 1
h=1 h=24 h=48Th
.
.....Optimization
period 2
h=1 h=24 h=48.....
...
Figure 5.3: Time dimension discretization and rolling optimization horizon.
An electricity storage plant can typically be characterized by the minimum
and maximum charge power rating P c,min and P c,max, discharge power rating
5In such games, not only local competitors, but also those in neighboring market zones
have to be considered due to market-coupling.
6The rolling optimization horizon restricts the perfect foresight to the next 48 hours.
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P d,min and P d,max, and energy storage capacity Emin and Emax, the charge
and discharge efficiency ηc and ηd, and the down and upward ramp rate in
charge mode Rc,do and Rc,up and in discharge mode Rd,do and Rd,up. In
addition, storage plants have a limited lifetime, which is either determined by
the calendar life N cal in case of infrequent use or by the cycle-life N cyc in case
of frequent use [92].7 The calendar life is the maximum time that the storage
plant can be used, independent from the use, while the cycle-life takes into
account the deterioration of the energy storage subsystem due to use. The
latter is particularly important when considering a BES system due to the
partial nonreversibility of the chemical reactions. Although there is no direct
constraint on the number of cycles during each optimization period, due to
the limited cycle-life it is implied that the targeted cycling rate N cyc/N cal is
constant throughout the lifetime. If the cycling rate ncyc (5.9) is lower than or
equal to the targeted cycling rate, the depreciation cost resulting from cycling
ccyc is zero, otherwise ccyc > 0 (Fig. 5.4). This formulation to include the
limited cycle-life and resulting depreciation cost is derived from [92]. Contrary
to BES systems, for PHS plants the cycle-life is sufficiently large such that ccyc
is negligible. Furthermore, this chapter assumes changes in the buffered energy
due to exogenous power flows to be negligible in the short-term.
Ncal
constrained
ccyc =0
Ncyc
constrained
ccyc >0
ccyc = (Cinv,e · Emax) · (ncyc/Ncyc − 1/Ncal) (ii)
ccyc = 0 (i)
ccyc = max(i,ii)
ncyc [s-1]N
cyc
Ncal
ccyc [e/s]
Figure 5.4: Opportunity cost for wearing out the energy storage subsystem.
Since the storage operator is assumed to be a price-taker in this initial problem
formulation, the (dis)charge schedule is optimized not taking into account the
(potential) impact on the price without its participation λda,oh . The resulting
problem is an MILP which is solved in GAMS using the CPLEX solver [227]:
7The cycle-life is usually defined as the number of cycles before the remaining usable
capacity falls below 80% of the initial storage capacity due to wear.
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piop = max
bh,ccyc,eh,
ncyc,pch,p
d
h
∑
h∈H
λda,oh ·
[
T h · (pdh − pch)
]
/(|H| · T h)− ccyc, (5.2)
s.t. eh = eh-1 + T h · (pch · ηc − pdh/ηd), ∀h ∈ H, (5.3)
−Rc,do · P c,max ≤ (pch − pch-1)/T h ≤ Rc,up · P c,max, ∀h ∈ H, (5.4)
−Rd,do · P d,max ≤ (pdh − pdh-1)/T h ≤ Rd,up · P d,max, ∀h ∈ H, (5.5)
0 ≤ P c,min · bh ≤ pch ≤ P c,max · bh, ∀h ∈ H, (5.6)
0 ≤ P d,min · (1− bh) ≤ pdh ≤ P d,max · (1− bh), ∀h ∈ H, (5.7)
0 ≤ Emin ≤ eh ≤ Emax, ∀h ∈ H, (5.8)
ncyc = ηc ·
∑
h∈H
pch/E
max, (5.9)
ccyc ≥ (C inv,e · Emax) · (ncyc/N cyc − 1/N cal), (5.10)
ccyc, eh,ncyc, pch, pdh ∈ R+ , bh ∈ {0, 1} , H ⊂ N, ∀h ∈ H. (5.11)
The objective value in (5.2) expresses the operating profit piop, which does
not consider the electricity storage plant’s investment cost. Constraint (5.3)
expresses the intertemporal character of electricity storage, while (5.4) and (5.5)
limit the change in (dis)charge power by the storage plant’s ramp rates.
Constraints (5.6)-(5.8) represent capacity bounds on the (dis)charge power
and storage capacity, with binary variable bh ensuring that the storage plant is
operated with a strict separation of the electricity consumption and generation
phase, i.e., pch · pdh = 0 ∀h. If however simultaneous charging and discharging is
technically feasible (e.g., in certain PHS plants), it is profitable to ignore the
nonsimultaneity constraint during negative price periods.8 The nonnegativity
of ccyc and (5.9)-(5.10) represent the convex relaxation9 of the max operator
illustrated in Fig. 5.4, with C inv,e the investment cost of the energy-component
of the storage plant. The intertemporal equation (5.3) indicates that if the
8During negative price periods the storage operator is paid to consume electric energy, and
will therefore attempt to fill the storage buffer as quickly as possible. When the upper limit
of the storage buffer is reached during these periods, it is profitable to charge and discharge
simultaneously, thereby being remunerated for the incurred energy losses.
9As ccyc is minized in (5.2), the convex relaxation leads to a result satisfying the original
max operator.
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storage plant consumes pch electric power during T h then the stored energy level
eh increases by T h · pch · ηc, while if the storage plant generates pdh electric power
during T h then the stored energy level eh decreases by T h · pdh/ηd. When h = 1
in (5.3)-(5.5), index h-1 indicates h = 24 of the previous daily optimization
period, except for the first optimization period where index h-1 at h = 1 refers
to starting values for the (dis)charge power and stored energy.
Given the (dis)charge schedule decided upon by the storage operator that
does not consider the potential price-effect, the resulting DA prices can be
calculated ex-post for price-taking storage participations that are assumed not
to be included yet in the given DA prices. This is done by interpolating the
piecewise linear market resilience functions. These prices are used to calculate
the realized piop, as opposed to the expected piop following λda,oh , of additional
storage resources.10
5.4 Relaxing the price-taking assumption
5.4.1 Including time-varying piecewise-linear market resilience
functions
Detailed price resilience data is provided by several European power exchanges
in the form of time-varying piecewise linear functions (Fig. 5.5), which may be
nonconvex and include both increasing and counterintuitive decreasing linear
segments. Segments are considered to be intuitive if the price decreases with
additional supply and increases with additional demand, while counterintuitive
segments are the result of differences in accepted block orders: additional supply
can cause supply (demand) block orders that are accepted (rejected) in the
reference case to become rejected (accepted), while additional demand can cause
demand (supply) block orders that are accepted (rejected) in the reference case
to become rejected (accepted). For the Belgian DA market in 2014, 70.5% of
the segments include intuitive slopes, 19.5% include counterintuitive slopes,
and 10% of the segments are horizontal, i.e., no change in price due to a change
in quantity.
10The expected piop is identical to the realized piop in the situation in which the storage
plant is assumed to be small enough to not affect observed prices, or in which these prices are
assumed to already include its price-taking participation. The expected and realized piop may
differ in the situation in which the storage actions may affect the observed prices, with this
effect assumed to not be included yet, and the operator not recognizing this price-effect. In
the remainder of this chapter, the expected piop corresponds to (1) the expected and realized
values in the first type of situation, and (2) the expected value in the second type of situation.
In contrast, the realized piop corresponds to the realized value in the second type of situation.
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Figure 5.5: Illustration of piecewise linear market resilience functions.
To include these piecewise linear functions in the arbitrage problem formulation,
a set k ∈ K of piecewise linear function breakpoints and a variable δh,k, which
can be considered as a special ordered set of type two (SOS2) variable [228],
are introduced. For the Belgian DA market, the piecewise linear functions have
seven fixed breakpoints (i.e., |K| = 7) along the x-axis (i.e., (dis)charge volumes)
indicated by Xpwk , while the corresponding time-dependent y-axis values (i.e.,
prices) are indicated by Y pwh,k . The MRP lies at breakpoint k = 4, with X
pw
4 =
0 and Y pwh,4 = λ
da,o
h . For each breakpoint k there is a nonnegative δh,k, which
is bounded by 1 and which may be larger than 0 for at most two breakpoints.
If there are two positive δh,k, they must correspond to adjacent breakpoints
and take on values between 0 and 1, depending the weighted share of the
corresponding breakpoints’ x-axis values and y-axis values in the calculation of
the chosen (dis)charge volume and resulting DA price:
δh,k =
|Xpwk+1 − T h · (pdh − pch)|
|Xpwk −Xpwk+1|
=
|Y pwh,k+1 − λdah |
|Y pwh,k − Y pwh,k+1|
, (5.12)
δh,k+1 =
|Xpwk − T h · (pdh − pch)|
|Xpwk −Xpwk+1|
=
|Y pwh,k − λdah |
|Y pwh,k − Y pwh,k+1|
. (5.13)
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Alternatively, one δh,k might take on the value 1, which means that the storage
operator decides to be at one of the breakpoints. The adjacency condition is
enforced by incorporating additional binary variables bpwh,k, corresponding to the
segments between adjacent breakpoints.
The DA arbitrage objective function is now (5.14), which is still subject
to (5.3)-(5.10), and is now additionally subject to (5.15)-(5.19). The resulting
problem is a nonconvex MIQP which is solved in GAMS using the SBB
solver [229]:
piop = max
bh,bpwh,k,c
cyc,
eh,ncyc,pch,
pdh,λ
da
h ,δh,k
∑
h∈H
λdah ·
[
T h · (pdh − pch)
]
/(|H| · T h)− ccyc, (5.14)
s.t. (5.3)-(5.11),
T h · (pdh − pch) =
∑
k∈K
δh,k ·Xpwk , ∀h ∈ H, (5.15)
λdah =
∑
k∈K
δh,k · Y pwh,k , ∀h ∈ H, (5.16)
∑
k∈K
δh,k = 1, ∀h ∈ H, (5.17)
∑
k∈K\{|K|}
bpwh,k = 1, ∀h ∈ H, (5.18)
δh,k ≤ bpwh,k, ∀h ∈ H, k = 1,
δh,k ≤ bpwh,k-1 + bpwh,k, ∀h ∈ H, k ∈ K\{1, |K|},
δh,k ≤ bpwh,k-1, ∀h ∈ H, k = |K|, (5.19)
δh,k ∈ R+ , λdah ∈ R , bpwh,k ∈ {0, 1} , K ⊂ N, ∀h ∈ H, k ∈ K. (5.20)
Since solving this nonconvex MIQP requires significant computation time,
a stepwise approximation of the piecewise linear functions is discussed in
Section 5.4.2. This approximation converts the problem into an easier to
solve MILP, and furthermore allows to determine lower and upper bound
approximations to the piecewise linear outcome.
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5.4.2 Stepwise approximation of time-varying piecewise linear
functions
This method approximates each linear segment of the piecewise linear market
resilience functions by a stepwise function with identical step heights. A target
step height Star is set for all linear segments, but is updated to Supdh,k in (5.23)
by (5.22) for each time slot and linear segment individually if the divison’s
remainder 0 ≤ Rdivh,k ≤ 1 in (5.21) is larger than zero:
|Y pwh,k − Y pwh,k+1|
Star
= N swh,k +Rdivh,k, ∀h ∈ H, k ∈ K\{|K|}, (5.21)
N swh,k = N swh,k + 1 if Rdivh,k > 0, ∀h ∈ H, k ∈ K\{|K|}, (5.22)
Supdh,k =
|Y pwh,k − Y pwh,k+1|
N swh,k
, ∀h ∈ H, k ∈ K\{|K|}, (5.23)
with N swh,k ∈ N0 the number of steps to approximate the linear segment between
breakpoints k and k+1. The resulting time-varying stepwise function’s total
number of steps
∑
k∈K\{|K|}N
sw
h,k, determined by Star, relates to the preferred
trade-off between computation time and approximation error.11
For each time slot, three stepwise functions are constructed. Two of them allow
to calculate a lower and upper bound to piop following the piecewise linear
market resilience functions. The lower bound is calculated by considering
a larger price-effect compared to the piecewise linear price-effect, thereby
underestimating piop, while the upper bound is calculated by considering a
smaller price-effect, thereby overestimating piop. The former is based on a
stepwise function that approximates the piecewise linear function such that
λdah is identical or less favorable for all (dis)charge actions, while the latter’s
stepwise function approximates the piecewise linear function such that λdah is
identical or more favorable (Fig. 5.6).12 Although this method provides lower
and upper bounds when considering a single optimization period, this might
not be true for each individual optimization in a rolling horizon framework if
the starting value for the stored energy level, carried over from the previous
optimization period, differs. Therefore, they should be interpreted as lower
and upper bound approximations rather than true bounds when consecutively
considering multiple optimization problems. The third stepwise function is
11Alternatively, an iterative approach could be applied in which first a rather large step size
is used, after which it is successively refined in the neighborhood of the most recent solution.
12Less favorable indicates higher prices when charging and lower prices when discharging,
while more favorable indicates lower prices when charging and higher prices when discharging.
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centered along the piecewise linear function (Fig. 5.6), but does not provide
information on whether the obtained result is an over or underestimation.
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Figure 5.6: Lower bound, upper bound, and centered stepwise approximation of the
piecewise linear market resilience functions.
The objective function is (5.24), with u ∈ Uh the set of steps of the stepwise
market resilience function, and pch,u, pdh,u, Y swh,u the charge power, discharge power,
and DA price that correspond to step u, respectively. The objective function is
still subject to (5.3)-(5.10), and now additionally subject to (5.25)-(5.29), with
Xsw,loh,u and X
sw,up
h,u being the lower and upper bound of the (dis)charge volume
corresponding to step u, respectively. The binary variables bswh,u correspond to
the steps of the stepwise function, and can be considered as special ordered set
of type one (SOS1) variables [228]. The resulting problem is formulated as an
MILP which is solved in GAMS using the CPLEX solver:
piop = max
bh,bswh,u,c
cyc,
eh,ncyc,pch,
pch,u,p
d
h,p
d
h,u
∑
h∈H
∑
u∈Uh
[
Y swh,u ·
[
T h · (pdh,u − pch,u)
]]
/(|H| · T h)− ccyc, (5.24)
s.t. (5.3)-(5.11), (5.20),∑
u∈Uh
pch,u = pch, ∀h ∈ H, (5.25)
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∑
u∈Uh
pdh,u = pdh, ∀h ∈ H, (5.26)
bswh,u ·Xsw,loh,u ≤ T h · (pdh,u − pch,u) ≤ bswh,u ·Xsw,uph,u , ∀h ∈ H,u ∈ Uh,(5.27)∑
u∈Uh
bswh,u = 1, ∀h ∈ H, (5.28)
pch,u, pdh,u ∈ R+ , bswh,u ∈ {0, 1} , ∀h ∈ H,u ∈ Uh,(5.29)
Uh = {1, 2, ...,
∑
k∈K\{|K|}
N swh,k}, ∀h ∈ H. (5.30)
5.5 Results
Unless specified otherwise, the used storage plant characteristics, along with
other input data, are displayed in Table 5.1, and serve to model typical PHS
plants. In addition, Fig. 5.7 provides information on the average market resilience
curve slope up to 500MWh additional supply and 500MWh additional demand.
Table 5.1: Input parameters.
C inv,e 50 e/MWh N cyc 100 000 - P d,min 0 MW Rd,up 50 %/min
Emax 2000 MWh P c,max 500 MW Rc,do 50 %/min ηc 86.6%
Emin 0 MWh P c,min 0 MW Rc,up 50 %/min ηd 86.6%
N cal 50 a P d,max 500 MW Rd,do 50 %/min
|H| 48 - |K| 7 - Star 1.0 e/MWh T h 1 h
5.5.1 Computational performance and accuracy of the step-
wise approximation
Table 5.2 validates the use of the stepwise approximations for the piecewise
linear market resilience functions, in order to move from a nonconvex MIQP
to an MILP. Both the operating profit piop and computation time13 following
the stepwise approximation are expressed in relative terms compared to the
piecewise linear values (i.e., the values for the MIQP represent 100%). This
13The computation time is defined as the time used by the solver, given by the GAMS
parameter “resusd”, while all models are solved to optimality by setting the GAMS option
“optcr” to zero.
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is done for twelve separate optimization periods of 12 time steps each, as for
longer periods (e.g., 24 time steps) multiple hours of computation time did not
suffice to solve the nonconvex MIQP to optimality.
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Figure 5.7: Average market resilience curve slope [e/MWh2] up to 500MWh additional
demand (upward slope from the MRP) and up to 500MWh additional supply
(downward slope from the MRP), Belgium, 2014. Positive values indicate intuitive
price-effects, while negative values indicate counterintuitive price-effects.
Table 5.2 shows that piop following the stepwise approximation effectively
provides tight lower and upper bounds to piop following the piecewise linear
functions, while only requiring a fraction of the computation time. In addition,
these bounds become more accurate as Star is set to a smaller value while only
incurring a slight increase in computation time, with the Star = 0.1e/MWh
bounds to piop located in between the Star = 1.0e/MWh bounds. Although
the centered stepwise approximation provides accurate estimations of piop as
well, these might be both under or overestimations.
5.5.2 Operating profit as a function of storage size
Fig. 5.8 shows piop for 2014 for increasing storage power rating sizes assuming a
fixed discharge E2P ratio Emax/P d,max of 4 h. Fig. 5.8a displays piop in absolute
values, while Fig. 5.8b illustrates piop relative to the expected operating profit
when assuming to be a price-taker in the market. When the storage operator
assumes to be a price-taker and thus not considers the price-effect when deciding
on the (dis)charge schedule, the expected piop increases linearly with the storage
size, as price spreads remain constant. However, when ex-post calculating the
resulting DA price using the market resilience data, the realized piop given the
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(dis)charge schedule decided upon by the price-taking storage operator is lower,
with the gap between expected and realized piop being negligible for small storage
plants but increasing with the size of additional storage resources. Contrarily,
in order to retrieve the upper limit to piop of additional storage capacity, the
price-effect is already considered at the decision stage. The results show both
a lower and upper bound approximation to piop following the piecewise linear
price-effect, as well as an approximation based on a centered stepwise function.
As more additional capacity is used for arbitrage, the incremental piop decreases
due to the price-effect, resulting in a trade-off between the capacity used and
the average profit per unit.
Table 5.2: Validation of the stepwise approximation’s lower and upper bound to
piop following piecewise linear price-effects, as well as of the centered stepwise
approximation, Belgium, 2014. The MILP values are shown relative to the MIQP
values, which represent 100%.
Optimization Star = 0.1e/MWh Star = 1.0e/MWh
Optimization Lower bound Upper bound Centered Lower bound Upper bound Centered
period piop Time piop Time piop Time piop Time piop Time piop Time
Hour Date [%] [%] [%] [%] [%] [%] [%] [%] [%] [%] [%] [%]
1 - 12 Jan 1 99.92 1.69 100.60 1.82 100.26 1.67 99.92 0.15 102.46 0.17 101.18 0.19
1 - 12 Feb 1 99.98 0.03 100.13 0.03 100.06 0.03 99.96 0.01 101.16 0.01 100.56 0.01
1 - 12 Mar 1 99.92 0.27 100.05 0.26 99.97 0.24 99.67 0.02 100.46 0.03 100.04 0.02
1 - 12 Apr 1 99.95 18.43 101.16 17.75 100.55 19.78 99.89 1.80 105.91 1.57 102.89 1.80
1 - 12 May 1 99.93 0.38 100.16 0.43 100.04 0.42 99.72 0.04 100.90 0.03 100.31 0.04
1 - 12 Jun 1 99.90 0.76 100.06 0.89 99.98 0.85 99.16 0.05 100.16 0.05 99.66 0.05
1 - 12 Jul 1 99.94 0.39 100.15 0.42 100.05 0.40 98.78 0.01 100.55 0.02 99.67 0.01
1 - 12 Aug 1 99.99 0.91 100.53 1.00 100.26 0.99 99.67 0.08 103.71 0.10 101.49 0.12
1 - 12 Sep 1 99.97 5.61 100.33 6.51 100.15 6.58 98.84 0.49 101.92 0.49 100.30 0.69
1 - 12 Oct 1 100.00 0.05 100.36 0.04 100.18 0.05 99.93 0.01 102.68 0.01 101.27 0.01
1 - 12 Nov 1 99.86 0.61 100.15 0.58 100.01 0.62 98.78 0.07 100.92 0.05 99.85 0.05
1 - 12 Dec 1 99.70 0.18 100.20 0.18 99.95 0.29 98.34 0.01 101.27 0.01 99.66 0.01
5.5.3 (Dis)charge schedule and price profile
A duration curve of the (dis)charge actions for 2014 is displayed in Fig. 5.9,
for both a storage operator which is assumed to be a price-taker in the market
and a storage operator that takes into account its price-effect. In the former
case the (dis)charge power rating is always used to its full capacity when
(dis)charging, unless bounded by the limited energy storage capacity. Contrarily,
in the latter case fewer full load hours (19% vs. 31.6%) are observed when
taking into account the price-effect of (dis)charge actions to keep price spreads
from diminishing too much. Although (dis)charge actions are partially shifted
to neighboring hours, observed through the increased number of operational
hours of the storage plant (47.3% vs. 39.6%), in total less energy is charged
(733.2GWh vs. 893.3GWh) and discharged (549.9GWh vs. 670GWh). When
considering the price-effect the total energy that is charged and discharged is
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shown by the colored area between the red line and the x-axis (Fig. 5.9); when
ignoring the price-effect a similar reasoning holds with respect to the black line.
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Figure 5.8: Expected and realized piop when not considering the price-effect, and a
lower and upper bound, as well as a centered, stepwise approximation to piop when
considering the piecewise linear price-effect, Belgium, 2014.
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Figure 5.9: Considering the price-effect leads to fewer full load hours, more operational
hours, and less (dis)charged energy in total, Belgium, 2014. The illustrated (dis)charge
actions when considering the price-effect are those of the lower bound approximation.
Fig. 5.10 shows an example of a daily price profile and (dis)charge schedule. It
shows that when not considering the price-effect the storage operator (dis)charges
at full power rating, while when considering the price-effect a trade-off occurs
between used capacity and remaining price-spread. The charge action is partly
shifted to market period 4, which is not just characterized by a smaller price-
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effect compared to market periods 5 to 8, but by a counterintuitive one as
the price decreases when charging. The resilience function for market period
4 shows a slightly decreasing slope up to 250 MWh additional demand, after
which the slope increases, hence a charge action of 250 MW during hour 4.
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(a) Price profile.
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(b) (Dis)charge schedule.
Figure 5.10: The price profile and (dis)charge schedule. When not considering the price-
effect the storage operator (dis)charges at full power rating, while when considering
the price-effect a trade-off emerges between used (dis)charge power and remaining
price-spread, Belgium, May 10, 2014. The illustrated price profile and (dis)charge
schedule when considering the price-effect are those of the lower bound approximation.
5.5.4 Discussion: yearly arbitrage value compared to annual-
ized investment cost
To provide some perspective on the order of magnitude of the obtained DA
arbitrage value for Belgium for 2014, it is compared to the annualized investment
cost of the considered PHS plant. As the available literature provides a wide
range of investment cost estimations (e.g., [39]), Table 5.3 shows a sensitivity
analysis with regard to a variety of credible power-related and energy-related
investment cost and weighted average cost of capital (WACC) estimations. It
shows that for a storage plant with the characteristics displayed in Table 5.1,
when using Belgian market data from 2014, DA market arbitrage does not
provide adequate revenues to compensate for the annualized investment cost
of PHS capacity in any of the analyzed investment cost and WACC scenarios.
In addition, as more power is used for arbitrage, the remaining price-spread
decreases due to the price-effect. Therefore, a trade-off occurs between the
capacity used and the average profit per unit of power.
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Similar to previous studies on the electricity storage economics (e.g., [15, 192]),
it is concluded that maximizing the value of electricity storage likely requires the
aggregation of multiple applications while accounting for the interdependence
between potential revenue streams. Although some studies focus on the co-
optimization of different storage applications (e.g., [33, 192, 230]), most articles
focus on only a single application or allocate the storage power rating and energy
capacity a priori when considering multiple applications. While applications
can be aggregated by both a single market participant or by multiple players
through the co-operation and sharing of storage resources, the latter has only
been studied to a limited extent [32, 231].
Table 5.3: The share of the annualized investment cost that is covered by the DA
market arbitrage operating profit for Belgium for 2014. A sensitivity analysis is
provided for three different power-related and energy-related investment cost scenarios,
and for three different WACC scenarios (i.e., 3%, 5%, 7%).
600e/kW, 20e/kWh 750e/kW, 50e/kWh 900e/kW, 80e/kWh
3% 5% 7% 3% 5% 7% 3% 5% 7%
[%] [%] [%] [%] [%] [%] [%] [%] [%]
Ignore price-effect (expected) 83.7 59.5 45.2 60.4 42.7 32.3 46.8 33.2 25.1
Consider price-effect (upper) 65.6 46.6 35.4 47.4 33.5 25.3 36.7 26.0 19.7
Consider price-effect (centered) 62.9 44.7 33.9 45.4 32.1 24.3 35.1 24.9 18.8
Consider price-effect (lower) 60.5 42.9 32.6 43.7 30.9 23.3 33.8 23.9 18.1
Ignore price-effect (realized) 42.6 30.3 23.0 30.8 21.8 16.4 23.8 16.9 12.8
5.6 Conclusions
Although the value of electricity storage arbitrage is directly related to the
frequency and size of price spreads, it is also a function of the price-effect of
(dis)charge actions. The price-effect represents the degree to which additional
demand increases off-peak prices and additional supply decreases on-peak prices,
and is, ceteris paribus, inversely correlated to the arbitrage value. While the
impact of the price-effect is negligible for small storage volumes, it reduces
the arbitrage value significantly for large storage volumes. In this chapter the
price-effect is taken into account by considering real-world market resilience
data, available in the form of hourly piecewise linear functions, and published by
multiple European power exchanges. A nonconvex MIQP model is formulated
and a stepwise approximated MILP model (for which the accuracy can be
chosen) is derived to improve the computational tractability. This approach
widens the scope with respect to previous works that model the price-effect as
stepwise from the start.
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Since this resilience data is only available ex-post, their application mainly lies in
estimating the upper limit to the arbitrage value of additional storage capacity
in a certain market given current market conditions, and the evaluation of
the performance of the price-taking assumption and price-making assumptions
based on more conceptual and simplified price-effects. The former assumes
that the price-effect is already taken into account at the (dis)charge decision
stage, while the latter can be done by ex-post calculating the realized profit as
opposed to the anticipated profit.
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Abstract:
In electricity storage valuation studies, the lack of the (efficient) aggregation
of applications in a single operation strategy is usually identified as a major
barrier. Determining the true value of storage requires the aggregation of
applications while accounting for the interdependence between revenue streams.
Individual applications cannot simply be added together, but need to be co-
optimized since they can interfere with each other. This chapter’s contributions
are threefold. First, we provide model formulations to aggregate multiple
arbitrage opportunities, and to quantify the accompanying potential arbitrage
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value. Whereas the storage arbitrage literature focuses on the capturing of price
differences over time for the day-ahead market, we consider all three short-term
markets, i.e., the day-ahead, intra-day, and real-time markets, and we consider
the opportunity to capture three types of price differences: (1) over time in each
individual market, (2) over the three markets for the same time step, and (3)
over time over the three markets. Second, an important assumption in arbitrage
models is related to whether storage operators recognize that their actions may
affect those prices. This price-effect of storage actions has been considered
before for the day-ahead market, but not for the intra-day and real-time markets.
We study the price-effect with high detail for all three short-term markets, based
on real-world price and volume data. Third, we apply the developed models to
the four market zones of the Central Western European region, i.e., the Belgian,
French, German, and Dutch market zones. As such, this chapter provides insight
in the extent to which the three short-term markets, and their combination,
in these market zones are potentially interesting for storage arbitrage. This
assists improved decision-making of market participants in storage investment
and operation, and informs policy-makers about the impact of market design
on the potential storage value.
Positioning:
Qualitative
Quantitative:
system
perspective
Quantitative:
storage operator
perspective
Model development Storage role and value Market design
Chapter 2
Electricity storage
Chapter 3
Role of
electricity storage
Chapter 4
Short-term
electricity markets
Chapter 5
Single-application operation
Chapter 6
Multi-application operation
Chapter 7
Multi-player
operation
INTRODUCTION 129
6.1 Introduction
6.1.1 Motivation
In Europe, market players self-schedule their assets based on trading in a series
of consecutive markets. This trading can start up to a few years before delivery
in the long-term forward and future markets, which usually continue until one
day before physical generation and consumption. Next, trading continues in the
DA and ID market, after which the TSO takes over to keep the system balanced
by organizing the RT balancing market. The DA, ID, and RT market are
generally referred to as the short-term electricity markets. Short-term markets
are important tools to deal with the expected and unexpected variability in the
system; variability materialises in these markets, thereby expressing the need for
flexibility and offering a valorization platform. With the increasing variability in
the system, resulting from the further integration of variable RES, the demand
for flexibility increases and these markets become increasingly important [6].
A significant part of the growing attention for flexibility focuses on electricity
storage, as one of the flexibility sources alongside flexible consumption and
flexible generation, and the access to these sources in neighboring regions through
the grid. Storage systems can be employed for different applications, which can
generally be categorized in three groups: energy services include arbitrage and
portfolio management; grid services include the provision of frequency control,
congestion management, voltage support, and black-start capabilities to the
system operator; reliability services include the support of reliability on the
local level through back-up, uninterruptible power supply, and power quality
management, and on the system level by contributing to generation adequacy.
Even though there is an increasing demand for flexibility and multiple markets
and applications exist for storage to participate in, recent studies point to
difficult business cases. The lack of the (efficient) aggregation of applications in
a single operating strategy is identified as a major barrier [13, 16, 32, 192]. This
may be due to the presence of historical operation patterns, the complexity of
revenue stacking, and the accompanying risk. In this chapter, we aim to further
inform the discussion on the value of storage by stacking revenue streams from
different arbitrage opportunities, resulting from the participation in all three
short-term markets, in a single operating strategy.
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6.1.2 Literature review
Arbitrage
Electricity storage arbitrage has been studied extensively, but almost exclusively
in the context of capturing price differences over time in the DA market. The
considered approaches range from a system perspective (e.g., [195, 196, 197,
198, 199, 200]) to an individual storage operator’s perspective. The latter is the
method adopted here, and is typically referred to as the PBUC formulation of
the arbitrage problem. Generally, there are two important assumptions in PBUC
formulations: the first is the perfect vs. imperfect price foresight assumption,
which defines the operator’s assumed knowledge of future prices, while the
second is the price-taking vs. price-making assumption, defining whether the
operator recognizes that its actions may have an impact on those prices [9, 201].
The second assumption corresponds to an exogenous price approach vs. price
as a function of the player’s decisions approach [59].
A large share of the PBUC storage arbitrage literature assumes perfect foresight
of future prices and the storage plant to be small enough compared to the size of
the market to not affect the prices (e.g., [204, 205, 206, 207, 208]). Furthermore,
while many authors have studied a relaxation of the perfect price foresight
assumption (e.g., [201, 209, 210, 211, 214, 232]), less attention is given to the
study of the price-effect of storage transactions.
First, [201, 215] consider the price-effect monthly through the slope of an
observed linear relationship between the system load and price. Second, [32]
uses a similar methodology, by introducing a constant slope for the entire
year to represent the price-effect. Third, [216] and [217] relax the price-taking
assumption by considering the residual inverse demand curve. In [216] the
price-effect is defined by a residual inverse demand curve that depends on
the slopes of the demand and supply curves, and which is modeled as an
approximated sigmoid function. In contrast, in [217], the mirrored image of
the stepwise supply curve from other generators is assumed to represent the
residual inverse demand curve, with the demand curve assumed to be perfectly
inelastic. Refs. [233] and [234] employ a similar methodology, with the latter
linearizing the stepwise supply curve. Whereas the former works introduce
inaccuracies by neglecting (1) the time-varying aggregated supply and demand
curves, (2) the presence of and change in acceptance or rejection of complex
orders, and (3) changes in cross-border flows, [9] considers the most accurate
available price-effect data. It is published by several European power exchanges
in the form of hourly piecewise linear relationships between quantity and price.
These are referred to as DA market resilience functions, and show to which
extent additional demand and supply would affect the price. It is obtained by
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rerunning the market-clearing algorithm for different variations of additional
offer or demand volume at any price, and takes into account the (1) aggregated
supply and demand curves, (2) presence and dynamics of complex orders, and
(3) cross-border interaction through market-coupling.
Co-optimization of applications
The existing literature considering multi-service portfolios for storage can also
be categorized according to the adopted approach, i.e., a system perspective or
PBUC storage operator perspective. The former studies the degree to which
storage plants, employed for multiple applications, contribute to minimizing
total system cost (e.g., [34, 56, 83, 87]), while the latter focuses on maximizing
the value of the considered storage plant. Most PBUC work underestimates the
storage value due to the focus on only a single application. Furthermore, most
of the studies that do focus on the aggregation of different applications, do not
allocate the storage resources by means of a continuous optimization process.
Determining the true value of storage requires the aggregation of multiple
applications while accounting for the interdependence between revenue streams.
The latter means that the value of individual applications cannot simply be
added, but need to be co-optimized since different services can interfere with
one another.
However, some recent studies focus on co-optimizing the scheduling for different
applications by the storage operator. Ref. [33] maximizes the storage value
while simultaneously focusing on DA market arbitrage, congestion management,
and frequency control. Ref. [235] is related to the former study as it focuses
on the same set of services and includes a similar model, but focuses on the
impact of battery degradation. In [192], the storage scheduling for DA market
arbitrage, frequency control, back-up provision, and congestion management
is co-optimized, while [236] uses a similar model but includes a more detailed
representation of the operating constraints. Ref. [237] studies a multi-application
operation of storage including DA market arbitrage and the provision of
frequency control, with [230] focusing on the same set of services but applied to
CAES specifically. In [238], a storage plant is assumed to participate in the DA
and RT markets, and provides upward frequency control. Ref. [239] studies the
combined storage value for supporting a large consumer and RES generation
system, and providing grid services such as frequency control and congestion
management to the system operator.
Applications cannot only be aggregated for a certain storage plant by one
market player, but also over multiple market participants. The sharing of
storage resources by different players has only been studied to a limited extent.
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Ref. [32] studies a sequential allocation of storage resources to players which
express their need for storage at different time scales. Ref. [13] further builds on
this work by introducing the concept of physical storage rights, to allocate the
right to use storage resources among different players simultaneously through
an auction-based mechanism. In addition, [240] provides additional insights
in this topic, but assigns different meanings to the introduced storage rights,
and focuses on this multi-player operation as a way for storage to overcome
regulatory barriers. Finally, in [241], different users located on the same site
share a storage system for a combination of services, which can generally be
categorized as portfolio management for large consumers and RES generators.
6.1.3 Scope and contributions
This chapter contributes to the current literature on electricity storage
valuation in short-term markets through three aspects. First, we provide
model formulations that allow to aggregate multiple arbitrage opportunities
for electricity storage in a single operating strategy, and to quantify the
accompanying potential arbitrage value. We consider all three short-term
markets, i.e., the DA, ID, and RT balancing market, and we consider the
opportunity to capture three types of price differences: (1) over time in a single
market for all three markets, (2) over the three short-term markets for the
same market period, and (3) over time over the three short-term markets. The
developed models do not a priori allocate a storage plant’s power and energy
ratings across the three short-term markets and three arbitrage types, but
allocate the storage resources for each time step according to a daily performed
multiperiod optimization. Second, the price-effect of actions of additional
storage capacity has been considered before in the literature for the DA market
with various levels of detail, but not for the ID or RT balancing market. We
contribute by studying the price-effect with high detail for not only the DA
market, but also for the ID market, and for the RT balancing market by using
custom-made piecewise linear RT market resilience functions based on real-
world data. Third, we apply the developed models to the four market zones of
the CWE region, i.e., the Belgian, French, German, and Dutch market zones,
for a full year using price and volume data from these markets. As such, we
provide insight in the extent to which the three short-term markets, and their
combination, in these market zones are potentially interesting for electricity
storage arbitrage. This is intended to support market participants in electricity
storage investment and operation decisions, and to inform policy-makers about
the impact of market design rules on the electricity storage arbitrage potential.
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6.2 Electricity storage arbitrage in short-term elec-
tricity markets
6.2.1 Short-term electricity markets
Day-ahead market
In the DA market, which is fully harmonized across the CWE region, players can
submit buy and sell quantity-price bids on a 1 h basis to change their position
from the previously held long-term markets. These bids can be submitted
until DA market closure, i.e., noon (12:00 pm) the day before delivery (D-1),
for each hour of delivery day D. All submitted demand and supply bids are
aggregated, with the intersection determining the market-clearing volume and
price: all cleared demand bids in a market zone pay this price, while all cleared
supply bids in a market zone receive this price, i.e., pay-as-cleared. While DA
market trading within market zones is not constrained by the grid capacity, its
interaction with neighboring zones is [6, 11, 149].
In Europe, currently 23 countries, including the CWE region, are coupled
through the implicit auctioning of interconnection capacity: all bids of the
different exchanges are considered in the same market-clearing algorithm to
optimize the utilization of interconnection capacity available to the power
exchanges [158]. Market players only provide bids for electric energy, while
interconnection capacity is allocated implicitly to individual bids to maximize
social welfare. As a result, electric energy is exchanged in case of a price
difference between neighboring markets until the price difference is eliminated
or until all available interconnection capacity is used [9, 160].
Intra-day market
ID markets are organized to adjust positions based on updated expectations.
Although they are currently still characterized by low liquidity in the CWE
region, they are becoming increasingly important [6]. Trading in the ID market
is the last opportunity for market-based transactions before the submitted
schedules (or “nominations”) become financially binding. Nominations are not
physically binding, as RT deviations from scheduled positions (i.e., imbalances)
are settled at the imbalance price.
While the Belgian, Dutch, and French ID markets are based on continuous
trading with 1 h products, the German ID market includes both continuous
trading (with both 1 h and 15min products) and a discrete auction with 15min
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market periods. With continuous trading, bids are submitted to a central
platform, and matching pairs are continuously cleared on an individual basis.
Trading is possible from 02:00 pm D-1 in Belgium, and from 03:00 pm D-1 in
France, Germany, and the Netherlands, and can occur until close to RT. The
discrete auction, implemented in the German ID market since December 2014,
with market closure at 03:00 pm D-1, is based on principles similar to the DA
market [111, 138].
In the CWE region, ID markets are currently less well harmonized and integrated
than DA markets, and only the residual interconnection capacity after DA
trading can be used. In the ID market, explicit allocation of interconnection
capacity allows players to obtain remaining interconnection capacity for free
as long as capacity is available. However, in case the obtained capacity is not
used, this unfulfilled position is settled at the imbalance price since allocated
cross-border capacity is automatically nominated [173]. With implicit allocation,
orders in one zone are automatically matched with orders in the neighboring
zone, given the remaining transmission capacity. At the different borders of the
CWE region currently a mix of explicit and implicit allocation applies, but a
move can be observed from the former to the latter [6].
Real-time balancing market
In the RT balancing market the TSO contracts and activates reserve capacity
from BSPs at the reserve procurement side, and settles imbalance positions with
BRPs at the imbalance settlement side. We focus on the imbalance settlement
as a possibly attractive market for storage to participate in. It is based on
15min market periods in Belgium, Germany, and the Netherlands, and 30min
periods in France [6].
At the settlement side of the balancing market, BRP imbalance positions and
the control area’s imbalance prices are determined. Imbalance positions refer
to the difference between BRP positions after ID market closure and RT net
exchanges with the grid. A long position indicates a positive imbalance, with
more injection and/or less offtake than scheduled, while a short position indicates
a negative imbalance, with less injection and/or more offtake. BRPs with a long
position receive the long imbalance price, while BRPs with a short position pay
the short imbalance price [146]. Through this settlement, the TSO allocates
the activation cost of reserves to responsible BRPs, while reservation costs to
contract reserves are recovered via grid tariffs.
Imbalance prices are calculated through either a dual or single-pricing scheme.
With dual-pricing, the imbalance price applied to BRP imbalances in the same
direction as the SI is based on the activation cost of reserves, while the imbalance
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price applied to those in the opposite direction of the SI is (typically) based on
the DA price. In contrast, in a single-pricing scheme, a uniform imbalance price,
based on the activation cost of reserves, is applied to all BRPs with a long or
short position. In France, a dual-pricing scheme is implemented, and in Belgium,
Germany, and the Netherlands single-pricing applies [103]. However, in case
both up and downward reserves are activated the prices differ in the Netherlands:
the long imbalance price is based on the activation price for downward reserve
while the short imbalance price is based on that for upward reserve. In addition,
in Belgium and the Netherlands, the imbalance price applied to short and long
positions differs in the event of large SIs by including a balance-incentivizing
component, to either punish BRP imbalances in the same direction as the SI or
to incentivize all BRPs. Although such a component is applied in Germany as
well, it does not result in different prices: the price is increased for all BRPs in
case the SI is negative, and decreased in case the SI is positive [119].
When the imbalance price reflects the procurement cost of activated reserves,
it is either based on the marginal or average activation price. With marginal
pricing, the imbalance price is set to the price of the marginal accepted bid,
while for average pricing it is calculated by dividing the net total activation
costs of the TSO by the net activated reserve volume. The imbalance price is
based on marginal pricing in Belgium and the Netherlands, while France and
Germany apply average pricing [146, 115, 113, 143].
6.2.2 Electricity storage arbitrage
Classic definitions of arbitrage denote making a riskless profit by simultaneously
buying and selling a similar commodity with net zero investment [28]. However,
any activity in which a player buys a commodity and sells a similar commodity,
or one in which the former can be converted, at a higher price for profit can be
referred to as arbitrage. This definition allows to include initial investments,
does not require simultaneity of the purchase and sale, and furthermore does
not restrict to a single commodity either [9].
We distinguish four types of arbitrage in electricity markets: intertemporal,
interzonal, intermarket, and intercommodity (Fig. 6.1). With intertemporal
arbitrage, electricity price differences are captured over time, while interzonal
arbitrage refers to the capturing of price spreads between adjacent market zones.
Intermarket arbitrage refers to the activity in which virtual bidders profit from
price differences between different (sequentially organized) electricity markets
by making trades in the opposite direction to cancel outstanding positions.
Finally, intercommodity arbitrage is based on price differences between fuel
and electricity. These four basic arbitrage types can also be combined leading
136 MULTI-APPLICATION OPERATION
to hybrid types, e.g., intertemporal intermarket arbitrage is the capturing
of electricity price spreads over time over different markets. In this chapter,
electricity storage arbitrage refers to considering intertemporal, intermarket,
and intertemporal intermarket arbitrage.
Type Example
03:00 am 04:00 am 05:00 am 06:00 am
DA (BE)Intertemporal Buy low Sell high
DA (BE)
DA (FR)Interzonal
Buy low
Sell high
DA (BE)
ID (BE)Intermarket
Buy low
Sell high
Gas
PowerIntercommodity
Buy low
Sell high
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Figure 6.1: Arbitrage in electricity markets.
Aside from the operational flexibility of the considered storage plant, which is
determined by its start-up and shut-down cost, minimum load requirements,
ramp rates and cost, and minimum up and down times, we define four factors
related to the combination of storage technology, storage sizing, and market
parameters, that determine the profitability of electricity storage arbitrage.
1. The price spread between the buy price λbt and sell price λst, and the cost
due to energy losses if physical (dis)charge actions are required (i.e., with
intertemporal and intertemporal intermarket arbitrage). The cost due to
losses to arbitrage one unit of energy is calculated as (1/ηrt− 1) · λbt , with
ηrt the roundtrip efficiency.
2. The price profile, and the (dis)charge duration. Two price profiles,
containing identical prices but in a different order, result in different
arbitrage profits in case the (dis)charge duration is limiting the optimal
operation. E.g., a limited duration can cause the storage to be fully charged
prematurely in times of consistent low prices, making it impossible to
capture all present arbitrage opportunities.
3. The uncertainty and predictability of λbt and λst. In the DA market, which
is the most studied market for storage arbitrage, the uncertainty used to
be much lower, and the predictability much higher, because of clear daily
and weekly patterns of the system load and prices. However, the ongoing
energy transition makes prices more uncertain as the historically clear
patterns are becoming less obvious. This is even more challenging for ID
prices and especially RT imbalance prices.
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4. The price-effect, and the buy and sell volume. Typically, additional buy
transactions increase λbt , and additional sell transactions decrease λst.
This price-effect is generally negligible for transactions that are small
compared to the market size, but can be significant for large-scale storage
transactions. Taking this into account results in a trade-off between the
remaining price spread and transaction size.
6.3 Electricity storage arbitrage model formula-
tions
6.3.1 Methodology and model setup
Whereas the scheduling of capacity to meet the load at minimum cost is
referred to as cost-based UC, scheduling to maximize profit based on price
signals is referred to as PBUC [194]. In this chapter a PBUC perspective
is used to quantify the potential electricity storage arbitrage value under
different assumptions and scenarios. We consider the storage operator’s
participation in the DA market, ID market, and RT market’s settlement
side, and study two strategies: separate (Section 6.3.2) and coordinated
participation (Section 6.3.3). Separate participation refers to considering each
market separately and sequentially, whereas coordinated participation indicates
that at each decision stage all markets that are still to be held are considered
simultaneously. For each strategy, the problem that the operator faces in the
DA stage, ID stage, and RT stage is described. We define the DA stage to take
place before DA market closure (i.e., ≤ 12:00 pm D-1), the ID stage after the
DA stage and before the start of the optimization period (i.e., DA stage ≤ and
≤ 12:00 am D), and the RT stage after the ID stage and before the start of the
optimization period (i.e., ID stage ≤ and ≤ 12:00 am D).
The continuous time dimension is discretized, with q the discrete 15min time
index and T q the fixed time step length of 15min (Fig. 6.2). The storage
operator maximizes the operating profit from electricity storage arbitrage on
a daily basis. In order to ensure that energy stored at the end of each daily
optimization period has carryover value [9, 201], each optimization is done
with a two-day horizon, i.e., 192 15min time steps (∀ q ∈ Q), to determine the
(trans)actions in the 96 15min periods of each day D.
The included base case model formulations for separate and coordinated
participation assume a perfect foresight and no impact on prices. As such, we
quantify the electricity storage arbitrage potential in case (1) the (trans)actions
of the additional storage capacity are small compared to the size of the market,
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or (2) the prices to already include the storage plant’s price-taking participation.
They are applied to the four market zones of the CWE region. Afterwards, we
include the price-effect in a case study for Belgium, to analyze its impact and
quantify the upper limit to the storage arbitrage value for additional large-scale
storage resources.1
Optimization horizon
D D+1
Time
12:00 am
01 Jan
12:00 am
02 Jan
12:00 am
03 Jan
Optimization
period 1
q=1 q=96 q=192Tq
.
.....Optimization
period 2
q=1 q=96 q=192.....
...
Figure 6.2: Time dimension discretization and rolling optimization horizon.
In the model formulations storage plants are characterized by a minimum and
maximum (dis)charge power rating and energy storage capacity, (dis)charge
efficiency, down and upward ramp rate in (dis)charge mode, and targeted cycling
rate. Although there is no direct constraint on the number of cycles during
each optimization period, due to the limited cycle-life it is implied that the
targeted cycling rate is constant throughout the calendar life. If the cycling
rate is lower than or equal to the targeted cycling rate, the depreciation cost
resulting from cycling is zero, otherwise it is positive (Fig. 6.3). The formulation
to include the cycle-life and depreciation cost is based on [9], and originally
derived from [92]. Furthermore, this chapter assumes changes in the buffered
energy due to exogenous power flows (e.g., self-discharge) to be negligible in
the short-term.
Finally, the formulated optimization problems are MILPs, which are modeled
in GAMS [242] and solved using the CPLEX solver [227]. All models are solved
to optimality by setting the GAMS option “optcr” to zero.
1While when participating in a certain market (e.g., DA market) there may be a price-effect
in another market (e.g., ID market) as well, which we label as cross-market price-effects, this
chapter focuses on price-effects in the same market, which can be referred to as own-market
price-effects.
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Ncal
constrained
ccyc = 0
Ncyc
constrained
ccyc > 0
ccyc = (Cinv,e · Emax) · (ncyc/Ncyc − 1/Ncal) (ii)
ccyc = 0 (i)
ccyc = max(i,ii)
ncyc [s-1]N
cyc
Ncal
ccyc [e/s]
Figure 6.3: Opportunity cost for wearing out the energy storage subsystem [9].
6.3.2 Separate participation - no price-effect
Day-ahead stage (problem I)
With separate participation, at the DA stage the storage operator maximizes the
operating profit resulting from participation in the DA market (6.1). Its market-
based transactions pb,daq and ps,daq are subject to two sets of equations: (6.2)-(6.3),
and (6.4)-(6.5). The former ensure that either a buy or sell transaction can occur
per time step, while respecting the power rating bounds of the physical storage
asset backing the transactions. The latter enforce that the transaction in each
15min time step of any hour is uniform, in line with the DA market’s 1 h market
periods. Consistently, the included 15min DA price λda,oq is identical for the four
consecutive 15min of any hour as well. Constraint (6.6) links the market-based
transactions with the planned physical operation, with (6.7)-(6.14) representing
the physics of the storage system. Constraint (6.7) expresses the intertemporal
nature of electricity storage. Constraints (6.8) and (6.9) limit the change in
(dis)charge power by the storage plant’s ramp rates.2 Constraints (6.10)-(6.12)
represent capacity bounds on the (dis)charge power and storage capacity, with
a strict separation of the electricity consumption and generation phase. The
combination of the nonnegativity of ccyc, (6.13)-(6.14), and the minimization of
ccyc in (6.1), represents the convex relaxation of the max operator illustrated in
Fig. 6.3:
2When q = 1 in (6.7)-(6.9), index q-1 indicates q = 96 of the previous optimization period,
except for the first optimization period where index q-1 at q = 1 refers to certain starting
values.
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piop,da = max
∑
q∈Q
λda,oq · T q · (ps,daq − pb,daq )/(|Q| · T q)− ccyc,da, (6.1)
s.t. 0 ≤ pb,daq ≤ P c,max · bbs,daq , ∀ q ∈ Q, (6.2)
0 ≤ ps,daq ≤ P d,max · (1− bbs,daq ), ∀ q ∈ Q, (6.3)
pb,daq = p
b,da
q+1 = p
b,da
q+2 = p
b,da
q+3 , ∀ q ∈ Qfq,(6.4)
ps,daq = p
s,da
q+1 = p
s,da
q+2 = p
s,da
q+3, ∀ q ∈ Qfq,(6.5)
pd,daq − pc,daq = ps,daq − pb,daq , ∀ q ∈ Q, (6.6)
edaq = edaq-1 + T q · (pc,daq · ηc − pd,daq /ηd), ∀ q ∈ Q, (6.7)
−Rc,do · P c,max ≤ (pc,daq − pc,daq-1 )/T q ≤ Rc,up · P c,max, ∀ q ∈ Q, (6.8)
−Rd,do · P d,max ≤ (pd,daq − pd,daq-1 )/T q ≤ Rd,up · P d,max, ∀ q ∈ Q, (6.9)
0 ≤ P c,min · bdaq ≤ pc,daq ≤ P c,max · bdaq , ∀ q ∈ Q, (6.10)
0 ≤ P d,min · (1− bdaq ) ≤ pd,daq ≤ P d,max · (1− bdaq ), ∀ q ∈ Q, (6.11)
0 ≤ Emin ≤ edaq ≤ Emax, ∀ q ∈ Q, (6.12)
ncyc,da = ηc ·
∑
q∈Q
pc,daq · T q/(Emax · |Q| · T q), (6.13)
ccyc,da ≥ (C inv,e · Emax) · (ncyc,da/N cyc − 1/N cal), (6.14)
ccyc,da, edaq ,ncyc,da, pb,daq , pc,daq , pd,daq , ps,daq ∈ R+,
bbs,daq , bdaq ∈ {0, 1},Q,Qfq ⊂ N,Qfq ⊂ Q,
Qfq = {q ∈ Q | qmod (60min/T q) = 1}, ∀ q ∈ Q. (6.15)
The optimized values for pb,daq and ps,daq in problem I are afterwards derived and
defined as parameters (small “p” for decision variable, corresponding capital
“P” for parameter) to be used in the ID and RT stages:
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P b,daq = argmax
pb,daq
(problem I),P s,daq = argmax
ps,daq
(problem I), ∀ q ∈ Q. (6.16)
Intra-day stage (problem II)
The formulation provided in (6.17)-(6.36) encompasses the most extensive
ID case, i.e., the German ID market. However, it also applies to market
zones in which only a subset of the three ID markets present in Germany is
organized, by simply enforcing that the buy and sell transactions in the absent
ID markets equal zero. With separate participation, at the ID stage the storage
operator maximizes the operating profit resulting from participation in the
ID market(s) (6.17). As each trade can be settled at a different price with
continuous trading, we use the volume-weighted average ID price of the cleared
trades in q for λid,ch,oq and λid,cq,oq .3 The transactions in the 1 h continuous
trading ID market are subject to two sets of equations similar to the case at the
DA stage, i.e., (6.19)-(6.20), and (6.25)-(6.26). In contrast, the transactions in
the 15min continuous trading and auction-based ID markets are only subject
to the first set of equations, i.e., (6.21)-(6.22) and (6.23)-(6.24), respectively.
Constraint (6.27) links the financial transactions with the planned physical
(dis)charge actions of the storage plant, taking into account the transactions
made in the previously held DA market (6.18). Finally, (6.28)-(6.35) represent
the storage system’s physics similar to the case at the DA stage:
piop,id = max
∑
q∈Q
[
λda,oq · T q · (ps,daq − pb,daq ) + λid,ch,oq · T q · (ps,id,chq − pb,id,chq )
+λid,cq,oq · T q · (ps,id,cqq − pb,id,cqq ) + λid,aq,oq · T q
·(ps,id,aqq − pb,id,aqq )
]
/(|Q| · T q)− ccyc,id, (6.17)
s.t. (6.15),
pb,daq = P b,daq , ps,daq = P s,daq , ∀ q ∈ Q, (6.18)
0 ≤ pb,id,chq ≤ P c,max · bbs,id,chq , ∀ q ∈ Q, (6.19)
0 ≤ ps,id,chq ≤ P d,max · (1− bbs,id,chq ), ∀ q ∈ Q, (6.20)
3Parameter λid,ch,oq is identical for the four consecutive 15min of any hour.
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0 ≤ pb,id,cqq ≤ P c,max · bbs,id,cqq , ∀ q ∈ Q, (6.21)
0 ≤ ps,id,cqq ≤ P d,max · (1− bbs,id,cqq ), ∀ q ∈ Q, (6.22)
0 ≤ pb,id,aqq ≤ P c,max · bbs,id,aqq , ∀ q ∈ Q, (6.23)
0 ≤ ps,id,aqq ≤ P d,max · (1− bbs,id,aqq ), ∀ q ∈ Q, (6.24)
pb,id,chq = p
b,id,ch
q+1 = p
b,id,ch
q+2 = p
b,id,ch
q+3 , ∀ q ∈ Qfq, (6.25)
ps,id,chq = p
s,id,ch
q+1 = p
s,id,ch
q+2 = p
s,id,ch
q+3 , ∀ q ∈ Qfq, (6.26)
pd,idq − pc,idq = ps,id,chq + ps,id,cqq + ps,id,aqq + ps,daq
−pb,id,chq − pb,id,cqq − pb,id,aqq − pb,daq , ∀ q ∈ Q, (6.27)
eidq = eidq-1 + T q · (pc,idq · ηc − pd,idq /ηd), ∀ q ∈ Q, (6.28)
−Rc,do · P c,max ≤ (pc,idq − pc,idq-1 )/T q ≤ Rc,up · P c,max, ∀ q ∈ Q, (6.29)
−Rd,do · P d,max ≤ (pd,idq − pd,idq-1 )/T q ≤ Rd,up · P d,max, ∀ q ∈ Q, (6.30)
0 ≤ P c,min · bidq ≤ pc,idq ≤ P c,max · bidq , ∀ q ∈ Q, (6.31)
0 ≤ P d,min · (1− bidq ) ≤ pd,idq ≤ P d,max · (1− bidq ), ∀ q ∈ Q, (6.32)
0 ≤ Emin ≤ eidq ≤ Emax, ∀ q ∈ Q, (6.33)
ncyc,id = ηc ·
∑
q∈Q
pc,idq · T q/(Emax · |Q| · T q), (6.34)
ccyc,id ≥ (C inv,e · Emax) · (ncyc,id/N cyc − 1/N cal), (6.35)
ccyc,id, eidq ,ncyc,id, pb,id,chq , pb,id,cqq , pb,id,aqq , pc,idq ,
pd,idq , ps,id,chq , ps,id,cqq , ps,id,aqq ∈ R+,
bbs,id,chq , bbs,id,cqq , bbs,id,aqq , bidq ∈ {0, 1}, ∀ q ∈ Q. (6.36)
The optimized values for pb,id,chq , pb,id,cqq , pb,id,aqq , ps,id,chq , ps,id,cqq , ps,id,aqq , pc,idq ,
and pd,idq in problem II are, similar to (6.16), derived and defined as parameters
(e.g., P b,id,chq ) to be used in the RT stage.
ELECTRICITY STORAGE ARBITRAGE MODEL FORMULATIONS 143
Real-time stage (problem III)
By arbitraging imbalance prices, BRPs typically reduce the amount of activated
reserves, here represented by the NRV, which is generally small compared to
the DA market trading volume and system load. This is done by intentionally
incurring imbalances in the opposite direction of the SI, as for this direction the
imbalance price is more favorable than in the same direction of the SI. This can
be referred to as “passive balancing”, which helps the TSO to keep the balance.
While dual-pricing provides little incentive for passive balancing, since the DA
price is applied to imbalances in the opposite direction of the SI, single-pricing
does.
• If SI < 0, the TSO activates upward reserve, i.e., NRV > 0. Typically, this
is activated at a price higher than the DA price, and more activated upward
reserve results in a higher imbalance price, as it is selected according to
a merit-order of increasing activation prices. This incentivizes BRPs to
have a long position.
• If SI > 0, the TSO activates downward reserve, i.e., NRV < 0. Typically,
this is activated at a price lower than the DA price, and more activated
downward reserve results in a lower imbalance price, as it is selected
according to a merit-order of decreasing activation prices. This incentivizes
BRPs to have a short position.
The storage operator faces the RT arbitrage problem at the RT stage (6.37).
The operator can either follow its submitted nomination, indicated by the
planned (dis)charge actions after the ID stage, which are the result of DA and
ID market trading (6.18), (6.38), or incur an imbalance position (6.41). Such
an imbalance can either be positive or negative (6.39)-(6.40), and is incurred
according to expected imbalance prices. Again, the planned (dis)charge actions
are subject to the physics of the storage system (6.42)-(6.49):
piop,rt = max
∑
q∈Q
[
λda,oq · T q · (ps,daq − pb,daq ) + λid,ch,oq · T q · (ps,id,chq − pb,id,chq )
+λid,cq,oq · T q · (ps,id,cqq − pb,id,cqq ) + λid,aq,oq · T q
·(ps,id,aqq − pb,id,aqq ) + λrt,+,oq · T q · pi,+q − λrt,-,oq · T q · pi,-q
]
/(|Q| · T q)− ccyc,rt, (6.37)
s.t. (6.15),(6.18),(6.36),
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pb,id,chq = P b,id,chq , pb,id,cqq = P b,id,cqq , pb,id,aqq = P b,id,aqq ,
ps,id,chq = P s,id,chq , ps,id,cqq = P s,id,cqq , ps,id,aqq = P s,id,aqq ,
pc,idq = P c,idq , pd,idq = P d,idq , ∀ q ∈ Q, (6.38)
pi,+q ≤ P i,max · biq, ∀ q ∈ Q, (6.39)
pi,-q ≤ P i,max · (1− biq), ∀ q ∈ Q, (6.40)
pd,rtq − pd,idq − pc,rtq + pc,idq = pi,+q − pi,-q , ∀ q ∈ Q, (6.41)
ertq = ertq-1 + T q · (pc,rtq · ηc − pd,rtq /ηd), ∀ q ∈ Q, (6.42)
−Rc,do · P c,max ≤ (pc,rtq − pc,rtq-1 )/T q ≤ Rc,up · P c,max, ∀ q ∈ Q, (6.43)
−Rd,do · P d,max ≤ (pd,rtq − pd,rtq-1 )/T q ≤ Rd,up · P d,max, ∀ q ∈ Q, (6.44)
0 ≤ P c,min · brtq ≤ pc,rtq ≤ P c,max · brtq , ∀ q ∈ Q, (6.45)
0 ≤ P d,min · (1− brtq ) ≤ pd,rtq ≤ P d,max · (1− brtq ), ∀ q ∈ Q, (6.46)
0 ≤ Emin ≤ ertq ≤ Emax, ∀ q ∈ Q, (6.47)
ncyc,rt = ηc ·
∑
q∈Q
pc,rtq · T q/(Emax · |Q| · T q), (6.48)
ccyc,rt ≥ (C inv,e · Emax) · (ncyc,rt/N cyc − 1/N cal), (6.49)
ccyc,rt, ertq ,ncyc,rt, pc,rtq , pd,rtq , pi,+q , pi,-q ∈ R+,
biq, brtq ∈ {0, 1} , ∀ q ∈ Q. (6.50)
In case the settlement side of the French RT balancing is considered, the included
15min RT imbalance prices are identical for the two consecutive 15min of any
half-hour.
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6.3.3 Coordinated participation - no price-effect
Day-ahead stage (problem IV)
With coordinated participation, at the DA stage the storage operator already
takes into account the ID market and RT balancing market when deciding
on transactions in the DA market, i.e., the combined operating profit is
maximized (6.37). The transactions in the DA market and planned ID market
transactions are, similar to the case with separate participation, constrained
by (6.2)-(6.5) and (6.19)-(6.26), respectively. In addition, the nominations after
the DA and ID stage also have to satisfy the physical constraints of the storage
plant, i.e., (6.6)-(6.14) and (6.27)-(6.35), respectively. The operator can either
plan to operate the storage plant according to its nominated position resulting
from DA and planned ID trading, or to incur an imbalance position in RT
according to expected imbalance prices (6.39)-(6.41). The planned physical
operation at the (future) RT stage is again subject to (6.42)-(6.49).
The optimized values for pb,daq and ps,daq in problem IV are afterwards again
derived and defined as parameters to be used in the ID and RT stages.
Intra-day stage (problem V)
When deciding on ID market transactions at the ID stage in case of coordinated
participation, the storage operator already considers the settlement side of
the RT balancing market (6.37). Again, these ID market transactions are
constrained by (6.19)-(6.35). The operator can either plan to operate the
storage plant according to its nominated position resulting from performed
DA trading (6.18) and planned ID trading, or to incur an imbalance in
RT (6.39)-(6.41). The planned physical operation at the (future) RT stage
is again subject to (6.42)-(6.49).
Similar to the case of separate participation, the optimized values for pb,id,chq ,
pb,id,cqq , pb,id,aqq , ps,id,chq , ps,id,cqq , ps,id,aqq , pc,idq , and pd,idq in problem V are derived
and defined as parameters, to use them in the RT stage.
Real-time stage (problem VI)
The storage operator faces a similar optimization problem as in the RT stage with
separate participation, i.e., objective function (6.37) subject to (6.39)-(6.49),
but now with the DA transactions decided upon in problem IV (6.18), and ID
transactions and (dis)charge actions determined in problem V (6.38).
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6.3.4 Considering the price-effect of storage actions
In this section we provide model formulations for the separate participation case.
However, in combination with the formulations in Section 6.3.3, the price-effect
models for coordinated participation can be straightforwardly derived as well.
Day-ahead stage (problem VII)
Ref. [9] relaxes the price-taking assumption in the DA market by considering
hourly piecewise linear market resilience functions (Fig. 6.4a), which show the
degree to which additional demand and supply would affect the DA price. They
are obtained by rerunning the market-clearing algorithm for different scenarios
(e.g., for Belgium this is for 50MWh, 250MWh, 500MWh) of additional offer or
demand volume at any price. Using this data in the arbitrage problem leads to
an upper limit to the arbitrage value for additional large-scale storage capacity,
under the assumption that prices and price-effects are known at the decision
stage. Since the piecewise linear nature of the market resilience data poses
computational challenges, i.e., the resulting problem is a nonconvex MIQP, a
stepwise approximation is proposed to convert the problem into an MILP, which
is easier to solve as it offers trade-offs in accuracy vs. computation time. This
reduces computational efforts significantly while having the ability to provide
accurate approximations of the piecewise linear result (Fig. 6.5).
More demand
[MWh]
More supply
[MWh]
DA price
[e/MWh]
MRP
(0,λda,oq )
(a) DA market.
Positive NRV
[MWh]
Negative NRV
[MWh]
RT price
[e/MWh]
E.g.
MRP
(Rnrvq ,λ
rt,+,o
q )
(Rnrvq ,λ
rt,-,o
q )
(b) RT market.
Figure 6.4: Available price-effect data for the Belgian DA and RT markets. The MRP
refers to the situation without participation of the additional storage capacity.
This method approximates each linear segment of the piecewise linear functions
by a stepwise function with identical step heights Star,da, with N sw,daq,k ∈ N0
the number of steps to approximate the linear segment between a piecewise
linear function’s breakpoints k and k+1. The resulting time-varying stepwise
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function’s total number of steps
∑
k∈Kda\{|Kda|}N
sw,da
q,k relates to the preferred
trade-off between computation time and approximation error (i.e., the larger
the step height, the shorter the computation time, but the larger the error).
pb,daq · T q
[MWh]
ps,daq · T q
[MWh]
λdaq
[e/MWh]
bsw,daq,1 b
sw,da
q,2 b
sw,da
q,|Udaq |
Xsw,up,daq,1
Xsw,lo,daq,1
Xsw,up,daq,2
Xsw,lo,daq,2
Xsw,up,da
q,|Udaq |
Xsw,lo,da
q,|Udaq |
Y sw,daq,1
Y sw,daq,2
Y sw,da
q,|Udaq |
Y sw,da
q,|Udaq |-1
Figure 6.5: Centered stepwise approximation of the piecewise linear DA market
resilience functions.
The separate participation’s DA stage objective function (6.1) is updated
to (6.51), with pb,daq,u and ps,daq,u the DA market transactions, and Y sw,daq,u the
DA price, that correspond to step u. Constraints (6.54)-(6.55) force the storage
operator to be situated at one of the steps, and its DA market transaction’s
volume to be situated within the volume limits of that step, while (6.52)-(6.53)
link the updated problem formulation to (6.2)-(6.14).
piop,da = max
∑
q∈Q
∑
u∈Udaq
Y sw,daq,u · T q · (ps,daq,u − pb,daq,u )/(|Q| · T q)− ccyc,da, (6.51)
s.t. (6.2)-(6.15),∑
u∈Udaq
pb,daq,u = pb,daq , ∀ q ∈ Q, (6.52)
∑
u∈Udaq
ps,daq,u = ps,daq , ∀ q ∈ Q, (6.53)
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bsw,daq,u ·Xsw,lo,daq,u ≤ T q · (ps,daq,u − pb,daq,u )
≤ bsw,daq,u ·Xsw,up,daq,u , ∀ q ∈ Q,u ∈ Udaq , (6.54)∑
u∈Udaq
bsw,daq,u = 1, ∀ q ∈ Q, (6.55)
pb,daq,u , ps,daq,u ∈ R+ , bsw,daq,u ∈ {0, 1} ,
Udaq = {1, 2, ...,
∑
k∈Kda\{|Kda|}
N sw,daq,k }, ∀ q ∈ Q,u ∈ Udaq . (6.56)
Again, the optimized values for pb,daq and ps,daq in problem VII are derived to
be used as input parameters in the ID and RT stages, as are those for bsw,daq,u
(bsw,daq,u for decision variable, corresponding Bsw,daq,u for input parameter).
Intra-day stage (problem VIII)
In theory, the principle of the above discussed resilience functions can be
mimicked for the continuous trading ID market, by considering all submitted
supply and demand bids and ranking them in order of attractiveness. However,
this does not take into account the fact that these bids may have been submitted
any time in between ID market opening and market closure, and the presence
of block orders. In addition, it is not possible to construct such functions since
only data on cleared bid pairs is made available, not on nonmatched submitted
bids. In the absence of ID price-effect data, we impose an upper limit V id,chq
to the transaction volume at the included ID price to, in some way, include
the price-effect problem that large-scale storage operators face.4 This limit
represents the total volume of the cleared bids in q, which are also used to
calculate the included volume-weighted average ID price:
piop,id = max
∑
q∈Q
[
λdaq · T q · (ps,daq − pb,daq ) + λid,ch,oq · T q · (ps,id,chq − pb,id,chq )
]
/(|Q| · T q)− ccyc,id, (6.57)
s.t. (6.15), (6.18)-(6.20), (6.25)-(6.26), (6.28)-(6.36), (6.56),
4Parameter V id,chq is identical for the four consecutive 15min of any hour.
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λdaq =
∑
u∈Udaq
Y sw,daq,u ·Bsw,daq,u , ∀ q ∈ Q, (6.58)
(pb,id,chq + ps,id,chq ) · T q ≤ V id,chq , ∀ q ∈ Q, (6.59)
pd,idq − pc,idq = ps,id,chq + ps,daq − pb,id,chq − pb,daq , ∀ q ∈ Q. (6.60)
In order to use them in the RT stage, also here the optimized values for pb,id,chq ,
ps,id,chq , pc,idq , and pd,idq in problem VIII are derived and defined as parameters.
Real-time stage (problem IX)
In contrast to the DA market, in which the participation of additional storage
capacity increases the market size, as a result of passive balancing actions
arbitraging imbalance prices reduces the size of the RT market by reducing
the NRV. The NRV thus limits the arbitrage potential. For profit maximizing
players it may make sense not to seek this limit, but to use less capacity to
arbitrage RT imbalance prices due to the price-effect.
Price-effect data for the RT balancing market is not readily available. By using
15min marginal activation price data for (1) increasing amounts of reserve
capacity and (2) different reserve products, from the Belgian TSO Elia [100],
we construct piecewise linear RT market resilience functions. Since the Belgian
RT balancing market applies marginal single-pricing, we assume the marginal
activation prices to reflect both long and short RT imbalance prices.5 This
data is available for different scenarios for every 15min market period. The
resilience functions developed here consist of data for the activation of down and
upward contracted secondary control (which typically includes about 140MW
times T q), and of data for down and upward reserve volumes of 300MW times
T q, 600MW times T q, and the maximum available amount of reserve capacity
times T q. Since pro rata activation applies to contracted secondary control in
Belgium, the marginal activation price for the entire volume of down and upward
contracted secondary control is assumed to be constant at its marginal activation
price, independent from what share of its total volume is activated.6 Without
participation of the additional storage capacity, the system is characterized by a
certain imbalance price and accompanying NRV (i.e., the MRP) for each 15min
5It is acceptable to ignore the balance-incentivizing component, since in Belgium it only
applies to BRP imbalances in the same direction as the SI, not to passive balancing actions.
6In addition, in (the theoretical) case no reserve capacity is activated, the long imbalance
price is assumed to equal the upward reserve price, while the short imbalance price corresponds
to the downward reserve price.
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settlement period. This MRP serves as reference point from which the storage
operator can deduce its price-effect (Fig. 6.4b).
Similar to the DA market, we relax the price-taking assumption by considering
the piecewise linear RT market resilience functions, illustrating the degree to
which additional BRP imbalances would affect the imbalance price. Again, we
approximate the piecewise linear functions by stepwise functions to solve MILPs
instead of nonconvex MIQPs to approximate the piecewise linear outcome.
Objective function (6.37) is updated to (6.61), given the transactions in the
previously held DA market (6.18) and ID market (6.38), and the DA price (6.58),
subject to additional constraints (6.62)-(6.65), and still subject to (6.39)-(6.49):
piop,rt = max
∑
q∈Q
[
λdaq · T q · (ps,daq − pb,daq ) + λid,ch,oq · T q · (ps,id,chq − pb,id,chq )
+
∑
u∈Urtq
(Y sw,rt,+q,u · T q · pi,+q,u − Y sw,rt,-q,u · T q · pi,-q,u)
]
/(|Q| · T q)− ccyc,rt, (6.61)
s.t. (6.15), (6.18), (6.36), (6.38)-(6.50), (6.56), (6.58),∑
u∈Urtq
pi,+q,u = pi,+q , ∀ q ∈ Q, (6.62)
∑
u∈Urtq
pi,-q,u = pi,-q , ∀ q ∈ Q, (6.63)
bsw,rtq,u · (Xsw,lo,rtq,u +Rnrvq ) ≤ T q · (pi,+q,u − pi,-q,u)
≤ bsw,rtq,u · (Xsw,up,rtq,u +Rnrvq ), ∀ q ∈ Q,u ∈ Urtq , (6.64)∑
u∈Urtq
bsw,rtq,u = 1, ∀ q ∈ Q, (6.65)
pi,+q,u, pi,-q,u ∈ R+ , bsw,rtq,u ∈ {0, 1} ,
Urtq = {1, 2, ...,
∑
k∈Krt\{|Krt|}
N sw,rtq,k }, ∀ q ∈ Q,u ∈ Urtq . (6.66)
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6.4 Results
6.4.1 Data
The price data for the DA and ID markets originates from the Belgian
power exchange BELPEX [169], German and French power exchange EPEX
SPOT [171], and Dutch power exchange APX [170]. RT imbalance price data
is obtained from the Belgian TSO Elia [100], French TSO RTE [180], German
TSO Amprion [243], and Dutch TSO TenneT [188]. Finally, Belgian price-effect
data from BELPEX is used for the DA market, as well as for ID trading volume
data, and both NRV and marginal reserve activation price data is retrieved
from Elia to construct RT market resilience functions.
Fig. 6.6a provides information on the average market resilience function slope
for the DA market for both additional supply and demand, while Fig. 6.6c
gives this information for the RT market for both down and upward reserve
activation, and Fig. 6.6b shows the trading volume for the continuous hourly ID
market, all for the Belgian market zone for 2014. In these duration curves, the
x-axis refers to the share of 15min periods of the total of 35 040 15min periods.
Unless specified otherwise, the used storage plant characteristics, along with
other input data, are displayed in Table 6.1, and serve to model typical PHS
plants. Even though we sometimes refer to other power rating sizes, we assume
a fixed discharge duration of 4 h throughout this chapter.
Table 6.1: Input parameters.
C inv,e 50 e/kWh N cyc 100 000 - P d,min 0 MW Rd,do 50 %/min
Emax 2000 MWh P c,max 500 MW P i,max 1000 MW Rd,up 50 %/min
Emin 0 MWh P c,min 0 MW Rc,do 50 %/min ηc 86.6%
N cal 50 a P d,max 500 MW Rc,up 50 %/min ηd 86.6%
|Kda| 7 - |Krt| 10 - |Q| 192 |Qfq| 48 -
Star,da 1.0e/MWh Star,rt 1.0 e/MWh T q 0.25h
6.4.2 Arbitrage potential
No price-effect
Fig. 6.7a shows the electricity storage arbitrage potential for the four market
zones of the CWE region for 2014 under the assumption that the storage
transactions do not affect the price. It illustrates the extent to which the
different short-term and geographical markets on the one hand, and participation
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Figure 6.6: Fig. 6.6a shows the average DA market resilience function slope up to
500MWq additional demand (upward slope) and supply (downward slope). Fig. 6.6c
shows this data for the RT market up to the maximum available upward reserve
capacity (upward slope) and downward reserve capacity (downward slope). Fig. 6.6b
shows the trading volume in the continuous hourly ID market, Belgium, 2014.
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strategies on the other hand, exhibit interesting characteristics.7 We consider five
participation strategies (Table 6.2). Strategy “DA” refers to only participating
in the DA market, while strategies “ID” and “RT” have similar meanings for
the ID market and settlement side of the RT balancing market, respectively.
Strategy “SEP” refers to a separate participation in all three short-term markets,
while “COO” corresponds to a coordinated participation in these markets.
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Figure 6.7: Electricity storage arbitrage potential, 2014. Fig. 6.7a focuses on the CWE
region, and does not consider the price-effect of additional storage capacity. Fig. 6.7b
focuses on Belgium, does consider the impact of the price-effect, and is expressed in
values relative to the no price-effect values.
Table 6.2: Description of the five considered participation strategies.
Strategy Description
DA DA market participation only.
ID ID market participation only.
RT RT market participation only.
SEP Separate participation in the DA, ID, and RT markets.
COO Coordinated participation in the DA, ID, and RT markets.
Due to the full market-coupling and harmonization in the CWE region for the
DA market, unsurprisingly the DA market arbitrage value is in the same order
of magnitude across the four market zones.
For the ID strategy, the explanation is twofold. First, ID trading volume is
higher in France and Germany than in Belgium and the Netherlands, with no
trading volume in 30.41% of the time in Belgium (Fig. 6.6b) and 12.83% in
7It is not meant to provide an accurate prediction of the value that electricity storage
operators will capture, as it assumes a perfect foresight of prices for the upcoming day.
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the Netherlands, compared to only 1.10% in France and four 15min periods in
Germany. This limits the transactions the operator can execute in the former two
market zones, as with no trading volume in certain hours we assume the storage
operator not to be able to trade either. Second, in Germany three ID markets are
organized, allowing for three types of arbitrage (i.e., intertemporal, intermarket,
and intertemporal intermarket arbitrage) in the ID strategy, while for Belgium,
France, and the Netherlands only intertemporal arbitrage is possible.
The significant difference between the RT market results for France compared
to the other three market zones exists due to two main reasons. First, in France
dual pricing applies, while in the other three market zones single-pricing is in
place. Second, in France the RT market is based on 30min time steps, compared
to 15min time steps in Belgium, the Netherlands, and Germany. The reason
why a single-pricing design allows for a better valorization of the participation
of flexible capacity is explained in Section 6.3.2. Furthermore, a finer temporal
resolution would improve the extent to which the value of flexibility for the
system is reflected and rewarded, because the resulting price signals would
represent the physics of the system more accurately. Finally, the difference in
arbitrage potential for the RT strategy between Belgium and the Netherlands
on the one hand, and Germany on the other hand, can be attributed to the
difference in price profiles and within-day price volatility.
When considering all three short-term markets in one arbitrage strategy, a
significant difference between separate and coordinated participation is observed.
The bulk of the value in these cases is driven by the RT market (Fig. 6.8a).
In contrast to the SEP strategy, with COO, the storage operator can already
anticipate large (favorable) imbalance positions by a priori creating a position
in the opposite direction by means of DA and ID market trading. Fig. 6.8a
illustrates that taking such positions can even lead to negative operating profits
in the markets where this anticipatory behavior takes place, but that this loss
is more than offset through higher revenues in the RT market. In contrast,
negative operating profits cannot occur in the SEP strategy, as the transactions
in each market are optimized sequentially.
Fig. 6.9a provides additional clarification by displaying information on the
imbalance positions for the strategies including the RT market. In the SEP
case, the total yearly imbalance volume is 5 898MWh/MW,8 with no imbalance
position in 36.07% of the time, and a full imbalance (i.e., at 200% of the
rated power) in 6.13% of the time. With coordinated participation, these
numbers amount to 10 318MWh/MW, 17.59%, and 35.92%, respectively. A
“full imbalance position” refers to having a nominated position in one direction
8The total yearly imbalance volume is calculated as
∑q=35 040
q=1 |p
i,+
q − pi,-q | · T q, and is
represented in Fig. 6.9 by the area between the duration curves and zero.
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to the rated power (e.g., full charge power), while in RT the storage asset is
operated in the opposite direction to the rated power (e.g., full discharge power).
With strategy RT, the yearly imbalance volume amounts to 5 964MWh/MW,
with no imbalance in 30.66% of the time, and no full imbalance positions as
no anticipatory positions can be taken in the DA or ID market. Although the
quantification of the risk associated with the different participation strategies
is not in the scope of this chapter, it has to be noted that the coordinated
participation is considered to be far more riskier. To approach the indicated
value the operator has to have an accurate expectation of upcoming DA, ID,
and RT prices already at the DA stage.
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Figure 6.8: Market-wise origin of the electricity storage arbitrage potential, Belgium,
2014.
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Figure 6.9: Imbalance positions of the storage plant, expressed as percentage of the
installed power rating, Belgium, 2014.
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Price-effect
Fig. 6.7b displays the arbitrage potential when considering the price-effect,
resulting from the participation of additional large-scale storage resources. This
is done in values relative to the calculated operating profit when assuming to
be a price-taker in the market with no price-effect (Fig. 6.7a). The displayed
value per MW without price-effect for the DA market decreases rather slowly
with the storage size when considering the price-effect. In contrast, due to the
(current) relatively low ID market trading volume in Belgium (Fig. 6.6b), the
value for the ID market decreases more quickly, as well as for the RT market,
as the RT price-effect is many times stronger (Fig. 6.6c vs. Fig. 6.6a).
While the bulk of the value in the SEP and COO strategies is again provided by
the RT market (Fig. 6.8b), this is to a much lesser extent. As the share of large
imbalances decreases due to the emerged trade-off between the capacity used
and the remaining price spread, negative anticipatory behavior in the DA and
ID market occurs less frequently and less strongly, with no negative operating
profit for the DA market anymore.
Fig. 6.9b shows that total yearly imbalance volumes decrease significantly due
to the consideration of the price-effect, to prevent imbalance price spreads from
disappearing or strongly decreasing. With the RT strategy, the yearly imbalance
volume amounts to 1 514MWh/MW, while for the SEP and COO strategies
the imbalance volume amounts to 1 355MWh/MW and 1 804MWh/MW,
respectively. Full imblances do not appear anymore in any of the participation
strategies, and no imbalances occur in 28.50%, 28.50%, and 12.66% of the time,
for the RT, SEP, and COO strategies, respectively. Furthermore, 87.34% of the
imbalances are smaller than 50% of the rated power for the RT strategy, while
this is 89.04% and 88.26% for the SEP and COO strategies. The latter figures
for the case when not considering the price-effect are only 1.97%, 6.37%, and
6.34%, respectively. This illustrates that whereas transactions are always at full
(remaining) power rating when not considering the price-effect, unless of course
the energy buffer constrains this full-power-operation, here the transactions are
more heavily constrained due to the price-effect.
Finally, we observe three things based on Table 6.3. First, the number of time
steps including imbalance positions increase when considering the price-effect.
This shifting of imbalances to neighboring market periods is done to keep the
price spread from reducing as much as possible. Second, (surprisingly) the
majority of the storage plant’s imbalances do not seem to affect the price, as
the imbalance positions are chosen such that the NRV remains on the flat parts
of the RT resilience function (Fig. 6.4b). This allows for arbitrage without
reduction of the price spread, and (in part) explains the previous observation.
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While flat segments may occur at different places in the RT market resilience
curves, they can mainly be attributed to the pro rata activation of contracted
secondary control in the Belgian RT balancing market. In case the market
design does not include such pro rata activation, these flat segments are no
longer present in the piecewise linear RT resilience functions, thereby always
affecting the price when arbitraging at those segments. As such, we hypothesize
that the arbitrage value in the RT market would decrease even more than
the values displayed in Fig. 6.7b. When there is an impact on the price, the
price-effect in the RT market is always “intuitive”. Segments are considered
to be intuitive if the price decreases with additional supply (i.e., a positive
imbalance) and increases with additional demand (i.e., a negative imbalance).
In contrast to the RT market resilience functions, counterintuitive segments
are present in the DA market resilience functions. Ref. [9] explains that this
is the result of differences in accepted block orders.9 Third, passive balancing
can serve a valuable social purpose. The lion’s share of the storage plant’s
imbalances are “good” imbalances, as they contribute to a secure operation of
the system by reducing the amount of reserves the TSO has to activate. The
small share of “neutral” imbalances refer to situations in which an imbalance in
the same direction as the SI is created, but in which the imbalance price remains
unchanged (i.e., at a flat segment). The very minor share of “bad” imbalances
refer to situations similar to neutral imbalances, but in which the imbalance
price further increases in case NRV > 0, and further decreases in case NRV <
0. Whereas, some regulators prefer a dual-pricing scheme (e.g., France), as this
avoids BRPs to be incentivized to speculate on the direction of the SI, or do
not contractually allow BRPs to deviate from their nominated position, even
though that might help the system (e.g., Germany), we argue that incentivizing
design changes should be considered for these balancing markets.
Table 6.3: RT imbalance and price-effect data, Belgium, 2014.
Imbalance Price-effect Imbalance
Yes No Intuitive None Counter- Good Neutral Bad
intuitive
[%] [%] [%] [%] [%] [%] [%] [%]
RT (no price-effect) 69.34 30.66 - - - 97.06 2.94 -
RT (price-effect: 500MW) 71.50 28.50 16.22 83.78 0.00 97.06 2.65 0.29
SEP (no price-effect) 63.93 36.07 - - - 91.85 8.15 -
SEP (price-effect: 500MW) 71.50 28.50 16.89 83.11 0.00 86.14 10.66 3.20
COO (no price-effect) 82.41 17.59 - - - 88.22 11.78 -
COO (price-effect: 500MW) 87.34 12.66 15.67 84.33 0.00 88.80 9.01 2.19
9Additional supply can cause supply (demand) block orders that are accepted (rejected) in
the reference case to become rejected (accepted), while additional demand can cause demand
(supply) block orders that are accepted (rejected) in the reference case to become rejected
(accepted).
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6.4.3 Market actions
Duration curves of the transactions in the Belgian DA, ID, and RT market,
for 2014, are displayed in Fig. 6.10, for both a storage operator which is
assumed to be a price-taker in the market and a storage operator that takes
into account its price-effect. In the former case, the storage asset is always
used to its full power rating, unless bounded by the limited energy storage
capacity. In contrast, in the latter case, fewer full load hours are observed
(DA: 18.5% vs. 31.7%, ID: 0.3% vs. 21.7%, RT: 0.6% vs. 66.7%) to keep
price spreads from diminishing too much. Although (dis)charge actions are
partially shifted to neighboring market periods, observed through the increased
number of operational hours of the storage plant (DA: 46.8% vs. 39.2%, ID:
32.4% vs. 26.4%, RT: 71.5% vs. 69.3%), in total less energy is bought (DA:
1501MWh/MW vs. 1790MWh/MW, ID: 322MWh/MW vs. 1208MWh/MW,
RT: 865MWh/MW vs. 3408MWh/MW) and sold (DA: 1126MWh/MW vs.
1343MWh/MW, ID: 242MWh/MW vs. 906MWh/MW, RT: 649MWh/MW
vs. 2556MWh/MW).10
6.5 Conclusions
This chapter further informs the field of electricity storage valuation in
short-term markets with two modeling-wise contributions. First, it presents
PBUC model formulations that allow to aggregate multiple storage arbitrage
opportunities in a single operation strategy. All three short-term markets, i.e.,
the DA, ID, and RT balancing market, are considered, as well as the opportunity
to capture three types of price differences: (1) over time in each individual
market (i.e., intertemporal arbitrage), (2) over the three markets for the same
market period (i.e., intermarket arbitrage), and (3) over time over the three
markets (i.e., intertemporal intermarket arbitrage). Second, the price-effect is
studied with high detail for all three short-term markets: for the DA market
by using piecewise linear DA market resilience functions, for the ID market by
using trading volume data, and for the RT balancing market by using piecewise
linear RT market resilience functions. While the first two are published by the
power exchange, the latter are developed in this chapter based on marginal
reserve activation prices published by the TSO.
10The total yearly volumes are calculated similarly to the imbalance volumes in Fig. 6.9.
The buy volumes are represented by the area between the negative part of the duration curves
and zero, while the sell volumes are represented by the area between the positive part of the
duration curves and zero.
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Figure 6.10: Considering the price-effect leads to fewer full load hours, more operational
hours, and less energy traded in total. The illustrated transactions when considering
the price-effect are those of the 500MW storage plant. The DA and ID transactions,
and RT imbalances, are expressed as percentages of the rated power, Belgium, 2014.
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We show the extent to which the three short-term markets, and their
combination, in the four market zones of the CWE region are potentially
interesting for electricity storage arbitrage. This is intended to support market
participants in storage investment and operation decisions, and to inform
policy-makers about the impact of market design rules on the storage arbitrage
potential. While the arbitrage potential for the DA markets, which are coupled
and harmonized, is quite similar in the Belgian, French, German, and Dutch
market zones, this is not entirely the case for the ID markets, which are only
partly coupled and harmonized, and not at all for the RT balancing markets,
which are largely noncoupled and nonharmonized. Aggregating the arbitrage
opportunities for the three short-term markets increases the storage value, with
the aggregation strategy, i.e., separate or coordinated participation, determining
the expected additional complexity and risk. The price-effect is much stronger
in the ID and RT balancing market compared to the DA market, with the
average arbitrage value per unit of power decreasing to a larger extent with the
storage size in the ID and RT markets. For all short-term markets, considering
the price-effect leads to three observed changes in the storage operation and
trading behavior: fewer full load hours, more operational hours, and less traded
energy.
In the bigger picture of applications for which storage systems can be used, one
could wonder how relevant arbitrage opportunities in the short-term markets
are for the business case compared to longer-term contracts for, e.g., frequency
control. However, Chapter 4 shows that reserve contract durations are becoming
shorter as well, through which stable longer-term revenue streams for storage
are becoming rather uncommon. An exception to this trend towards shorter-
term contracts is the uprise of capacity markets. However, these do not value
flexibility but firm capacity, and usually represent complementary revenue
streams next to participation in the short-term markets.
Chapter 7
Multi-player operation
Auction-based allocation of shared electricity storage
resources through physical storage rights
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Abstract:
This chapter proposes a new electricity storage business model based on multiple
simultaneously considered revenue streams, which can be attributed to different
market activities and players. These players thus share electricity storage
resources and compete to obtain the right to use them in a dynamic allocation
mechanism. It is based on the design of a new periodically organized auction
to allocate shared storage resources through physical storage rights between
different market players and accompanying applications. Through such a
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flexibility platform owners of flexible resources can commercialize their flexible
capacity over different applications, while market players looking for additional
flexibility can obtain this through a pay-per-use principle and thus not having
to make long-term investment commitments. As such, they can quickly adapt
their portfolio according to the market situation. Alternatively, through such
an allocation mechanism players can effectively share storage resources. Players
may be incentivized to participate as they can share the investment cost,
mitigate risk, exploit economies of scale, overcome regulatory barriers, and
merge time-varying and player-dependent flexibility needs. The mechanism
allocates the limited storage resources to the most valuable application for
each market-clearing, based on the competing players’ willingness-to-pay. An
illustrative case study is provided in which three players share storage resources
that are allocated through a daily auction with hourly market-clearings.
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7.1 Introduction
The integration of variable RES is a major challenge for the operation of the
power system. Their limited controllability and predictability results in an
increased need for power system flexibility, while flexible conventional power
plants currently experience decreasing profitability as a result of low electricity
prices and a limited number of operating hours [103]. Flexibility is the ability to
provide up and downward power adjustments to deal with temporary imbalances
between generation and consumption of electric energy [190, 244]. This flexibility
can be provided by flexible generation and consumption, and electricity storage,
but can also be activated in neighboring regions through interconnection capacity
and the further integration of adjacent markets (Fig. 7.1). Electricity storage
has the ability to compensate temporary power surpluses and shortages by
decoupling the generation of electric energy from its consumption over time.
The extent of this compensation is limited by its storage capacity.
Although there is a need for flexibility because of its increasing demand and
decreasing supply, market participants are only incentivized to integrate new
flexible resources if the investment is profitable. In addition, the value of
storage is often underestimated due to the focus on operation strategies based
on only a single application, usually price arbitrage between off-peak and on-
peak hours. However, determining the true value of electricity storage will
likely require the aggregation of multiple applications while accounting for the
interdependence between potential revenue streams [32, 33, 34]. The value
of individual applications cannot simply be added together, but need to be
co-optimized since different storage services can conflict with each other [192].
Intra-regional
Electricity storage
Flexible supply
Flexible demand
Grid capacity
Inter-regional
Electricity storage
Flexible supply
Flexible demand
Figure 7.1: Overview of power system flexibility sources.
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Therefore, this chapter considers a new storage business model based on multiple
simultaneously considered revenue streams, which can be attributed to different
activities in the market and can thus be the focus of different market players.
As such, these market players share electricity storage resources and compete
to use the shared storage resources. The allocation is based on the design of a
periodically organized auction with sequential market-clearings, in which the
right to use storage resources is traded between different players.
7.1.1 Electricity storage applications
Electricity storage refers to systems, bidirectionally coupled with the power
system, which buffer energy. This includes both systems in which the charging
and discharging side is physically located at one location, e.g., PHS plants and
BES systems, or at multiple locations, i.e., P2G systems in combination with a
gas turbine. This definition distinguishes electricity storage from the broader
concept of energy storage, which may, e.g., also include stock-piling fuel at the
supply side of the power system.1
Historically, electricity storage plants were considered as an alternative for
investing in peak-load generation, by charging during off-peak and discharging
during on-peak moments. However, due to the liberalization of electricity
markets and the integration of RES, distinct valorization paths for different
applications of storage emerged [10, 25, 26, 27]. These can be categorized in
energy, network, and reliability services.
Energy services include arbitrage and portfolio management of market
participants. Arbitrage is based on price differences over time: electricity is
bought and stored when the price is low, and is sold and generated again when the
price is higher. Portfolio management is performed at different time scales, i.e.,
investment, scheduling, and operation, and covers generation investment deferral,
inter-temporal energy shifting, and capacity firming, respectively. Through
inter-temporal energy shifting generators optimize the value of generation by
decoupling generation and physical injection, while consumers optimize the
cost of consumption by decoupling consumption and physical offtake. Capacity
firming can indicate the ability to smoothen the generation or consumption
output, resulting in less volatile power profiles, or to follow predetermined
output schedules to reduce imbalance positions in RT. Network services include
the provision of frequency control (i.e., primary, secondary, tertiary)2, voltage
1Power plants may have significant fuel reserves, e.g., the natural gas grid with its storage
capabilities for gas-fired power plants, coal piles at classic thermal power plants, and nuclear
fuel at nuclear power plants.
2In the ENTSO-E synchronous zone operating reserves are categorized into FCR, FRR,
both automatic (aFRR) and manual (mFRR), and RR.
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support, congestion management, and black-start capabilities to the TSO. In
the future, some of these will likely be provided to the DSO as well. Reliability
services include the provision of reliability on both the local and system level.
This multitude of applications makes electricity storage plants an interesting
asset for a wide range of market participants. However, operating a storage
plant to provide just one or a few of these services might not always result in
a positive business case: profitability may require the aggregation of multiple
applications.
7.1.2 Motivation
Although some studies focus on the co-optimization of different storage
applications (e.g., [33, 192, 230]), most existing work focuses on only a single
application or allocates the available storage resources a priori when considering
multiple applications, instead of applying a periodically performed optimization
process. In addition, the sharing and operation of storage resources by different
players has only been studied to a limited extent, except for [32]. As such,
the contribution of the auction-based allocation described in this chapter is
that it does not a priori define the applications or even the market player that
the storage resources will serve at a certain moment in time. This can be
accomplished by the development of a centralized platform where periodical
auctions with sequential market-clearings take place to allocate the right to
use (dis)charge power capacities and energy storage capacity. These auctions
can serve both settings where (1) multiple players share common storage plants
and (2) multiple suppliers of storage resources and prospective consumers
meet to trade physical storage rights. Whereas the presented allocation
mechanism allows to simultaneously include multiple resource suppliers and
players competing for the right to use them, and to simultaneously consider
their offers, the method discussed in [32] considers a sequential allocation to
players which express their need for flexible resources at different time scales.
In addition, the presented allocation mechanism auctions physical (dis)charge
power rights and storage capacity rights, whereas the allocation in [32] is based
on actual utilization profiles.
Market players can have multiple incentives to share, contract, or offer storage
resources by means of a periodically organized auction. First, this may allow
them to exploit economies of scale, i.e., increasing the plant size at a reduced
cost per unit of power and energy. Second, they can share the investment
cost and associated risk, especially when considering large-scale storage plants.
Third, as flexibility needs vary throughout the year and even throughout the day,
and across market players, they may have different (possibly complementary)
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storage utilization patterns, providing an incentive to share resources. Fourth,
this may allow them to overcome regulatory barriers, here we identify two.
First, although PHS is currently the most mature storage technology, rapidly
decreasing costs and technological advancements are making BES systems
increasingly competitive [3]. To overcome barriers for such small-scale storage
resources to participate in the market, the development of a centralized platform
allows owners of these resources to offer flexibility to market players that
aggregate them. Second, regulatory barriers might prevent storage operators
to provide certain services simultaneously. E.g., in the US storage plants can
either provide market-based or regulated services (e.g., congestion management
to avoid grid upgrades), but they are not allowed to combine both in a single
business case [245]. An auction such as the one proposed in this chapter can
overcome this regulatory barrier by allocating storage rights to different players
to provide either market-based or regulated services.
From a system point of view, there may be additional reasons to share storage
resources. First, as (large-scale) storage resources are usually limited due to
geographical requirements, they should be allocated to the most valuable services
at each point in time. Second, due to the introduced competition to use storage
resources, strategic under or overusage [215] is likely to occur less frequently.
This decoupling of the ownership of storage resources with its physical operation
has similar characteristics to the treatment of transmission capacity, as both
have the ability to move power, the former in time while the latter in space. In
European electricity markets cross-border transmission capacity is auctioned
explicitly or implicitly [246, 247]. The former indicates that market players
can obtain the right to use interconnector capacity, after which they can use
these capacities to capture price differences in neighboring markets. In the
latter, these capacities are not auctioned to market players but allocated to the
power exchange to include in the market-clearing algorithm to maximize social
welfare. The allocation mechanism discussed in this chapter is based on explicit
auctioning, as first the right to use storage resources is auctioned, after which
players can use these resources in the electricity market. Furthermore, [248, 249]
consider a situation where the surplus collected by the system operator or power
exchange (i.e., storage congestion rent), following a central operation of storage
resources to maximize social welfare, is allocated to players holding financial
storage rights. These are based on the design of FTRs [250, 251], and thus
remunerate storage investors by either the revenues of the auction of financial
storage rights, or the value of the storage congestion rent itself. Similar to the
proposed auction-based allocation mechanism, this allows them to recover the
investment cost without participating in the electricity market themselves.
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7.1.3 Contributions
The main contribution of this chapter is the presentation of an alternative
approach for electricity storage plants to aggregate multiple applications. This
is based on a new market for flexibility, namely a periodically organized
auction to allocate shared storage resources through physical storage rights
between different market players and accompanying applications. Through this
allocation mechanism (1) market participants can share storage resources to
exploit economies of scale, reduce the investment cost, mitigate risk, match
complementary flexibility needs, and overcome regulatory barriers, and (2)
owners of flexible resources can commercialize their flexible capacity over
different applications while market players looking for additional flexibility
have access to these resources on a short-term basis. As such, the latter do not
have to make long-term investment commitments and can adapt their portfolio
according to changing market situations.
The chapter is structured as follows. Section 7.2 discusses (Generalized) Nash
games, mixed complementarity problems, and the designed storage allocation
mechanism in more detail. Section 7.3 illustrates this auction-based allocation
through a case study in which three market players share storage resources, by
providing the mathematical formulation of the players’ individual optimization
problems and resulting market equilibrium problem. While Section 7.4 discusses
the case study’s results, Section 7.5 provides the conclusions of this chapter.
7.2 Methodology
7.2.1 (Generalized) Nash equilibrium problems
The interaction between several market players, in which each player aims to
optimize the value of its objective function given the decisions by all rivals, can
be mathematically formulated as an equilibrium problem. We first introduce
Nash equilibrium problems (NEPs) [252] before discussing the concept of a
GNEP [253]. Assume a market with a finite amount of players, in which each
player l ∈ L faces the following optimization problem:
max
xl
fl(xl,x-l), (7.1)
s.t. xl ∈ Xl. (7.2)
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Each player’s vector of decision variables xl, has to be chosen from its set of
feasible strategies Xl, while the vector of decision variables of its rivals x-l is
considered as given. A Nash equilibrium x∗l is then reached when the following
condition holds:
fl(x∗l ,x∗-l) ≥ fl(yl,x∗-l), ∀ l ∈ L , yl ∈ Xl. (7.3)
This equilibrium means that given the decisions by all rivals, no player has
an incentive to deviate from its chosen strategy. An implicit assumption of
the NEP is that the strategies chosen by the competing players only affect the
players’ objective function and not their feasible set of strategies. In contrast,
in a GNEP this assumption is relaxed [253, 254, 255, 256, 257], as each player’s
vector of decision variables xl has to be chosen from a set of feasible strategies
Xl(x-l) that is affected by the strategies chosen by the competing players. A
Generalized Nash equilibrium x∗l is then reached when the following condition
holds:
fl(x∗l ,x∗-l) ≥ fl(yl,x∗-l), ∀ l ∈ L , yl ∈ Xl(x∗-l). (7.4)
The general structure of both an NEP and GNEP, consisting of a set of
interrelated optimization problems, is illustrated in Fig. 7.2. In a GNEP,
each player’s objective function may be subject to both individual and shared
constraints. While each individual optimization problem represents the decision
process of one player, the equilibrium problem represents the interactions in a
market environment of multiple interrelated players.
7.2.2 Mixed complementarity problems
The NEP and GNEP can be solved by formulating the problem as an MCP.
This is done by deriving the first-order optimality, or KKT, conditions of each
player’s optimization problem and solving them simultaneously. In the MCP
formulation, the complementarity conditions enforce that the inner product
of an inequality constraint and the primal or dual variable3 is zero, and the
nonnegativity of both the inequality constraint and the primal or dual variable.
This means that either the inequality constraint holds as an equality, i.e., is
3A constraint’s dual variable represents the incremental improvement of the player’s
objective value when marginally relaxing the respective constraint, and can be interpreted as
the marginal price of the resource subject to the constraint.
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binding, or the primal or dual variable is zero. Mathematically, this is expressed
by using the perpendicular operator ⊥, which indicates complementarity.
GNEP
NEP
• shared constraints
Player 1
• objective
function
• individual
constraints
Player |L|
• objective
function
• individual
constraints
...
Figure 7.2: Illustration of (Generalized) Nash equilibrium problems.
An MCP is thus an array of equalities and inequalities which is obtained by
aggregating all players’ KKT conditions. However, when tackling a GNEP,
aggregating the individual players’ KKT conditions into an MCP results in a
nonsquare system: the shared constraints are identical for each player, while
the associated dual variables of each involved player may hold different values.
This “squareness” issue can be solved by assigning an identical dual variable
for each player to the shared constraint [253], meaning that each player values
the shared resource identically, which leads to a single “price” for the shared
resource [254, 255].
This approach can be interpreted as an auctioneer allocating the shared resource
to the players according to the price they are willing to pay to obtain the right
to use it. Their willingness-to-pay directly relates to the improvement of their
objective value from a marginal relaxation of the shared resource.
7.2.3 Auction-based allocation of shared storage resources
The shared storage resources’ allocation problem can be formulated as both
an NEP and GNEP. In the former case, the suppliers of storage resources are
modeled explicitly, while the consumers and suppliers in the market for storage
resources interact by means of market-clearing conditions representing the
auctioneer. This formulation relates to the situation where multiple suppliers
and consumers of storage resources compete in a centralized market. In the latter
case, the suppliers are not modeled explicitly but are included implicitly through
the storage resources’ shared constraints. Through these shared constraints an
auctioneer is assumed to allocate the storage rights over the different players.
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This formulation is particularly useful to represent the situation where multiple
market players share the storage resources and allocate them periodically among
each other.
It is well known from [253] that an NEP where the auctioneer is modeled
explicitly yields the same solution as a GNEP where the dual variables of each
player for the shared constraints are assumed to be identical. If the solution
is nonunique, the two solutions may differ in terms of the primal variables
(i.e., operating decisions), but the objective value (i.e., pay-off) for each player
must be identical. In this chapter, we use the GNEP formulation in a case
study in Section 7.3 as it illustrates a case in which three players share storage
resources. For illustrative purposes, the remainder of the discussion assumes a
single storage plant.
In both formulations the auctioneer thus acts as a facilitator between the supply
of shared storage resources (i.e., charge power P c,max, discharge power P d,max,
energy storage capacity Emax) and a number of players |L| which compete
to obtain the right to use them. A periodical auction is organized, in which
for each market period t ∈ T the supplier of the storage resources submits
supply bids sct , sdt , set and each market player l ∈ L has the opportunity to
submit demand bids dcl,t, ddl,t, del,t for each storage resource (Fig. 7.3, left). The
supplier is assumed to provide a supply bid for each shared resource equal to
its maximum capacity, to be sold at any price defined by the market. Each
player l bids the maximum price he is willing to pay to obtain the right to use
a specified volume of each storage resource. This maximum price equals its
incremental pay-off. The auctioneer then aggregates the demand bids for each
storage resource, i.e., the demand curve, and matches them with each resource’s
supply bid, i.e., the supply curve, which results in a market-clearing for each
time step t (Fig. 7.3, right). This yields a cleared volume for the charge power
rights pc,maxl,t , discharge power rights p
d,max
l,t , and storage capacity rights emaxl,t
for each player l, and uniform market-clearing prices µct , µdt , µet . In equilibrium,
these prices equal the marginal willingness-to-pay for each respective resource.
Similar to the case in current electricity markets, the allocation process may
be iterated at different timeframes (e.g., week-ahead, DA, ID, RT) to allow
players to adjust their obtained physical storage rights, based on updated market
information. In a first auction (e.g., DA) the shared resources are allocated to
the different players according to their willingness-to-pay, which is dependent
on their market expectations and risk aversion, while in a consecutive allocation
closer to RT (e.g., ID) players can trade and reallocate the obtained resources
among each other: players that contracted too much can offer part of their
obtained rights again to the platform, while players that contracted too little
can bid to obtain additional storage rights. As is the case in electricity markets,
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these sequential markets for storage resources may also allow for arbitrage
opportunities as price spreads can be captured over the different sequential
markets. Arbitrageurs could, e.g., obtain additional storage rights at the DA
stage to afterwards sell in the ID market to other players if they expect the
ID price to clear at a higher price. Alternatively, players could, e.g., postpone
the reservation of physical storage rights in the DA market to the ID market
if they expect the ID market to clear at a lower price. Although the value of
this arbitrage is related to the presence of price spreads, it also depends on
the effect of additional/fewer requested storage rights on prices, as arbitrage
may reduce price spreads by increasing low prices when requesting additional
storage rights and decreasing high prices when requesting fewer storage rights.
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d
1,t,d
e
1,tPlayer 1
Demand bids
dc2,t,d
d
2,t,d
e
2,tPlayer 2
... ...
dc|L|,t,d
d
|L|,t,d
e
|L|,tPlayer |L|
Auctioneer
Market-
clearing
∀ t ∈ T
sct
sdt
set
pc,max
l,t ∀ l ∈ L
µct
pd,max
l,t ∀ l ∈ L
µdt
emaxl,t ∀ l ∈ L
µet
Figure 7.3: Market-clearing mechanism to allocate storage resources.
7.3 Case study
To illustrate the presented auction-based allocation mechanism, a case study is
shown for a daily auction with hourly market-clearings in which three market
players compete for constrained storage resources, i.e., L = {a, p, r}, with index
a representing a player arbitraging DA market prices, index p a player focusing
on portfolio management, and index r a player that aims to use storage resources
to capture imbalance price differences in the RT market. First, the individual
optimization problems are presented as if electricity storage resources would
be readily available to them. Second, we discuss which changes have to take
place in order for the players to share storage resources and compete in an
auction-based allocation mechanism, i.e., equilibrium problem. Third, the MCP
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formulation of the equilibrium problem is discussed while it is provided in full
in Appendix A.
The model formulations of the provided case study include discretized hourly
time periods h ∈ H, with |H| = 24 and T h representing the length of one time
period, i.e., one hour. Variables in parentheses denote the dual variables of the
respective constraints. In addition, all players are assumed to be price-takers
with perfect foresight for the next optimization horizon, i.e., the next day in
this case study. The storage plant is assumed to have sufficiently fast ramp
rates for the considered hourly time resolution, with no restrictions regarding
simultaneous charge and discharge actions, and a sufficiently large cycle-life such
that its impact on the operation is negligible. These storage plant assumptions
might serve to model typical PHS plants.
7.3.1 Individual optimization problems
First, a storage operator is considered that aims to capture price differences
in the DA market. This player is indicated by index a, and its optimization
problem, in which the pay-off is maximized over a time horizon |H| · T h, reads
as follows:
max
ea,h,pca,h,p
d
a,h
∑
h∈H
λda,oh ·
[
T h · (pda,h − pca,h)
]
/(|H| · T h), (7.5)
ea,h = ea,h-1 + T h · (pca,h · ηc − pda,h/ηd), (γea,h), ∀h ∈ H, (7.6)
pca,h ≤ P c,max, (µca,h), ∀h ∈ H, (7.7)
pda,h ≤ P d,max, (µda,h), ∀h ∈ H, (7.8)
ea,h ≤ Emax, (µea,h), ∀h ∈ H, (7.9)
ea,h, pca,h, pda,h ∈ R+ , H ⊂ N, ∀h ∈ H, (7.10)
with pca,h the charge power, pda,h the discharge power, ea,h the stored energy, λ
da,o
h
the DA market price, ηc the charge efficiency, and ηd the discharge efficiency.
Constraint (7.6) expresses the intertemporal character of electricity storage,
while (7.7)-(7.9) represent capacity bounds on the electricity storage resources.
Next, a RES generator operating a portfolio of both wind and PV capacity is
considered. This player uses storage resources to increase the market value of
CASE STUDY 173
its RES generation. This can be done by either directly selling its RES power
output to the market or temporarily storing it during low price periods. This
application of electricity storage results from the fact that periods experiencing
high RES generation often coincide with lower price periods [103]. This player
is indicated by index p, and its optimization problem is:
max
ep,h,pcp,h,p
d
p,h,
pg
p,h,p
l
p,h
∑
h∈H
λda,oh ·
[
T h · (pgp,h + pdp,h)
]
/(|H| · T h), (7.11)
pcp,h + p
g
p,h + p
l
p,h = A
res,abs
p,h , (γ
g
p,h), ∀h ∈ H, (7.12)
ep,h = ep,h-1 + T h · (pcp,h · ηc − pdp,h/ηd), (γep,h), ∀h ∈ H, (7.13)
pcp,h ≤ P c,max, (µcp,h), ∀h ∈ H, (7.14)
pdp,h ≤ P d,max, (µdp,h), ∀h ∈ H, (7.15)
ep,h ≤ Emax, (µep,h), ∀h ∈ H, (7.16)
ep,h, pcp,h, pdp,h, p
g
p,h, p
l
p,h ∈ R+ , H ⊂ N, ∀h ∈ H, (7.17)
with Ares,absp,h the available RES power output, p
g
p,h the RES output directly sold
to the market, and plp,h the curtailed RES output. Constraint (7.12) denotes
that the RES power output can either be stored, sold, or curtailed.
Unforeseen imbalances between generation and consumption are dealt with
in RT on the balancing market, which is coordinated by the TSO. At the
procurement side of the balancing market the TSO contracts and activates
reserve capacity to cover SIs, while at the settlement side of the balancing
market the TSO settles individual imbalance positions of market participants by
means of an imbalance price that is based on the activation cost of reserves [103].
The third considered player is an arbitrageur that is active on the settlement
side of the RT balancing market to capture imbalance price differences over time.
As the RT balancing market is characterized by a small volume compared to the
DA market, the imbalance positions this player can take while not diminishing
the expected price spreads are assumed to be bounded by P i,maxr (7.19). As
such, the price-taking assumption assumed in this illustrative case study holds.
Although the balancing market is usually characterized by quarter-hourly or
half-hourly market periods, for illustrative purposes hourly market periods are
assumed. This player is indicated by index r, and its optimization problem
reads as follows:
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max
er,h,pcr,h,p
d
r,h
∑
h∈H
λrt,oh ·
[
T h · (pdr,h − pcr,h)
]
/(|H| · T h), (7.18)
pcr,h + pdr,h ≤ P i,maxr , (γlr,h), ∀h ∈ H, (7.19)
er,h = er,h-1 + T h · (pcr,h · ηc − pdr,h/ηd), (γer,h), ∀h ∈ H, (7.20)
pcr,h ≤ P c,max, (µcr,h), ∀h ∈ H, (7.21)
pdr,h ≤ P d,max, (µdr,h), ∀h ∈ H, (7.22)
er,h ≤ Emax, (µer,h), ∀h ∈ H, (7.23)
er,h, pcr,h, pdr,h ∈ R+ , H ⊂ N, ∀h ∈ H, (7.24)
with λrt,oh the RT imbalance price.4
7.3.2 Generalized Nash equilibrium problem
When formulating the presented optimization problems as a GNEP, two changes
take place. First, as they compete for the shared electricity storage resources, the
constraints representing the limited charge power (7.7), (7.14), (7.21), discharge
power (7.8), (7.15), (7.22), and energy storage capacity (7.9), (7.16), (7.23) are
replaced by:
pcl,h ≤ pc,maxl,h , (τ cl,h), ∀ l ∈ L,h ∈ H, (7.25)
pdl,h ≤ pd,maxl,h , (τdl,h), ∀ l ∈ L,h ∈ H, (7.26)
el,h ≤ emaxl,h , (τ el,h), ∀ l ∈ L,h ∈ H, (7.27)
with pc,maxl,h , p
d,max
l,h , and emaxl,h the allocated charge power rights, discharge power
rights, and storage capacity rights, respectively. These physical rights are
bounded by the supplied storage resources, which are assumed to equal the
4In Belgium the same imbalance price applies to positive and negative imbalances. While
these prices may differ in case of large SIs because of the activation of a balance-incentivizing
component, it is acceptable to ignore this component here: it only applies to imbalances in
the same direction as the SI, which is not the case when arbitraging imbalance prices.
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installed (dis)charge power rating and energy storage capacity in this illustrative
case study:
∑
l∈L
pc,maxl,h ≤ P c,max, (µch), ∀h ∈ H, (7.28)
∑
l∈L
pd,maxl,h ≤ P d,max, (µdh), ∀h ∈ H, (7.29)
∑
l∈L
emaxl,h ≤ Emax, (µeh), ∀h ∈ H. (7.30)
Alternatively, when considering a centralized market for storage resources rather
than a situation where players share them, the supply is characterized by index h
as well as it will be time-varying. Second, a cost term is subtracted ex-post from
each player’s objective value, since the right to use the limited storage resources
is now allocated through an auction instead of being readily available to them.
The uniform prices of the shared resources µch (7.28), µdh (7.29), µeh (7.30) at
each hourly market-clearing are determined by the willingness-to-pay of the
players’ marginally cleared demand bids to obtain the right to use them. The
ex-post calculation of the profit pil as opposed to the operating profit piopl is
done by considering the objective value resulting from (7.5), (7.11), (7.18) and
subtracting a cost term βl:
βl =
∑
h∈H
(pc,maxl,h · µch + pd,maxl,h · µdh + emaxl,h · µeh), ∀ l ∈ L, (7.31)
piopl − βl = pil, ∀ l ∈ L. (7.32)
The MCP comprised of each player’s KKT conditions and the shared constraints
is solved in GAMS using the PATH solver [258], and is provided in Appendix
A for both a daily auction with hourly market-clearings, and a less dynamic
periodically organized (e.g., daily, weekly) auction including a single market-
clearing, i.e., allocation, for each of the shared resources for the entire period
(e.g., day, week). Since the considered optimization problems are convex and
the players only face linear constraints, the KKT conditions are both necessary
(i.e., an optimal solution satisfies the KKT conditions) and sufficient (i.e., each
KKT point is an optimal solution) [257].
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7.4 Results
The Belgian DA market price [169], RT imbalance price [100], and RES
generation profiles [100] for 2014 are used for the illustrative case study. The
hourly imbalance price λrt,oh is calculated as the average of the four quarter-
hourly imbalance prices in hour h. The RES portfolio of player p is assumed
to consist of both PV systems and offshore wind turbines, both accounting for
50% of the portfolio. The time-varying available RES power output Ares,absp,h is
determined by multiplying the hourly availability of the respective sources by
the installed capacity Ares,maxp . The storage plant characteristics used for the
case study, along with other input data, are displayed in Table 7.1.
Table 7.1: Input parameters.
Emax 200 MWh P i,maxr 25 MW P d,max 50 MW ηc 86.6 %
Ares,maxp 150 MW P c,max 50 MW T h 1 h ηd 86.6 %
Fig. 7.4 shows the individual operating profit piopl and total operating profit∑
l∈L pi
op
l for 2014 as a result of the use of storage resources5 for different
allocations, either fixed a priori defined allocations (i.e., column 1 to 4) or
allocations resulting from the proposed allocation mechanism (i.e., column 5
and 6). In columns one to three, piopl is shown for the case where the players
are each allocated 100% of the storage resources. Column four indicates piopl
in case each player is awarded a fixed share equal to one-third of the storage
resources for the entire year. Since the players are assumed to be price-takers
in their respective markets (i.e., DA electricity and RT balancing market), one
may expect that piopl is equal to one-third of pi
op
l following a 100% allocation
to the respective player. Although this is the case for player a, this is not the
case for player p (42.5%) and player r (61.5%) as their actions are limited by
Ares,absp,h and P i,maxr in the provided case study. Column five shows pi
op
l when
assuming a daily organized auction with a single market-clearing, i.e., daily
allocated (dis)charge power and storage capacity rights, while column six is
based on a daily organized auction with hourly market-clearings. Fig. 7.4 shows
that the auction-based allocations lead to a higher total realized operating profit∑
l∈L pi
op
l , with shorter time frames for the market-clearings performing better.
The latter ensures that the limited storage resources are allocated to the most
valuable services at each point in time.
Table 7.2 shows piopl , βl, and pil for the different players. The revenue collected
through the auctioning of the (dis)charge power and storage capacity rights is
5This means that for player p the value that would have been realized without use of the
storage resources due to the RES generation is subtracted.
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indicated by
∑
l∈L βl. The price of an auctioned right (i.e., µch, µdh, µeh for hourly
allocations, and µc, µd, µe for single allocations per auction) only takes on a
nonzero value when the inequality constraint representing the limited availability
of the storage resource subject to the constraint is binding (i.e., (A.35)-(A.37)
for hourly allocations, and (A.72)-(A.74) for single allocations per auction). In
case the price is nonzero, it takes on the willingness-to-pay of the demand bid
of the marginally cleared player for the respective resource. As such, the zero
profit pia and close-to-zero profit pip indicate that when these players’ bids to
obtain storage rights are accepted, they represent the marginally cleared bids.
This is similar to the situation in electricity markets, where the player of the
marginally cleared demand bid pays as much as he values the consumption
of electric power during that market period. Contrarily, the positive profit pir
shows that its bids to obtain storage rights not always represent the marginally
cleared bid. This can be explained by the large price spreads in the RT market
compared to the DA market, through which player r values the use of storage
resources higher, and because the inequality constraints are not binding when he
is the only player that contracts storage resources as its (dis)charge actions are
limited by P i,maxr . In the former case player r pays the lower willingness-to-pay
of one of the other cleared players, while in the latter case the price of the
right of the storage resource subject to the constraint is zero. Contrary to this
illustrative case study, as more players participate in such an auction, and more
applications are considered, these situations occur less frequently. As such, the
revenue collected through the auctioning of storage rights converges to the total
captured value in the electricity market more closely.
Table 7.2: Yearly operating profit, cost to obtain storage rights, and profit, 2014.
Daily auctions with hourly allocations Daily auctions with daily allocations
Operating profit Cost Profit Operating profit Cost Profit
piopl βl pil pi
op
l βl pil
[Me/a] [Me/a] [Me/a] [Me/a] [Me/a] [Me/a]
Player a 0.445 0.445 0.000 0.365 0.365 0.000
Player p 0.369 0.336 0.033 0.230 0.197 0.033
Player r 1.934 0.367 1.567 1.958 0.584 1.374∑
l∈L 2.748 1.148 1.600 2.553 1.146 1.407
Fig. 7.5 illustrates the allocation of the auctioned (dis)charge power and storage
capacity rights for a daily auction with daily (Fig. 7.5a, Fig. 7.5c, Fig. 7.5e) and
hourly (Fig. 7.5b, Fig. 7.5d, Fig. 7.5f) market-clearings for 2014. As for price-
taking players with perfect foresight the overall daily value of storage resources
is likely to be higher for arbitraging RT imbalance prices than arbitraging DA
electricity prices, due to the larger and more frequent price spreads, player a and
player p do not often get the opportunity to use more than 25MW (i.e., P i,maxr )
in the daily allocation case. However, for some hours of the day they might
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actually have a higher willingness-to-pay and thus the storage resources would
be valorized at a higher value. Therefore, when using more frequent market-
clearings (i.e., with shorter durations), the storage resources are allocated more
efficiently to the time-varying most valuable services, resulting in a higher total
storage value.
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Figure 7.4: Total and individual operating profit for different allocations of the shared
storage resources, 2014.
7.5 Conclusions
Electricity storage has the ability to compensate for temporary power surpluses
and shortages by decoupling the generation of electric energy from its
consumption over time, thereby meeting increased flexibility needs. However,
market participants are only incentivized to invest in new flexible resources
when the investment is profitable. As this may not be the case when only
considering a single or a few storage services, maximizing the value of electricity
storage requires the aggregation of multiple value streams in a single operating
strategy.
As such, this chapter proposes a new storage business model based on multiple
simultaneously considered revenue streams, in which the applications or even
the player that the storage resources will serve at a certain moment in time are
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(a) Daily allocation of charge power rights.
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(b) Hourly allocation of charge power rights.
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(c) Daily allocation of discharge power rights.
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(d) Hourly allocation of discharge power rights.
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(e) Daily allocation of storage capacity rights.
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(f) Hourly allocation of storage capacity rights.
Figure 7.5: Allocation of physical storage rights in a daily auction with daily market-
clearings (Fig. 7.5a, Fig. 7.5c, Fig. 7.5e), and hourly market-clearings (Fig. 7.5b,
Fig. 7.5d, Fig. 7.5f), 2014.
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not predefined. This can be accomplished by the development of a platform
where periodical auctions with sequential market-clearings take place to allocate
physical storage rights to use (dis)charge power capacities and energy storage
capacity. These auctions allow storage owners to commercialize their resources
over different applications, while players looking for additional flexibility can
obtain this on a short-term basis. Alternatively, through such an allocation
mechanism players can effectively share storage resources. The mechanism
allocates the resources to the most valuable application for each market-
clearing, based on the players’ willingness-to-pay, which directly relates to
the improvement of their objective value from a marginal improvement of the
respective storage resource.
Players may be incentivized to participate in such a mechanism to share
investment costs, mitigate associated risks, exploit economies of scale, overcome
regulatory barriers, and merge time-varying and player-dependent flexibility
needs. In addition, this may include positive effects for the system as well, as
limited storage resources are allocated to the most valuable services at each
point in time and the strategic operation of storage resources is likely to occur
less frequently due to the introduced competition.
While this is not considered in the presented case study, the owner of the storage
resources faces an optimization problem as well. The storage resources can
either be supplied through the auction to be sold to other players, or can be used
by the owner to participate in the electricity markets himself. Alternatively,
and depending on the time of market closure of the storage auction with respect
to the electricity markets, remaining storage capacity after the former can be
used by the owner of storage resources to participate in the latter markets.
Chapter 8
Conclusions
Summary, conclusions, and suggestions for future
work
8.1 Summary and conclusions
Electricity storage currently receives a lot of attention. This can be attributed
to a combination of two factors: techno-economic developments in storage
technologies1 and increasing flexibility needs due to the ongoing integration of
variable RES in the generation mix. Due to techno-economic constraints of
power plants, and the limited ability to foresee RES generation, outages, and
load behavior, the latter is most apparent in short-term electricity markets.
These include the DA, ID, and RT balancing markets, and thus it is in these
markets in which storage is financially rewarded for its flexibility.
The two factors mentioned above, together with the continuously updated
design of the short-term electricity markets, set the scene for this thesis. It
aims to contribute to the ongoing discussion on electricity storage by providing
novel insights in its participation and modeling in short-term markets, and
power systems in general, facing an increasing integration of variable RES. Such
insights are important, as underestimating the value and role of storage could
leave an important flexibility source underexploited, whereas overestimating the
value and role of storage could lead to considerable development of a flexibility
source that can possibly not be effectively valorized (yet).
1These include (1) improved technical performances, (2) decreased costs, and (3) new
suitable locations for historically geographical-constrained technologies.
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First, Chapter 2 presents a comprehensive introduction to electricity storage.
Storage systems can be characterized by different techno-economic parameters,
which most commonly, but not exclusively, include the (dis)charge power rating
and duration, energy storage capacity, roundtrip efficiency, calendar and cycle-
life, power and energy density, and investment cost. A wide range of technologies
are available, with PHS, CAES, flywheels, supercaps, SMES, BES, fuel cells, and
P2G being the ones most often considered for grid integration. Storage systems
can be used for different applications: energy services include arbitrage and
portfolio management; grid services include the provision of frequency control,
congestion management, voltage support, and black-start service; reliability
services include the support of reliability on the local level through back-up,
UPS, and power quality management, and on the system level by providing
firm generation capacity. The extent to which the different storage technologies
can technically provide such services depends on their technical characteristics,
while the extent to which they are well-suited for these services depends on their
technical and economic characteristics, and for some services on their location
(i.e., transmission or distribution grid, and location within those grids) as well.
Chapter 3 illustrates the system-level role and value of storage, and concludes
that it is a valuable technology to support the transition to, and operation of,
RES-based systems. A combined long-term investment and short-term operation
model with high temporal and operational detail is presented, which allows to
capture the interactions between capacity investment and energy and reserve
scheduling. Storage is shown to decrease total system cost, which has a threefold
explanation. First, storage compensates the system’s expected variability by
storing base load and RES generation in times of low residual demand, and
replacing (high) peak generation in times of high residual demand, with the
storage fuel cost decreasing with the RES share. Second, storage compensates
the system’s unexpected variability by providing reserve, thereby reducing the
need for inefficient scheduling to accommodate must-run conventional generators.
The interaction between energy and reserve scheduling leads to storage providing
upward reserve at all RES targets, and downward reserve only at high RES
targets. Third, RES targets can be achieved with less RES capacity, as excess
RES generation can be stored instead of curtailed, or generated to be consumed
since the incompressible part of supply is lower. In addition, both BES and
PHS are shown to be valuable technologies. PHS is mainly developed to provide
energy services and energy-intensive reserve products, while investments in BES
mainly serve to provide power-related reserve products. Although they compete
to provide some services, they complement each other to cover the overall
demand for flexibility in the system. Finally, a relationship is shown between
the imposed RES target and installed flexible resources. If due to capacity
legacy or market design conventional flexible capacity is kept operational in the
system, this thus affects the development of alternative flexibility sources.
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Next, its participation in the short-term markets is studied from an operator’s
perspective in Chapter 5 and Chapter 6, and an innovative type of participation
is introduced in Chapter 7. Since a good understanding of these markets is
essential, Chapter 4 first reviews the design of these markets in detail for the
CWE region, and analyzes the implications for flexibility. As such, insights in
whether flexibility is treated consistently and appropriately among the different
geographical and sequential markets are provided. Furthermore, desirable
future reforms are identified. Highlighted reforms include the introduction of ID
auctions, facilitation of passive balancing, increase of cross-border cooperation,
and finer temporal resolutions. Trading volume analyses confirm that the DA
market is by far the largest short-term market. Although the ID market plays
a minor role in terms of trading volume, it has been increasing and is expected
to keep on growing. Finally, the RT market has seen its share of consumption
decrease due to improved RES output forecasts and profiling in the DA and
ID market, and increased ID market liquidity, cross-border cooperation, and
passive balancing. In conclusion, the details of market design are crucial to the
successful integration of RES, as they define the opportunities for flexibility
providers to valorize flexible operations. An open research question remains
whether the current designs with energy-based remuneration are adequate in
highly renewable power systems. Capacity markets, flexibility products, and
operating reserve demand curves can present add-ons to fix current designs.
Chapter 5 studies the trading and operation of storage for a single application,
being day-ahead market arbitrage. A comprehensive formulation of the arbitrage
problem including detailed operating constraints is presented, along with a new
methodology to account for the price-effect of storage, which dictates that storage
generally reduces price spreads by increasing low prices and decreasing high
prices. The most accurate available price-effect data is considered, published by
several European power exchanges as so-called DA market resilience functions.
These show piecewise linear relationships between quantity and price, for which
a stepwise approximation is proposed that is able to reduce computational effort
significantly while providing accurate lower and upper bound approximations.
Results show that the price-effect cannot simply be ignored in trading and
operation analyses for additional large-scale storage capacities. When optimizing
as a price-taker, the power rating will always be used to its full capacity, unless
bounded by the limited energy storage capacity. In contrast, considering
the price-effect leads to (1) fewer full load hours to keep price spreads from
diminishing too much, (2) more operational hours as actions are partially shifted
to smoothen the price-effect, and (3) less (dis)charged energy in total. Due to
the price-effect, a trade-off emerges between the capacity used and the average
profit per unit. Finally, when using Belgian market data from 2014, results show
that DA market arbitrage does not provide adequate revenues to compensate
for the annualized investment cost of PHS in a wide range of scenarios.
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Storage profitability requires aggregating applications, and co-optimizing them
as use for one might interfere with use for others. As such, Chapter 6 extends the
day-ahead market models to allow for the aggregation of arbitrage opportunities.
All three short-term markets are considered, as well as the opportunity to engage
in three types of arbitrage: intertemporal, intermarket, and intertemporal
intermarket. In addition, the price-effect is studied for not only the DA market,
but also for the ID market, and for the RT market by using custom-made
piecewise linear RT market resilience functions. While the DA market is a
conventional revenue source, the ID and RT markets include interesting new
opportunities. Results show that the arbitrage potential for the coupled and
harmonized DA markets is similar in the four CWE market zones, but not
entirely for the partly coupled and harmonized ID markets, and not at all for
the largely noncoupled and nonharmonized RT markets. As storage value differs
between market zones, different locations have to be analyzed in investment
decisions. Differences in storage value among the geographical and sequential
markets are shown to relate to differences in market design. Aggregating
arbitrage opportunities increases the storage value, with the aggregation method,
i.e., separate or coordinated participation, determining the expected additional
value, complexity, and risk. In addition, the price-effect is shown to be much
stronger in the ID market and RT market compared to the DA market. Finally,
the earlier observation stating that considering the price-effect leads to fewer
full load hours, more operational hours, and less overall traded energy, is shown
to be generally applicable independent from the considered short-term market.
The aggregation of applications can not only be achieved by one player, but
also through the co-operation and sharing of storage resources by different
players. As such, Chapter 7 discusses the design of a new market, or market
product within existing markets, to enable such a multi-player storage use, and
thus also the decoupling of storage investment and ownership from storage
trading and operation. A periodically organized auction is presented to allocate
storage resources through so-called physical storage rights between different
market players. Similar to the case of the explicit auctioning of cross-border
capacity through PTRs, first the right to use resources is auctioned, after
which players can use these contracted resources. Incentives to participate may
include the exploitation of economies of scale, mitigation of risk, matching of
complementary flexibility needs, and overcoming of regulatory barriers. The
storage value resulting from the proposed allocation mechanism is shown to
outperform that from a range of fixed a priori allocations. Furthermore, market-
clearings for shorter durations perform better. This ensures that the storage
resources are allocated to the most valuable services at each point in time. The
more players and applications are considered, the more the revenue collected
through the auctioning of physical storage rights converges to the total captured
value of the storage resources in the electricity markets.
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8.2 Suggestions for future work
The suggestions for future work are categorized according to the performed
analyses in the articles presented in Chapter 3 to Chapter 7.
Chapter 3: Role of electricity storage
There are five topics that are suggested for future work. First, an expansion of
the geographical scope to include multiple neighboring market zones, allows to
analyze the role and value of storage under different scenarios for the degree to
which the considered system is interconnected. Due to the increasing coupling of
markets, competition in flexibility supply not only has to be considered locally,
but also across market zones in making operation and investment decisions.
Second, an expansion of the flexibility sources including the participation of
flexible demand, allows to study the impact of the price-responsiveness of the
demand under different scenarios. Third, whereas the reservation of capacity
to provide frequency control is modeled, including the activation of reserves
presents a valuable addition to the current state-of-the-art. Fourth, once (a
subset of) these model additions have been included, the developed model can
be applied to advise specific systems’ policy-makers on market design and energy
policy, and market players on the investment in and operation of storage capacity.
Fifth, the trade-off between using the available computational resources for
accurately modeling short-term operation or to consider uncertainty regarding
input parameters (e.g., fuel prices, investment costs, demand growth) should be
investigated. This contributes to an efficient allocation of the computational
resources to the right areas for each specific application.
Chapter 4: Short-term electricity markets
An important suggestion for future research includes the use of models or
statistical methods to analyze how specific market design rules may affect
the operation and development of different flexibility sources, generation
technologies, and the operation of the system in general. This allows to
quantitatively complement the qualitative study of the article presented in
Chapter 4, thereby providing useful advice concerning future market redesigns.
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Chapter 5: Single-application operation
Suggestions for future work include three topics. First, the estimation of a lower
limit to the arbitrage value under uncertainty in addition to the presented upper
limit, which allows to provide an operating profit range under imperfect price
foresight. The combination of the relaxation of the perfect foresight assumption
and the study of the price-effect has not been considered before. Second,
analyzing the arbitrage application of storage in the context of a portfolio of
generation, storage, and/or consumption units, allows to analyze the effect of
storage ownership on its value and operation, and on other players through
market prices. Third, more complex games in which competing players, both
locally and in neighboring market zones, might react and change their behavior
in response to entry of additional storage capacity is identified as an important
future research topic as well.
Chapter 6: Multi-application operation
In addition to the three suggestions for future research discussed for the article
presented in Chapter 5, which could also all be applied to the models developed
in the article in Chapter 6, expanding the developed models to combine more
storage applications provide a natural extension of the performed work. In
first instance, the aggregation of both different arbitrage opportunities and the
provision of different frequency control products is suggested for future research,
but other services may present equally important topics for future work as well.
Chapter 7: Multi-player operation
Suggestions for future work include the comparison of the explicit auctioning
of storage resources through physical storage rights to a centralized operation
of storage with implicit auctioning and to financial storage rights. In addition,
suggestions include the analysis of different design parameters of the presented
auction (e.g., lead times between the auction and physical delivery, allocation
horizon), as well as the accommodation of flexible demand in this flexibility
platform because of the similarities with electricity storage (e.g., limited
duration). Furthermore, whereas the provided illustrations and case study
focus on the sharing and co-operation of large-scale storage by multiple players,
the applicability to the aggregation of multiple small-scale and decentralized
storage systems is suggested for future research. Finally, the integration of the
presented auction-based allocation platform in the existing electricity market
design, is identified as an important topic for future work.
Appendix A
Mixed complementarity
problem formulations
A.1 Hourly market-clearings
First the MCP formulation for a periodically organized auction with hourly
market-clearings for the shared storage resources is presented. The KKT
conditions of player a are (A.1)-(A.10), while those of player p are (A.11)-(A.23),
and finally the KKT conditions of player r are (A.24)-(A.34). The shared
constraints are represented by (A.35)-(A.37) in the MCP formulation.
Player a:
0 ≤ λda,oh /|H|+ T h · γea,h · ηc + τ ca,h ⊥ pca,h ≥ 0, ∀h ∈ H, (A.1)
0 ≤ −λda,oh /|H| − T h · γea,h/ηd + τda,h ⊥ pda,h ≥ 0, ∀h ∈ H, (A.2)
0 ≤ −γea,h + γea,h+1 + τ ea,h ⊥ ea,h ≥ 0, ∀h ∈ H, (A.3)
0 ≤ −τ ca,h + µch ⊥ pc,maxa,h ≥ 0, ∀h ∈ H, (A.4)
0 ≤ −τda,h + µdh ⊥ pd,maxa,h ≥ 0, ∀h ∈ H, (A.5)
0 ≤ −τ ea,h + µeh ⊥ emaxa,h ≥ 0, ∀h ∈ H, (A.6)
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0 = −ea,h + ea,h-1 + T h · (pca,h · ηc − pda,h/ηd) , γea,h ∈ R, ∀h ∈ H, (A.7)
0 ≤ pc,maxa,h − pca,h ⊥ τ ca,h ≥ 0, ∀h ∈ H, (A.8)
0 ≤ pd,maxa,h − pda,h ⊥ τda,h ≥ 0, ∀h ∈ H, (A.9)
0 ≤ emaxa,h − ea,h ⊥ τ ea,h ≥ 0, ∀h ∈ H. (A.10)
Player p:
0 ≤ γgp,h + T h · γep,h · ηc + τ cp,h ⊥ pcp,h ≥ 0, ∀h ∈ H, (A.11)
0 ≤ −λda,oh /|H| − T h · γep,h/ηd + τdp,h ⊥ pdp,h ≥ 0, ∀h ∈ H, (A.12)
0 ≤ −γep,h + γep,h+1 + τ ep,h ⊥ ep,h ≥ 0, ∀h ∈ H, (A.13)
0 ≤ −λda,oh /|H|+ γgp,h ⊥ pgp,h ≥ 0, ∀h ∈ H, (A.14)
0 ≤ γgp,h ⊥ plp,h ≥ 0, ∀h ∈ H, (A.15)
0 ≤ −τ cp,h + µch ⊥ pc,maxp,h ≥ 0, ∀h ∈ H, (A.16)
0 ≤ −τdp,h + µdh ⊥ pd,maxp,h ≥ 0, ∀h ∈ H, (A.17)
0 ≤ −τ ep,h + µeh ⊥ emaxp,h ≥ 0, ∀h ∈ H, (A.18)
0 = −Ares,absp,h + pcp,h + pgp,h + plp,h , γgp,h ∈ R, ∀h ∈ H, (A.19)
0 = −ep,h + ep,h-1 + T h · (pcp,h · ηc − pdp,h/ηd) , γep,h ∈ R, ∀h ∈ H, (A.20)
0 ≤ pc,maxp,h − pcp,h ⊥ τ cp,h ≥ 0, ∀h ∈ H, (A.21)
0 ≤ pd,maxp,h − pdp,h ⊥ τdp,h ≥ 0, ∀h ∈ H, (A.22)
0 ≤ emaxp,h − ep,h ⊥ τ ep,h ≥ 0, ∀h ∈ H. (A.23)
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Player r:
0 ≤ λrt,oh /|H|+ T h · γer,h · ηc + γlr,h + τ cr,h ⊥ pcr,h ≥ 0, ∀h ∈ H, (A.24)
0 ≤ −λrt,oh /|H| − T h · γer,h/ηd + γlr,h + τdr,h ⊥ pdr,h ≥ 0, ∀h ∈ H, (A.25)
0 ≤ −γer,h + γer,h+1 + τ er,h ⊥ er,h ≥ 0, ∀h ∈ H, (A.26)
0 ≤ −τ cr,h + µch ⊥ pc,maxr,h ≥ 0, ∀h ∈ H, (A.27)
0 ≤ −τdr,h + µdh ⊥ pd,maxr,h ≥ 0, ∀h ∈ H, (A.28)
0 ≤ −τ er,h + µeh ⊥ emaxr,h ≥ 0, ∀h ∈ H, (A.29)
0 ≤ Lmaxr − pcr,h − pdr,h ⊥ γlr,h ≥ 0, ∀h ∈ H, (A.30)
0 = −er,h + er,h-1 + T h · (pcr,h · ηc − pdr,h/ηd) , γer,h ∈ R, ∀h ∈ H, (A.31)
0 ≤ pc,maxr,h − pcr,h ⊥ τ cr,h ≥ 0, ∀h ∈ H, (A.32)
0 ≤ pd,maxr,h − pdr,h ⊥ τdr,h ≥ 0, ∀h ∈ H, (A.33)
0 ≤ emaxr,h − er,h ⊥ τ er,h ≥ 0, ∀h ∈ H. (A.34)
Shared constraints:
0 ≤ P c,max − pc,maxa,h − pc,maxp,h − pc,maxr,h ⊥ µch ≥ 0, ∀h ∈ H, (A.35)
0 ≤ P d,max − pd,maxa,h − pd,maxp,h − pd,maxr,h ⊥ µdh ≥ 0, ∀h ∈ H, (A.36)
0 ≤ Emax − emaxa,h − emaxp,h − emaxr,h ⊥ µeh ≥ 0, ∀h ∈ H. (A.37)
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A.2 Daily market-clearings
Second the MCP formulation for a less dynamic periodically organized auction
(e.g., daily, weekly, monthly) including a single market-clearing, i.e., allocation,
for each of the shared resources for the entire period (e.g., day, week, month)
is presented. In this case, the KKT conditions of player a are (A.38)-(A.47),
of player p are (A.48)-(A.60), and finally of player r are (A.61)-(A.71). The
shared constraints are included through (A.72)-(A.74) in the MCP formulation.
Player a:
0 ≤ λda,oh /|H|+ T h · γea,h · ηc + τ ca,h ⊥ pca,h ≥ 0, ∀h ∈ H, (A.38)
0 ≤ −λda,oh /|H| − T h · γea,h/ηd + τda,h ⊥ pda,h ≥ 0, ∀h ∈ H, (A.39)
0 ≤ −γea,h + γea,h+1 + τ ea,h ⊥ ea,h ≥ 0, ∀h ∈ H, (A.40)
0 ≤
∑
h∈H
(−τ ca,h) + µc ⊥ pc,maxa ≥ 0, (A.41)
0 ≤
∑
h∈H
(−τda,h) + µd ⊥ pd,maxa ≥ 0, (A.42)
0 ≤
∑
h∈H
(−τ ea,h) + µe ⊥ emaxa ≥ 0, (A.43)
0 = −ea,h + ea,h-1 + T h · (pca,h · ηc − pda,h/ηd) , γea,h ∈ R, ∀h ∈ H, (A.44)
0 ≤ pc,maxa − pca,h ⊥ τ ca,h ≥ 0, ∀h ∈ H, (A.45)
0 ≤ pd,maxa − pda,h ⊥ τda,h ≥ 0, ∀h ∈ H, (A.46)
0 ≤ emaxa − ea,h ⊥ τ ea,h ≥ 0, ∀h ∈ H. (A.47)
Player p:
0 ≤ γgp,h + T h · γep,h · ηc + τ cp,h ⊥ pcp,h ≥ 0, ∀h ∈ H, (A.48)
0 ≤ −λda,oh /|H| − T h · γep,h/ηd + τdp,h ⊥ pdp,h ≥ 0, ∀h ∈ H, (A.49)
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0 ≤ −γep,h + γep,h+1 + τ ep,h ⊥ ep,h ≥ 0, ∀h ∈ H, (A.50)
0 ≤ −λda,oh /|H|+ γgp,h ⊥ pgp,h ≥ 0, ∀h ∈ H, (A.51)
0 ≤ γgp,h ⊥ plp,h ≥ 0, ∀h ∈ H, (A.52)
0 ≤
∑
h∈H
(−τ cp,h) + µc ⊥ pc,maxp ≥ 0, (A.53)
0 ≤
∑
h∈H
(−τdp,h) + µd ⊥ pd,maxp ≥ 0, (A.54)
0 ≤
∑
h∈H
(−τ ep,h) + µe ⊥ emaxp ≥ 0, (A.55)
0 = −Ares,absp,h + pcp,h + pgp,h + plp,h , γgp,h ∈ R, ∀h ∈ H, (A.56)
0 = −ep,h + ep,h-1 + T h · (pcp,h · ηc − pdp,h/ηd) , γep,h ∈ R, ∀h ∈ H, (A.57)
0 ≤ pc,maxp − pcp,h ⊥ τ cp,h ≥ 0, ∀h ∈ H, (A.58)
0 ≤ pd,maxp − pdp,h ⊥ τdp,h ≥ 0, ∀h ∈ H, (A.59)
0 ≤ emaxp − ep,h ⊥ τ ep,h ≥ 0, ∀h ∈ H. (A.60)
Player r:
0 ≤ λrt,oh /|H|+ T h · γer,h · ηc + γlr,h + τ cr,h ⊥ pcr,h ≥ 0, ∀h ∈ H, (A.61)
0 ≤ −λrt,oh /|H| − T h · γer,h/ηd + γlr,h + τdr,h ⊥ pdr,h ≥ 0, ∀h ∈ H, (A.62)
0 ≤ −γer,h + γer,h+1 + τ er,h ⊥ er,h ≥ 0, ∀h ∈ H, (A.63)
0 ≤
∑
h∈H
(−τ cr,h) + µc ⊥ pc,maxr ≥ 0, (A.64)
0 ≤
∑
h∈H
(−τdr,h) + µd ⊥ pd,maxr ≥ 0, (A.65)
0 ≤
∑
h∈H
(−τ er,h) + µe ⊥ emaxr ≥ 0, (A.66)
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0 ≤ Lmaxr − pcr,h − pdr,h ⊥ γlr,h ≥ 0, ∀h ∈ H, (A.67)
0 = −er,h + er,h-1 + T h · (pcr,h · ηc − pdr,h/ηd) , γer,h ∈ R, ∀h ∈ H, (A.68)
0 ≤ pc,maxr − pcr,h ⊥ τ cr,h ≥ 0, ∀h ∈ H, (A.69)
0 ≤ pd,maxr − pdr,h ⊥ τdr,h ≥ 0, ∀h ∈ H, (A.70)
0 ≤ emaxr − er,h ⊥ τ er,h ≥ 0, ∀h ∈ H. (A.71)
Shared constraints:
0 ≤ P c,max − pc,maxa − pc,maxp − pc,maxr ⊥ µc ≥ 0, (A.72)
0 ≤ P d,max − pd,maxa − pd,maxp − pd,maxr ⊥ µd ≥ 0, (A.73)
0 ≤ Emax − emaxa − emaxp − emaxr ⊥ µe ≥ 0. (A.74)
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